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There is a long history of street trading restriction 
in South Africa, and the relocation of traders from 
key public spaces in Cape Town, in connection with 
renovation and construction for the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup, highlighted the contested nature of street trading 
in the Cape Town city centre. The Grand Parade, South 
Africa’s oldest public space, sits adjacent to the city’s 
major public transport hub, and plays a vital role in the 
daily lives of many city residents. Therefore, public space 
contestations, and the informal sector’s importance 
in job creation and poverty reduction, necessitate an 
investigation into the impacts of the City of Cape Town’s 
street trading management approach on the livelihood 
strategies of traders on the Parade. 
I review relevant literature on street trading 
management, and develop criteria for assessing the City 
of Cape Town’s street trading management approach. 
These criteria are linked to Lefebvre’s (1968) and 
Fainstein’s (2010) concepts of ‘the right to the city’ and 
‘the just city’ respectively. The main research question 
thus asks: What is the impact of the City of Cape Town’s 
street trading management approach on the livelihood 
strategies of traders on the Grand Parade? The research 
uses the case study and discourse analysis methods to 
address this question. Data is collected through non-
participant observation and individual semi-structured 
interview techniques. The focus is on capturing the 
views and experiences of traders on the Grand Parade. 
The research findings indicate that the City of Cape 
Town tends to adopt a more restrictive approach to 
managing traders on the Grand Parade, and that this 
has, effectively, a negative impact on trader livelihoods. 
This approach serves to produce informal arrangements, 
aggression and resistance on the part of traders. A 
disjuncture is found between the stated developmental 
approach of the City’s Informal Trading Policy (informed 
by national developmental policies) and its practices. The 
combination of organisational restructuring processes, 
confused mandates as well as the low political and 
funding priority given to street trading management 
has meant that the complex of socio-economic factors 
and persistent management issues on the Parade, that 
require interdepartmental cooperation to address, 
continue to negatively impact trader livelihoods.
I recommend that the City of Cape Town, in line with 
the aims contained in its Informal Trading Policy, and 
inspired by the ‘eThekwini model’, implement a more 
progressive street trading management approach that 
is based on participatory and area-based approaches. 
A dedicated focus on capacitating trader organisations 
through training initiatives is recommended, as well as 
changes to trading permit application processes and 
conditions. Lastly, specific recommendations are also 
made to better enable livelihood strategies of street 
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1.1. Purpose of this Chapter
I did this because there was no way for me to get by 
and I thought, let me find a way.
Female trader in the Cape Town city centre (Sassen, 
2014: Online)
This dissertation investigates the impact of the City 
of Cape Town’s street trading management approach 
on the livelihood strategies1 of traders on the Grand 
Parade, a historic public space in the Cape Town city 
centre. This chapter serves to introduce the issue under 
investigation, together with the main research question 
of the study. The first section defines the meanings of 
‘informal trading’ and ‘street trading, and why I make use 
of the latter term in this dissertation. This is followed by 
a discussion of the context for establishing the research 
issue by presenting an overview of the history of 
informal trading policy in South Africa. The third section 
establishes the issue under investigation, and the case 
study area, namely the Grand Parade, is introduced. 
The aim of my research is then discussed in the fourth 
section. The main research question is presented in 
the fifth and final section of this chapter, folllowed by 
a brief outline of the structure of the remainder of this 
dissertation.
1  Livelihood strategies are defined as those activities 
undertaken by households to provide a means of living (Eneyew and 
Bekele, 2012).
1.2. Informal Trading and Street 
Trading
In defining ‘informal trading’, I seek to adopt a more 
nuanced understanding of what this term entails. 
Through presenting the myriad meanings of ‘informal 
trading’, I refrain from attempting to establish universal 
categories that supposedly apply everywhere. By 
establishing universal categories, research can fall into 
the trap that postmodern, poststructural, postcolonial 
and decolonial scholars argue against.
Castells and Portes (1989:15) define ‘informal’ activities 
as means of income generation that are “unregulated 
by the institutions of society, in a legal and social 
environment in which similar activities are regulated”. 
One can view informal trading as part of the ‘smaller-
scale’ informal economic sector. I use the term ‘smaller-
scale’ here to distinguish between ‘larger-scale’ drug/
human trafficking, money laundering, etc. (Simone, 
2001) and, for example, selling goods on a pavement 
without a permit. There has long been a view that 
marginalised people use an economically and spatially 
contained ‘informal sector’2 temporarily for survival until 
they can enter the ‘formal sector’ (Skinner and Haysom, 
2016). A number of commentators note this has been 
2  Stats SA (2016:xxiii) define the informal sector as having: 
“i) Employees working in establishments that employ fewer than 
five employees, who do not deduct income tax from their salaries/
wages; and ii) Employers, own-account workers and persons helping 
unpaid in their household business who are not registered for either 
income tax or value-added tax.”   
replaced by a realisation of informality’s permanence 
for many new urban citizens. It defines the landscape, 
economy and politics of contemporary African cities 
(Skinner and Haysom, 2016; Tranberg-Hansen and Vaa, 
2002; Simone, 2004).
It is important to understand how the City of Cape Town 
defines informal trading. The Informal Trading By-Law 
of 2013 (CoCT, 2013:4) defines informal trading as “the 
trading in goods and services in the informal sector by 
an informal trader”. This includes trading in streets, 
pedestrian malls, markets, transport interchanges, and 
public open spaces. Other forms listed include “mobile 
trading, such as from caravans, and light delivery 
vehicles, roving traders, trading at special events …
[and] beach trading.” (ibid.). The By-law also defines an 
‘informal trader’ as “a person, or an enterprise which is 
not registered or incorporated in terms of the corporate 
laws of South Africa and which engages in informal 
trading” (ibid.). A ‘market’ is defined as “a demarcated 
area within a trading area which is designated as such 
in a trading plan and which is managed in a coordinated 
manner” (ibid.). 
The types of trading occurring on the Grand Parade (cf. 
Chapter 3) most closely correspond to the following 
three categories as defined by the City’s Informal 
Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013): Public Markets, Trading in 
Public Open Spaces and Street/kerbside trading. “Public 
Markets” are markets operating on public land such as 
flea and craft markets, among others. “Trading in Public 
Open Spaces” refers to trading that occurs in public open 
12
spaces including parks, parking areas and cemeteries. 
Lastly, “Street/kerbside trading” is trading that occurs 
from city-allocated bays on pavements and kerbs (CoCT, 
2013:9).
Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) draws on Castells and Portes’ 
(1989) definition of the informal, and argues that the 
idea of informality is thus linked to management and by-
laws, and the way in which these are defined. The by-laws 
define the boundary between informality and formality. 
This boundary is not fixed; it shifts often (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2015). Depending on by-laws, or for example a trader’s 
location in a demarcated or prohibited area, they are 
either formal or informal. Traders in markets or buildings 
can thus also be seen as either formal or informal (ibid.) 
Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) argues that ‘street trading’ is any 
trade occurring on a street: commonly a pavement, but 
also including pedestrianised streets that can be seen 
as extensions of pavements. It is important to use the 
term ‘informal’ when referring to street trading, so as 
to distinguish ‘informal street trading’ from other legal 
activities that take place along public streets, like, for 
example, outdoor cafes.
Furthermore, I draw a distinction between informal 
street traders who have legal permits to trade and 
informal street traders who are rendered illegal by not 
being able to access a permit. There are more than 
two types of trading in public spaces: i.e. legal traders 
(who tend to be concentrated in designated spaces) and 
illegal traders (who are ‘unregulated’ and who ‘infringe’ 
upon by-laws).  However, as the focus of my research is 
‘public space’ I maintain this distinction between legal 
and illegal in order to analyse the processes that serve 
to legalise or criminalise trading in public space. 
The use of the term ‘informal’ in my study is to denote 
unregulated (smaller-scale) economic activities (that 
take place in public spaces). While informal trading on 
the Grand Parade takes place both in a public open 
space, a market and as street/kerbside trading, for the 
purposes of this study I use the term ‘street trading’, 
as a form of shorthand. For the rest of this chapter and 
in Chapter 2, I also use it as a synonym for ‘informal 
trading’ when this occurs on streets (and other public 
spaces), as many authors and city authorities use these 
terms interchangeably. From Chapter 3 onwards, I use 
the term ‘street trading’ exclusively.
1.3. The Background to the Study: an 
overview of the history of informal 
trading policy in South Africa
South Africa has a long history of informal trading. 
Colonial and apartheid policies sought to eliminate 
informal trading from city centres and ‘white areas’ by 
using forceful means to harass ‘hawkers’ – as informal 
traders were pejoratively called. For example, during 
the colonial period, authorities in major centres such 
as Cape Town engaged in tight control of informal 
trading by limiting the number of trading licenses issued 
(Rogerson and Hart, 1989). This was a tactic to ensure 
that access to this form of livelihood opportunity was 
strictly limited. License limitation was not effective in 
preventing people from trading, as the numbers of 
unlicensed traders increased despite facing harassment 
and confiscation of goods (ibid.)
Beall and Preston-Whyte (1985) highlight the manner in 
which informal trade was curtailed by colonial authorities 
in Durban in the early twentieth century. Nesvag (2000) 
argues that, until the 1930s, the regulation of street 
trade was not as punitively regulated as it would 
be under the Apartheid regime. Policies were only 
moderately effective, as they were often contradictory 
and contained many loopholes (Nesvag, 2000).
Many of these loopholes were addressed by the 
Apartheid legislation that followed. Specifically, these 
were the Group Areas Act (1950) and the Black (Urban 
Areas) Consolidation Act (1945). The first prevented 
black South Africans access to better trading sites in 
city centres declared for ‘whites’, and the second even 
restricted economic activities in so-called ‘black urban 
areas’, which were often townships located on urban 
peripheries. According to Rogerson and Hart (1989: 32), 
South African city authorities “fashioned and refined 
some of the most sophisticated sets of anti-street trader 
measures anywhere in the developing world”. They note 
that until the early 1980s, traders in South Africa were 
subject to “a well-entrenched tradition of repression, 
persecution and prosecution” (ibid.). During the mid-
1980s, influx control laws became less enforceable and 
were repealed in 1986, while in 1991, the Businesses Act 
removed many barriers to informal economic activity, 
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and made enforcement of the ‘move-on’ laws an offence 
(Skinner, 2008b). Skinner observes that this relaxation of 
legislation controlling informal street trading in the early 
1990s led to a dramatic increase in trading in all South 
African cities and towns.
Only since the fall of Apartheid, has the informal sector 
been recognised as pivotal for the growth of the national 
economy and essential in job creation and poverty 
reduction. Rogan and Skinner (2017) estimate that more 
than 2.5 million people are employed in the informal 
economy in South Africa, making up 16.4% of the total 
workforce.  Just over half of them are self-employed, 
and the remainder are employees. This is significant 
in the context of a country with high unemployment. 
The informal economy plays a large role in access to 
employment for the poorest and most vulnerable 
sections of society, with around 37% of South Africa’s 
working low-income individuals involved in the informal 
economy (Turok et al., 2017). Sokanyile (2016) notes the 
City of Cape Town’s latest economic performance figures 
indicate that informal trade is the city’s second largest 
employment sector, providing more than 160 000 jobs, 
with significant growth in jobs occurring in recent years. 
Informal trading is vital not only for job creation and poverty 
reduction, but also aids in improving self-worth, as shown 
by the words of a female trader on the Grand Parade: 
I had a very long period where I was unemployed, 
but since trading here I must say I feel my dignity as a 
mother has been restored
(Sokanyile, 2016: Online).
However very little has in fact been done to support 
informal trading, and most actions taken can be seen 
as efforts at ‘formalisation’, such as creating restricted 
trading areas and making license payments a condition 
of recognition (Steck et al., 2013). There has been 
an increase in harassment of traders through the 
enforcement of municipal by-laws, with many of these 
drawing on colonial era by-laws (Skinner, 2008b). A 
contemporary case of harassment is seen by the mass 
evictions of around 7000 street traders in Johannesburg 
in October 2013 as part of the City of Johannesburg’s 
‘Operation Clean Sweep’ (SERI, 2015). Operation Clean 
Sweep resulted in stock confiscations and deprived 
traders of their trading locations, with police giving no 
cohesive explanation for the evictions (Nxumalo, 2013). 
Commentators have called the operation a “brutal, 
arbitrary, and contemptuous way for the state to solve 
urban issues” (Benit-Gbaffou et al., 2014:3).
According to Skinner (2000:55), these contemporary 
municipal by-laws were drafted using the Businesses Act 
that aims to promote informal trading, however most 
of these by-laws contain clauses that “prevent traders 
from obstructing movement, prevent unsafe stacking of 
goods…and ensure that traders keep their sites clean”. 
The language used thus indicates a restrictive attitude 
by City officials to informal trade management. But it 
makes no mention of participatory consultation with 
traders to ascertain their true needs.
1.4 Identifying the issue under study
The National Development Plan (NDP) outlines the 
need to “pilot mechanisms and incentives to assist the 
unemployed to access the labour market” (National 
Planning Commission, 2012). The principle of spatial 
justice in the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management 
Act of 2013 (SPLUMA), calls for “past spatial and 
development imbalances [to] be redressed through 
improved access to and use of land”, and “the inclusion of 
persons and areas previously excluded” (SPLUMA, 2013: 
18). Secondly, the principle of good administration in 
this Act calls for the inclusion of “transparent processes 
of public participation that afford all parties the 
opportunity to provide inputs on matters affecting them; 
and policies, legislation and procedures [that] must be 
clearly set in order to inform and empower members of 
the public” (ibid.). Informal traders have been included 
in participatory and consultative processes in the city of 
Cape Town. However, the degree of participation is often 
uneven, the representivity often contested and the level 
of bargaining power often minimal (Steck et al., 2013).
Deakin (1999:2), in an effort to define social equity in 
planning, notes that equity, fairness, and justice can 
function as synonyms, and defines the meaning of justice 
as having “a basis in fact, and [following] established 
rules and procedures to produce an impartial result”. 
Planners need to be aware that justice requires an 
examination of how gains and losses are distributed, 
and that compensatory action is sometimes required 
(Deakin, 1999). Planning can be seen as a means to 
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improve physical and economic conditions for people, 
particularly for the most under-resourced, and thus the 
challenge for planners is how to promote participatory 
democracy and positive social change (ibid.).
The motivation for doing this research is that equitable 
planning processes and outcomes are important for 
informal traders. This is due to the long history in South 
Africa of repressive policies towards informal trading, 
and that post-1994 there has been little in the way of 
support for informal trading in urban centres, or even 
the creation of an enabling environment for trading 
to occur. Municipal governments seldom see informal 
traders as actors with agency, who can actively engage 
with authorities and have an impact on planning 
processes and outcomes that affect their livelihoods. 
The fragmentary relationships between informal 
trader organisations are a contributing factor (Pezzano, 
2011; Didier et al, 2012). Equitable informal trading 
management processes could have a significant impact 
in creating outcomes that are more supportive and 
enabling of traders’ livelihood strategies.
But why focus on informal trading in the inner city of 
Cape Town specifically? 
[T]hrough a combination of brute force, dispossession
and expropriation, and the imposition of negative laws
and sanction…. [t]he right of blacks to live in the city 
were constantly under threat, if not denied in full. . . . 
[T]his is why most social struggle of the post-apartheid
era can be read as attempts to reconquer the right to
be urban.
 (Mbembé, 2004: 391).
Miraftab (2007) argues that since the 17th century, white 
settlers in the Western Cape have dispossessed Khoisan 
people of land and cattle (and thus wealth), exploited 
the slave labour of Africans and South and South East 
Asians, and extracted natural resources to support 
wealth accumulation by the “expansionist mercantile 
capitalist class in the [Cape Town] metropol” (Miraftab, 
2007:603). Miraftab draws a line from here, via the 
1913 Land Act that confined indigenous people to 
‘homelands’ and excluded them from cities, to the 1950 
Group Areas Act that further socially structured urban 
space to the exclusion and exploitation of a “racialised 
urban labour force” (ibid.). The argument that Miraftab 
makes is that the urban management strategy adopted 
by Cape Town since 2000, as implemented by the 
Central City Improvement District (CCID) in the central 
city “restructure[s] urban space to serve the ideal of 
a world-class city integrated into the global economy, 
at the cost of the city’s social and spatial integration” 
(Miraftab, 2007:603). It is thus a continuation of the 
exclusionary practices of the past. However, Miraftab 
notes, as the CCID’s “contentious neoliberal processes try 
to marketise public urban spaces, [they are] challenged 
both within and outside the [CCID’s] management 
structures” (ibid.). She argues that the tensions that 
the CCID embodies “are rooted in Cape Town’s colonial 
struggle between dispossession and citizenship claims, 
between imposed elitist fantasies of urban planning 
and the local realities”, that this encounter is far from 
approaching equilibrium, and that the manner in which 
these tensions will be resolved is not clear (ibid.).
In this study, I focus on the historic core of Cape Town, 
loosely defined as the central business district (CBD), 
which was a designated “white area” under Apartheid. 
This is done for the following two reasons: firstly, the 
historical significance of the area as a “contested space 
central to the struggle over citizenship and the right to 
the city ever since the first Western settlers arrived” 
(Miraftab, 2007:603); and secondly, the significant 
economic contribution of the area to the tax income 
of the City of Cape Town, as well as its vital role in the 
lives of the city’s low income residents, whose livelihood 
strategies are closely connected to the city centre’s 
public transport hub, informal markets and public 
squares (Miraftab, 2007).  The specific case study area 
is the Grand Parade, a public square that sits adjacent 
to the Cape Town station and plays a prominent role in 
these livelihood strategies.
The Grand Parade is South Africa’s oldest public space 
and is a declared Provincial Heritage Site. It sits in the 
historic core of Cape Town, bordered by some of the 
City’s most iconic buildings, and is at the heart of a civic 
spine leading from Parliament to the Civic Centre. It 
has served as a multifunctional place where the diverse 
people of Cape Town have traded, bought food, debated, 
protested and been entertained. It was the place where 
Nelson Mandela’s first public address occurred after his 
release from 27 years in prison on Robben Island. The 
historical significance of the site stretches back to pre-
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colonial times, as Stone Age tools have been discovered 
in the vicinity of the Grand Parade, and seasonal 
pastoralist settlements are known to have been located 
on the site (Abrahams, 1993). 
Despite the strategic metropolitan importance of the 
Grand Parade as a public open space that acts as a link 
between the city centre, the Castle, Cape Town Station, 
and the City Hall, there is currently no public policy 
position or plan for the future of the site. While the 
Central City Development Strategy (CTP, 2008) and the 
Fringe Urban Design Framework (GBUSPD, 2012), both 
produced for the Cape Town Partnership and the City 
of Cape Town, outline plans for the broader ‘East City’ 
context, little mention is made of the Grand Parade. 
When the Parade is directly addressed, it is stated that 
it “(will) continue to be a multi-use public space, but 
in a more formalised way” and that it will “become a 
more internally focused space with its edges (such as 
the north side abutting the bus terminus) attracting 
new investment such as office and commercial 
developments.” (GBUSPD, 2012:16). This leads one to 
speculate as to whether the Grand Parade is part of a 
process to ‘formalise’ and ‘package’ the site for future 
development.
Both the Cape Town Partnership and the City of Cape 
Town acknowledge that these two policy documents are 
outdated, however no revised policy documents have 
replaced them, and as such confusion is created as to 
the future of the Grand Parade and the broader East City 
Precinct. As the City is currently perceived by certain 
sectors of the public as having a pro-developer focus 
(Gosling, 2017), one wonders what this policy confusion 
could mean for the traders on the Grand Parade and 
their dependants, as well as the broader public who on 
a daily basis make use of this vital historic open space in 
a multitude of ways.
While the City of Cape Town recognises the importance 
of informal trading, which it says “contributes around 
12% to Cape Town’s economy and is a major creator of 
employment” (CTP, 2017), there is clearly more that can 
be done to enable informal trading in the Cape Town city 
centre and on the Grand Parade. 
1.5. Establishing the Aim of the Study
The contested nature of the Grand Parade necessitates 
an investigation into the impacts of the City of Cape 
Town’s street trading management approach on the 
livelihood strategies of traders on the Parade. A detailed 
understanding of these impacts can aid in crafting policy 
and management proposals to better enable these 
livelihood strategies. 
Accordingly, this study aims to:
• Identify, describe, and analyse the impacts of the
City of Cape Town’s street trading management
approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on
the Grand Parade
• Provide City officials and planners with
recommendations on how better to enable the
livelihood strategies of street traders on the Grand
Parade
These are the over-arching aims of my research. It is 
to a discussion of the main research question that this 
chapter now turns. 
1.6. Establishing the Main Research 
Question
The main research question, which is shaped by the issue 
identified above, as well as the aims of the research, 
asks:
What is the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management approach on the livelihood 
strategies of traders on the Grand Parade?
In order to answer the main research question, a 
selection of research methods and techniques will be 
employed. The former consists of the case study and 
discourse analysis methods. The latter entails the use of 
semi-structured interviews, both with informal traders 
and city officials, as well as field observations of informal 
trading on the Grand Parade. The fact that I will make use 
of two different research techniques, namely interviews 
and field observations, will allow for verification of the 
qualitative research findings. Each will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3. The next chapter (Chapter 
2) contains a literature review that is used to establish
subsidiary research questions and assessment criteria
against which the findings are analysed. However, before
turning to the next chapter, this chapter concludes with
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a brief outline of the structure of the remainder of the 
dissertation. 
1.6. Structure of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 contains an in-depth review of the relevant 
literature. This literature review will be used to establish 
subsidiary research questions. In turn, criteria for 
assessing the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management approach on the livelihood 
strategies of traders on the Grand Parade will be derived 
from these subsidiary research questions.
Chapter 3 outlines the qualitative research methods and 
techniques used to undertake this study. Case study and 
discourse analysis research methods, and the related 
techniques, will be identified and discussed at length 
in this chapter. The case under study will be introduced 
in more detail. In turn, the limitations of the methods 
and techniques used to collect data for this study will 
be discussed. The chapter will end with a discussion on 
how the data will be analysed. 
Chapter 4 provides a context of the history of street 
trading on the Grand Parade, as well as current 
management arrangements.
Chapter 5 describes and analyses the data collected 
using the assessment criteria established in Chapter 
2 to evaluate the impact of the City of Cape Town’s 
street trading management approach on the livelihood 
strategies of traders on the Grand Parade.
Chapter 6 begins by providing answers to the main and 
subsidiary research questions. In so doing, the research 
findings are synthesised. The chapter will then go on to 
present policy and other planning recommendations 
on how the issues identified in the study might be 
resolved. Some of the recommendations are developed 
from the ‘solutions’ suggested by the literature. Other 
recommendations are drawn from the research findings, 
and are hence situated and context-specific.






The central political challenge is to empower insurgent 
interests in the city to claim their rights, entitlements 
and interests through the available participatory 
democratic forums. 
(Pieterse 2004:101)
The purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to review the 
relevant literature on the issue under study. Secondly, 
it is to establish subsidiary research questions for the 
purpose of guiding my fieldwork, in pursuance of the 
aim of this study (cf. Chapter 1). Criteria against which 
the case will be evaluated are also established, with 
research findings presented in Chapter 5. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 
2.2 begins with a discussion of the importance of the 
informal economy in South Africa. Section 2.3 gives an 
overview of the informal sector policy environment 
at national and provincial levels. Section 2.4, in turn, 
establishes the disjuncture between developmental 
state policies and restrictive municipal street trading 
management practices. This discussion covers concepts 
such as the right to the city, the just city and the nature 
of participatory spaces in urban decision-making in 
South Africa. Section 2.5 contains an interrogation of the 
meanings surrounding management and regulation, and 
then goes on to discuss the elements of both progressive 
and restrictive street trading management approaches. 
Section 2.6 discusses the value and importance of 
‘genius loci’, or ‘a sense of place’, for planning and 
trading in public spaces, while section 2.7 summarises 
local and global South case examples that demonstrate 
innovative and progressive street trading management 
approaches. Common elements are also identified from 
these approaches. Section 2.8. turns to a discussion of 
street trader organisations and politics. This chapter 
concludes, in section 2.9, with the main arguments put 
forward, and a summary table of the subsidiary research 
questions asked and the accompanying assessment 
criteria identified.
2.2. The importance of the informal 
economy
The South African informal sector, though smaller than in 
other developing countries (Skinner and Haysom, 2016), 
is an important employment source, and contributes 
5.2% to the country’s gross domestic product (Stats SA, 
2016). It represented 16.4% of total employment in the 
country in 2016, with women making up 38% of total 
informal sector employment (Stats SA 2016). Foreign 
migrants are common in the sector, but not well captured 
in national survey data (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). 
This is because they are often excluded from formal jobs 
and have to create their own employment (Crush et al. 
2015). For example, a survey of Zimbabwean migrants in 
Johannesburg and Cape Town in 2010 showed that 20% 
of all migrants were employed informally (Crush and 
Tawodzera 2011). Trading made up 40.5% of all informal 
sector activity in 2016 (Stats SA 2016), and Skinner and 
Haysom (2016) note that the informal and the formal 
sectors are closely intertwined, with mutual trading and 
exchange occurring.
2.2.1. Food security
In 2014, 67% of street traders in South Africa were selling 
food (Stats SA, 2014), showing that food trade dominates 
informal retail. A survey of street traders in Durban in 
2003 found that 60% were selling food (Skinner 2008b), 
while a 2012 study of Delft in Cape Town showed that 
64% of informal businesses were selling food and/
or beverages (Charman et al 2012). Informal trading 
is a vital source of employment and income for poor 
households, aiding access to food (Skinner and Haysom, 
2016). There is an interdependent relationship between 
street traders and formal fresh produce markets in 
Cape Town (Ortiz 2015 in Skinner and Haysom, 2016), 
surfacing the existence of informal – formal linkages. 
The importance of the informal sector in food sourcing 
by poorer households is highlighted in a household 
food security survey conducted in eleven Southern 
African cities in 2011. This showed that around 66% of 
households in poorer areas normally source their food 
from informal outlets, with the majority purchasing at 
least once a week (Crush and Frayne 2011:799 cited in 
Skinner and Haysom, 2016). While supermarkets also 
provide access to food, their expansion in low-income 
areas of Cape Town is “often incompatible with the 
consumption strategies of the poorest households, 
revealing the significance of the informal economy” 
(Peyton et al. 2015:36 cited in Skinner and Haysom, 
2016). 
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Skinner and Haysom (2016) argue that urban food 
security is enabled through the use of multiple and 
varied food access strategies, with street trading being 
but one. In addition, they argue that access can be 
enabled or hindered by spatial planning and food system 
inequalities among others, which are facilitated through 
policy, governance and the market across various scales 
(Skinner and Haysom, 2016). Therefore street trading 
management and spatial planning must incorporate food 
security considerations into decision-making processes. 
One convenient aspect of informal food businesses is 
that when located near transport hubs, they provide 
access to food for those who have to leave home too 
early to eat breakfast (Krige, 2017). They offer meals or 
snacks that can easily be eaten on the go. Additionally, 
they often trade at peak consumer demand times, 
and thus are available when needed, in contrast to 
more formal businesses with strict operating hours. 
Petersen et al. (2017 cited in Krige, 2017) propose that 
an interconnected approach is necessary to provide 
support for informal food traders. They suggest one form 
of support could be the installation of bulk refrigeration 
to help keep stock fresh for longer.
2.2.2. The importance of street 
trading in Cape Town
Street trading plays an important role in Cape Town’s 
local economy and urban landscape. A CCID pedestrian 
survey in the city centre in 2014 showed that 73% of 
respondents shopped at informal traders (CCID, 2015). 
A 2015 CTP survey of people interviewed while they 
were shopping at informal traders, showed that the 
majority worked in the CBD, shopped regularly at 
informal traders, and that food, cigarettes and clothing 
were the most common purchases (Nteta, 2015). 
Most people surveyed also viewed informal trade as a 
necessary economic activity in the city centre. As noted 
in Chapter 1, informal trade is the city’s second largest 
employment sector, providing more than 160 000 jobs, 
with significant growth in jobs occurring in recent years 
(Sokanyile, 2016; cf. Chapter 1). Lastly, informal trading 
is vital not only for job creation and poverty reduction, 
but also aids in improving self-worth for marginalised 
Capetonians (ibid.; cf. Chapter 1).
2.3. Informal Sector Policy 
environment
2.3.1. National Government
Chapter 1 highlighted the repressive colonial and 
Apartheid-era policies that sought to eliminate informal 
trading from city centres, thus strictly limiting livelihood 
opportunities for marginalised South Africans. While 
the Businesses Act of 1991 removed many barriers to 
informal trading, it gave local governments the power 
to limit street trading and determine the locations and 
manner in which street trading could occur. A trader 
was rendered illegal by trading without a license, 
outside of designated areas, or in contravention of 
permit conditions. Thus, the Act was similar in spirit to 
preceding colonial and apartheid regulations (van der 
Heijden, 2012). In addition, the standard by-laws passed 
as a result of this Act, deal with street trading under 
criminal rather than administrative law, and therefore 
violations are sanctioned more harshly than if this was 
an administrative matter (ibid.). 
Post 1994, the White Paper on the Development and 
Promotion of Small Businesses of 1995 was the first 
policy that acknowledged survivalist and entrepreneurial 
informal businesses as part of small business in South 
Africa (RSA, 1995). Rogerson’s (2004: 765) 10 year review 
of the impact of the government’s small, medium and 
micro enterprise (SMME) programmes concluded that 
they “to a large extent have bypassed micro-enterprises 
and the informal economy”. From 2003 onwards, 
President Mbeki argued that the informal sector was a 
‘second economy’ that was ‘structurally disconnected’ 
from the first and the global economy, and not capable 
of generating its own growth and development (Devey 
et al., 2006). This is a false dichotomy, as research shows 
that the formal and informal economies are closely 
interconnected (Devey et al, 2006). The Accelerated 
Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) even 
went so far as to call for the “elimination of the second 
economy” (RSA 2006:11). 
Only with the National Development Plan, launched 
in 2012, did the focus shift to the importance of small 
business. The NDP targeted the creation of 11 million 
jobs by 2030 and argued that 90% of these new jobs 
will be created by SMMEs (NPC, 2012). However the 
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plan did not address how existing informal businesses 
will be supported, or how existing barriers to entry 
will be removed to generate these new jobs (Fourie, 
2015). The Department of Small Business Development 
(DSBD) was created in 2014 to respond to the small 
business focus in the NDP. However, the Draft Business 
Licensing Bill (DTI, 2013) released in 2013, highlighted 
government intentions to regulate the informal sector. 
The Bill specified that a license would be required by 
anyone involved in business activities, irrespective of 
size. Commentators view the Bill as mostly punitive, 
arguing that it would result in large-scale criminalisation 
of current livelihood activities, as well as discriminate 
against foreign migrants by trying to exclude them 
(Crush et al., 2015; Rogerson, 2016; Turok et al., 2017). 
It is currently under review (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). 
In 2014, the government launched the National Informal 
Business Upliftment Strategy (NIBUS) (DTI, 2014). This 
is the first post-apartheid national government policy 
statement on the informal sector (Skinner and Haysom, 
2016). NIBUS proposed a strategy to enable the 
formalisation and integration of informal businesses into 
the formal economy (Turok et al., 2017). It suggested 
interventions to address infrastructure and skills 
deficits in informal businesses, such as financing, skills 
development and infrastructure measures (ibid.). Turok 
et al. (2017) observe that the strategy has not resulted 
in much improvement in the operating environment for 
most informal traders. They argue that NIBUS is in need 
of refinement and more systematic implementation, and 
that it has also not helped municipalities in dealing with 
the reality of tensions between support for the informal 
economy and other competing interests (ibid.). 
2.3.2. Provincial government policies
Provinces have been slow in supporting and regulating 
the informal sector, despite their mandate to do so 
(Skinner and Haysom, 2016).  The KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) 
Informal Economy Policy of 2011 (KZNPG, 2011) has not 
been developed into a White Paper, but the Western 
Cape Informal Sector Framework (2014) at least refers to 
the informal sector’s role in food security (WCPG, 2014). 
However, government informal economy initiatives 
often show neglect of spatial divisions (Turok et al., 
2017). They ignore differences between areas and do 
not acknowledge and enable connections between the 
formal and informal sectors. Turok et al. (2017) argue 
that government strategies hardly revise or streamline 
existing legislation that hinders informal businesses.
2.4. South Africa: The disjuncture 
in approaches to street trading 
management
In South Africa, it is a constitutional requirement that 
public participation be undertaken by local authorities 
in order to build “a capable, accountable and responsive 
state that works effectively for its citizens” (NPC, 
2012). This participatory approach is seen by municipal 
governments as reconciling their business-friendly 
agenda with residents’ ‘right to the city’, a principle 
understood as meeting socio-economic and other needs 
(Steck et al., 2013). Suggestions of the ‘right to the city’ 
in South Africa’s contemporary public policies include 
principles embodied in the Bill of Rights of the national 
Constitution of 1996, such as the rights to equality; 
freedom of movement and residence; freedom of trade, 
occupation and profession; and access to adequate 
housing, basic services and education (RSA, 1996). But 
what exactly is this ‘right to the city’, and how would 
the principles embodied in the Bill of Rights be achieved 
in urban policies and practices affecting street trading 
management?
2.4.1. Right to the city
The phrase ‘the right to the city’ was first used by Henri 
Lefebvre as the title of a 1968 work (”Le Droit à la ville”) 
that criticised the commodification and privatisation 
of urban space (Lefebvre, 1968). In Purcell’s (2013) 
interpretation, Lefebvre argues that in the prevailing 
liberal-democratic framework in which capitalism 
operates, the property rights of owners dominate over 
the use rights of inhabitants, and the exchange value of 
property, rather than its social use value, determines 
how it is used. The right to the city is thus commonly 
understood as a struggle to enhance citizens’ rights 
against the property rights of owners (ibid.).
Purcell (2013) argues that Lefebvre’s conception of the 
right to the city is about the right to participation and 
the right to appropriate urban space. Firstly, the right 
to participation entails the right of inhabitants to play 
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a key role in decision-making processes involving the 
production of urban space at all scales. “Unlike the 
indirect nature of liberal-democratic enfranchisement 
in which the voice of citizens is filtered through the 
institutions of the state, the right to the city would 
see inhabitants contribute directly to all decisions that 
produce urban space in their city” (Purcell, 2013: 102). 
Secondly, the right to appropriate urban space means 
that it should be produced in a way that enables the “full 
and complete use” of urban space by inhabitants in their 
daily lives. It thus encompasses the “right to live in, play 
in, work in, represent, characterize and occupy urban 
space.” (Purcell, 2013: 103). Purcell (2013:149) gives a 
useful rationale to this appropriation:
In claiming a right to the city, inhabitants take 
urban space as their own, they appropriate what is 
properly theirs. Property rights, for Lefebvre, are an 
expropriation of urban space. They take what properly 
belongs to inhabitants of a community and arrogate it 
to property owners, to those who bought land in the 
marketplace. Appropriation is thus a ‘right’ in the sense 
that users have a normative right to the space of the 
city. It is rightfully theirs.
Inhabitants’ rights to appropriate and to participate 
are achieved through active participation in the making 
and re-making of the city (ibid.). Thus, the right to the 
city has to be realised through collective action, and 
needs solidarity and new forms of alliances between 
inhabitants (Horlitz and Vogelpohl, 2009). 
In the global South, it was in Brazil that the first initiatives 
for the right to the city appeared. According to Saule 
Júnior (2008 cited in Görgens and van Donk, 2012: 4):
The Right to the City arises as a response to the 
panorama of social inequality, considering the duality 
experienced in the same city: the city of the rich and the 
city of the poor; the legal city and the illegal city, as well 
as the exclusion of the majority of the city’s inhabitants 
determined by the logic of spatial segregation; by the 
commodity city; by the mercantilization of urban soil 
and real-estate appraisal; by the private appropriation of 
public investments in housing, in public transportation, 
in urban equipment, and in public services in general.
The stark inequalities in resource distribution and the 
spatial exclusion of South African cities parallel this 
argument, and call for greater justice in urban decision 
making. But how can this be achieved?
2.4.2. The just city
A ‘just city’ is a:
[C]ity in which public investment and regulation would
produce equitable outcomes rather than support those
already well off.
(Fainstein, 2010: 3)
Fainstein (2010:3) argues that the idea of what is injust 
is almost instinctive, and “consists of actions that 
disadvantage those who already have less or who are 
excluded from entitlements enjoyed by others who 
are no more deserving”. She observes that despite 
much planning and public policy literature detailing 
appropriate decision-making processes, there is little 
focus on which policies would result in more urban 
justice. In addition, she argues, most policy analysis 
deals with best practices concerning specific planning 
goals, but does not interrogate the wider objectives of 
these policies (ibid.). 
In response, Fainstein (2010) proposes an urban theory 
of justice. She argues that this would encompass equity, 
democracy, and diversity, and that this idea of justice 
should influence all public decision-making. Fainstein 
notes that Lefebvre’s arguments concerning the right 
to the city do extend beyond justice. She acknowledges 
that her proposals are “limited to what appears feasible 
within the present context of capitalist urbanisation” 
(Fainstein, 2010:5), and that they might not be able 
to “deal with the injustices inherent in capitalism”. 
However, she notes that she does not expect conflict to 
be avoided. Fainstein argues that the current system will 
change incrementally as a result of sustained pressure 
for justice. If decision makers are forced to make justice 
a main consideration in urban policies, then this will 
represent a significant change (ibid.). As an element of 
wider national and international movements, it would 
increase pressure for “restructuring capitalism into a 
more humane system” (Fainstein, 2010:6).
To guide public decision makers, Fainstein (2010) 
proposes a number of principles that can ensure greater 
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equity, diversity and democracy. Those of relevance to 
street trading in public spaces will be discussed here. 
To promote greater equity, she states that “businesses 
should not be involuntarily relocated for the purpose 
of obtaining economic development or community 
balance except in exceptional circumstances.” (Fainstein, 
2010:172). She argues that if relocation is necessary 
for the construction of public facilities, adequate 
compensation should be made in the form of an 
equivalent business site, irrespective of whether those 
dislocated are renters or owners, and independent of 
the market value of their original location. In addition, 
construction should occur incrementally to allow for 
those that are displaced to remain in the area on an 
interim basis. Secondly, Fainstein (2010) argues that 
economic development programmes should priorities 
small businesses that have more local roots than 
large corporations. She further argues that all new 
commercial development should provide space for 
public use, and when possible “should facilitate the 
livelihood of independent and cooperatively owned 
businesses” (Fainstein, 2010:172). Lastly, planners 
should take an active role in decision-making processes 
to push for equitable solutions and to block those that 
disproportionately benefit the already well off.
To promote greater diversity, Fainstein (2010) proposes 
that zoning should not be discriminatory but should 
foster inclusion, and that boundaries between districts 
should be porous. Secondly, public space should be 
easily accessible and varied; and that political speech 
should not be prohibited in privatised public spaces. She 
also argues “groups with clashing lifestyles should not 
have to occupy the same location” (Fainstein, 2010:174). 
Fainstein explains this to mean that people should have 
the right to protect themselves “from those who do 
not respect their way of life” (ibid.). “What is important 
is that people are not differentiated and excluded 
according to ascriptive characteristics such as gender, 
ethnicity, or homelessness” (ibid.). Thirdly, Fainstein 
(2010:174) argues that land uses should be mixed when 
practical and “desired by affected populations”. Lastly, 
she argues “public authorities should assist groups 
who have historically suffered from discrimination in 
achieving access to opportunity in housing, education, 
and employment” (Fainstein, 2010:174). Fainstein notes 
that Appiah’s concept of “cosmopolitanism” (2006, xv) 
echoes her concept of diversity, as “we have obligations 
to others stretching beyond those to whom we are 
related by blood or nationality”, and “we take seriously 
the value of the lives of others…and give recognition” 
(Appiah, 2006:xv cited in Fainstein, 2010).
To promote greater democracy, Fainstein (2010) proposes 
that when a group is not able to participate directly in a 
decision-making process, it should be represented by an 
advocate. Secondly, if an area is already developed, plans 
should be developed in consultation with the target 
population, but that the existing population should 
not have the only say in the future of an area. Broad 
citywide considerations must also apply (ibid.). She 
notes that the purpose of inclusion in decision-making 
should be to ensure the fair representation of interests, 
and not to value participation in and of itself. Fainstein 
(2010) argues that democracy is mainly an instrument in 
the achievement of justice, and thus equity should take 
priority over democracy.
Fainstein (2010) also provides strategies for how to 
promote justice in decision-making. She notes that 
planners and policy analysts work within the public sector, 
private consulting firms, and nonprofit organizations. 
They lack individual power to implement policy and are 
restricted by politicians and clients in the regard to what 
objectives they can aim for. She cites Weber’s (1958) 
argument that “bureaucrats can use their control over 
information to bend their political superiors to their 
will” (Fainstein, 2010:180). Fainstein argues that they 
can supplement cost/benefit analyses to include who 
bears the costs and who gets the benefits, and thus shift 
debate towards equity. Citizen activism can support this 
as “citizens have an interest in knowing who is getting 
what” (Fainstein, 2010:180). Regardless of this support, 
justice should be the goal of all decisions, as “it is way 
too easy to follow the lead of developers and politicians 
who make economic competitiveness the highest 
priority and give little or no consideration to questions 
of justice.” (Fainstein, 2010:180).
In the interests of a just city, these principles should surely 
inform all planning processes and outcomes involving 
street traders in the Cape Town city centre. In Chapter 1, 
it was argued that street traders were negatively affected 
by renovation of public spaces linked to the 2010 Soccer 
World Cup. To understand why these decisions appear 
to have gone against principles embodied in the Bill 
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of Rights and those proposed by Fainstein (2010), one 
must analyse the nature of participatory processes and 
explore the context of urban governance and street 
trading management in South African cities. It is to these 
discussions that I now turn.
2.4.3. Spaces of participation
Fainstein (2005) argues that it is only through more 
inclusive forms of governance that more just outcomes 
can be achieved. While participatory governance 
is promoted by the South African Constitution and 
mandated in public policies (e.g. SPLUMA; cf. Chapter 1), 
spaces of participation have been criticised by a number 
of commentators (Cornwall, 2002; Harvey, 2005), 
particularly in South African urban governance contexts 
(Winkler, 2011; Steck et al., 2013; Morange, 2015). It is 
important to understand the nature of these spaces. 
Cornwall (2002) proposes that spaces for participation 
exist along a continuum. At one end are ‘closed’ spaces, 
where decisions are made without any participation at 
all. When efforts are made at including some form of 
participation, ‘invited’ spaces are created where state 
actors control the space and narrative, inviting citizens to 
take part at different stages of the policy- and decision-
making processes. Lastly, ‘claimed’ spaces are those that 
civil society claims from those in power in reaction to the 
dominance of closed or invited spaces (Winkler, 2011). 
These spaces “come into being as a result of popular 
mobilization around identity or issue-based concerns” 
(Cornwall, 2002:24). 
Steck et al. (2013) and Morange (2015) view the state-
led participatory processes involving street traders that 
took place in the run-up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup as 
invited spaces that ‘constructed consent’ (Harvey, 2005) 
and a ‘fiction of community’ (Morange, 2015) in order to 
further the aims of a ‘world-class city’ amid increasing 
neo-liberal governance of urban space. These processes 
ended in fact to the traders’ disadvantage as many were 
relocated to make way for renovations of public spaces 
(Morange, 2015) and the construction of the Cape Town 
Stadium (Hirsch, 2016). But how can street traders claim 
their right to the city in these participatory processes?
Winkler (2011) argues that state-led public participation 
in South Africa is ineffective and lacks transformative 
potential due to the deepening centralisation of 
decision making, a focus on performance management 
(as part of a New Public Management approach3), and 
the powerful role of politics in planning. Certain scholars 
argue that participation is not transformative when “the 
language of empowerment is used to mask facilitators’ 
real concerns for ‘efficiency’ through NPM (Cooke 
and Kothari 2001; Harcourt and Escobar 2002 cited in 
Winkler, 2011: 260).
3  New Public Management (NPM) is an approach to 
running public sector organisations used at both national 
and sub-national levels (MSG, 2017). It focuses on citizens 
as ‘customers’ (derived from ideas in the private sector), and 
key themes are financial control, value for money, increasing 
efficiency, identifying and setting targets, and performance 
monitoring (ibid.). Performance is assessed via audits, 
benchmarks and performance evaluations.
In order for citizens to play a meaningful part in state-
led participation processes, and for this to lead to 
transformation in planning policies, practices, and 
outcomes, Winkler (2011) proposes a move towards 
Heller’s “optimist conflict model” of participatory 
democracy and responsive government (2001 cited 
in Winkler, 2011). Active citizenry is one aspect of this 
model (ibid.). Another aspect is a more responsive state 
“so that the boundaries between claimed and invited 
spaces for participation may become more permeable” 
(Winker, 2011: 267). The model helps citizens to claim 
space in challenging public policy, but also means that 
the state must remake these spaces to become more 
inclusive, responsive, and effective, even if trade-offs in 
outcomes are necessary (ibid.). However, these changes 
require the necessary political will to be implemented, 
and a “step-by-step process of radical reform and social 
learning in all domains of public action” (Friedmann 
1987: 407 cited in Winker, 2011).
2.4.4. The disjuncture between 
developmental policies and 
restrictive practices
Despite municipal policies acknowledging the importance 
of street trading, management practices contradict 
policy. The City of Johannesburg (CoJ) is a prime example 
of this contradiction, as it has steadily drafted progressive 
municipal street trading policies (Matjomane, 2013), and 
adopted apparently progressive institutions, such as the 
Informal Traders Forum, which involves traders in policy 
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and implementation discussions. In practice, however, 
the CoJ follows inefficient and restrictive approaches 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). The legitimacy given to traders 
was challenged by the highly contested Operation Clean 
Sweep in November 2013, which involved the City 
displacing around 7,000 licensed and unlicensed street 
traders from the Johannesburg city centre, many of 
them migrants  
The City of Cape Town appears to use less severe, but 
more systematic exclusion, shown by the allocation 
of only 410 street-trading bays in the whole inner 
city (Bukasa 2014 cited in Skinner and Haysom, 2016) 
and harassment or neglect of traders (Miraftab, 
2007; Morange, 2015; Hirsch, 2016). Less human and 
financial resources are allocated to street trading than 
other cities in South Africa, and policy application 
and infrastructure spending appear to vary across the 
city (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). Skinner and Haysom 
(2016:20) argue that in Cape Town “the modernist vision 
of a ‘world-class city’ with its associated antipathy to 
informality dominates, and informal space and activity 
is pathologised”.
In contrast, the approach of the eThekwini Municipality 
(Durban) in the early 2000s is held up as an example of a 
progressive approach to street trading (Skinner, 2008b; 
Dobson and Skinner, 2009). A progressive informal 
economy policy was adopted by the city administration 
in 2001 and this policy still stands (Skinner and Haysom, 
2016). The policy was manifested in the inclusive 
upgrading of the Warwick Junction inner-city transport 
hub, which will be detailed later in this chapter. 
However, the municipality has subsequently taken a 
more ambivalent approach (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). 
In 2009, the city council approved a mall development 
at Warwick which threatened the livelihoods of 6 000 
traders, which was only stopped through approaching 
the courts (Skinner, 2010). Poignantly, street traders 
won a case in 2015 that challenged the constitutionality 
of confiscating street traders’ goods, forcing the city 
to revise street trading by-laws (Skinner and Haysom, 
2016).
As can be seen from these examples, at the municipal 
level in South Africa a disjuncture exists between 
progressive policy and restrictive implementation. This 
is eloquently expressed by Bromley (2000:17 cited in 
Skinner, 2008a: 22): 
The key point is that there is a wide gulf between the 
broad aims and directives of senior administrators 
and politicians, and the ways policies can actually be 
worked out on the street. Regulating street vendors… 
requires interactions between dozens of local officials 
and literally thousands of vendors, with enormous 
potential for misunderstandings, avoidance and 
deception. The inspectors, police and extension workers 
who perform such functions are usually at the bottom 
of the administrative hierarchy, and regulating and 
promoting street vending is one of the lowest status 
and most difficult tasks that they have to perform.
Watson (2003) argues for the importance of 
understanding the ‘conflicting rationalities’ that affect 
planning and management decisions. The reality that 
individuals can have fundamentally different worldviews 
and different value-systems is often not acknowledged 
by officials and planners. These ‘conflicting rationalities’ 
can and often do clash when plans or development 
projects intersect with the “lives and livelihoods of 
households and communities” (Watson, 2003: 396). 
The ethical responses by officials and planners in such 
situations need to be interrogated. What should be 
done, for whom and by whom, and with what benefits 
and costs? (Watson, 2003:404). Whose ethics should 
prevail?
The disjuncture between developmental national 
policies and restrictive municipal approaches to street 
trading management in South Africa is such a case of 
Figure 2.1: Operation Clean Sweep  (Source: THE STAR, 
2 October 2012)
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‘conflicting rationalities’. It can be seen as an issue of 
policy implementation, and an understanding of street 
trading issues in predominantly economic terms (Bénit-
Gbaffou, 2015). As an issue of policy implementation, 
national policy (e.g. NIBUS) is supportive of street 
trading but it fails to acknowledge contextual municipal 
issues, such as the tension created by a dual (and 
often contradictory) mandate to alleviate poverty and 
promote economic development, while still managing 
intense use of urban space (ibid.). 
An understanding of street trading issues in 
predominantly economic terms is problematic as street 
trading is in fact primarily a planning and land use 
management issue (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). But in order 
to plan, municipal authorities also need to understand 
the economic aspects of residents’ livelihood strategies. 
It is up to city officials to decide how to address these 
conflicts, as determined by local by-laws and spatial 
plans. While this is partially addressed in local economic 
development planning, the effective separation of 
planning and management leads to a disconnect. A 
municipality must also adhere to national directives. I 
thus derive assessment criteria and ask the subsidiary 
question: 
To what extent does the City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management practice on the Grand Parade 
align with national developmental policies?
However, there are local and global South case examples 
that demonstrate innovative and progressive street 
trading management, despite being short-lived. Before 
turning to a summary of these cases, an understanding 
of the dimensions of street trading management models 
must first be developed. It is to this discussion that I now 
turn.
2.5. Street trading management 
models
2.5.1 The meaning of ‘management’
It is important to unpack the meaning of street trading 
management in order to understand the political aspects 
and social impacts of the choices made by authorities 
around how street trading occurs. Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) 
contends that the term  ‘management’ is used as a way 
of depoliticising ‘governance’, reducing it to technical 
details and ignoring political aspects and social impacts. 
In turn, she defines governance in the case of informal 
street trading as the manner in which decision-making 
impacts an area or group. This involves the interaction 
of a number of stakeholders, the state being just one, 
through cooperation, alliances or conflict, with the power 
balance between these stakeholders shifting constantly. 
Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) argues that one must question 
the political situation of the adoption and application of 
‘management’ models, as well as analyse the political 
context, power levels, interpersonal relationships, and 
structural conditions between stakeholders involved. 
The stakeholders relevant to my study are street traders, 
the state, law enforcers (e.g. police), private businesses, 
and public-private partnerships such as business (or 
city) improvement districts.   
‘Regulation’ is also a problematic term for traders in 
regards to street trading. This is because the term is 
commonly associated with the exclusionary outcomes 
that result from formalising a limited number of 
traders, and it is often equated in the literature with 
the repression of informal street traders by municipal 
authorities (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). But, this also does not 
acknowledge the difficult job of balancing competing 
land uses and urban needs in city centres. However, 
Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) argues that term ‘regulation’ is 
more useful than ‘governance’ as it helps to analyse the 
everyday management arrangements between traders, 
municipal officials, and law enforcers, such as the police. 
It highlights the strategic importance of the different 
technical decisions made in a regulatory process, 
including numbers of traders to be accommodated in a 
specific area and how this is decided; and the number 
of representatives from each stakeholder constituency 
that are represented in a trading stakeholder committee 
among other considerations. 
2.5.2 Progressive and sustainable 
management models
One also needs to understand what a ‘progressive 
management model’ and a ‘sustainable management 
model’ mean for street trading for both legalised 
and illegalised informal street traders. Bénit-Gbaffou 
(2015) argues that a progressive management model 
is developmental and inclusive. Firstly, she argues that 
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it is developmental if it endeavours to support traders’ 
livelihood strategies, along a spectrum from creating 
a less restrictive environment to a supportive one. 
She proposes the following questions to ascertain if a 
management model is developmental (from a trader 
perspective):
• To what extent does the management model allow
for new entrants with limited financial capital?
• What forms of support and services are provided to
traders to aid in sustaining their livelihoods?
• Do the support structures differ between survivalist
and entrepreneurial street traders?
I in turn derive criteria from these questions and ask the 
subsidiary research question: 
To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management approach on the Grand Parade 
developmental?
A progressive management model is inclusive if it 
endeavours to legalise all (or a majority of) existing 
street traders (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). Here, I question 
if all traders want to be legalised, as this surely is the 
state’s ultimate aim? UN-Habitat (2006) argues that 
regulation of the informal economy can lead to improved 
recognition of property rights, greater access to credit, 
access to basic urban services, productivity gains, as 
well as higher savings arising from a reduction in corrupt 
practices. Tax revenues can also be generated for the 
state. As such, I adopt the position that formalising 
street trading via the issuing of permits/licenses is 
beneficial to the livelihood security of traders. Inclusivity 
also means involving street traders in policy making 
and management decisions affecting them through the 
relevant decision-making institutions, rather than just 
consultation. 
For a management model to be sustainable, it must not 
be so contested that it results in a failure of management. 
Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) notes that sustainability implies 
notions of equity and managerial efficiency based on the 
perhaps debatable assumption that equitable models 
have a longer life span than those that are inequitable. 
This is because they generate less resistance from those 
being governed or managed i.e. the traders. However, 
as Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) points out, though this 
concept is useful, it also fails to make clear the complex 
relationship between equity and efficiency. She argues 
that regarding restrictive street trading management 
approaches, it is plausible that their lack of equity (or 
progressiveness) produces their lack of efficiency and 
possible management failure.
2.5.3. Restrictive street trading 
management approaches
There appears to be limited literature on examples of 
progressive or sustainable street trading management. 
However, much literature details the elements of 
restrictive municipal approaches to street trading 
management. Firstly, restrictive approaches try to 
significantly limit street trader numbers in city centres 
(Mitullah, 2005; UN-Habitat 2006; Roever, 2006; David 
et al. 2013). Placing an unreasonable restriction on 
the number of trading licenses results in increased 
numbers of un-licensed (or ‘illegalised’) street traders 
(ibid.) This creates more disorder, from the standpoint 
of city officials, and hinders opportunities for individuals 
to access livelihood opportunities. In effect this 
criminalises the poor and hinders livelihood strategies 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015).
Secondly, restrictive approaches engender municipal 
corruption, violence and mismanagement, and foster 
informal arrangements, patronage, and aggression 
between traders (Mitullah, 2005; UN-Habitat 2006; 
Roever, 2006; David et al. 2013). Corruption by municipal 
officials is fostered when they are tasked with applying 
by-laws removed from urban needs and realities. This is 
illustrated by the case of São Paulo, Brazil where vendors 
have precarious working conditions due to violent 
police repression, relations of patronage with officials 
controlling access to licenses, and the solicitation of 
bribes from traders operating in unlicensed spaces 
(Itikawa 2004 cited in Roever, 2006). Roever cites 
Itikawa’s argument that this patronage and corruption 
is due to the lack of clear legal definitions in by-laws, 
and the tendency by authorities to alternate between 
tolerance and repression of street trading. Aggression 
between traders is induced by restrictive approaches 
as traders are in competition for license allocation and 
trading space access (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). Crush et 
al. (2015) note that competition over informal trading 
spaces also produces gender struggles with men 
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sometimes displacing women.
Thirdly, relocating traders to off-street sites or other 
locations in a city may lead to reduced pavement 
congestion, with improved infrastructure, safety and 
hygiene for traders (Donovan, 2002; Roever, 2006), but 
also leads to income loss (Mitullah, 2003; Roever, 2006). 
Locating trading spaces along key pedestrian routes is 
vital for trader livelihoods (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). City-led 
relocations can produce tensions with relocated traders, 
and necessitate the deployment of law enforcement 
officers to prevent re-occupation of former trading sites, 
as was the case in Nairobi, Kenya (Mitullah, 2003). 
Lastly, restrictive policies and practices often produce 
both collective and individual resistance and adaptation 
on the part of traders (Roever, 2006; UN-Habitat, 2006) 
For example, lack of trader involvement in drafting a 
street trading by-law in Caracas, Venezuela, as well the 
by-law’s lack of legal clarity, encouraged street traders 
to “privately appropriate space through strategies of 
negotiation and confrontation with city governments” 
(Roever, 2006:21). 
From these dimensions of restrictive street trading 
management approaches, I derive criteria for assessment 
and ask the subsidiary research question: 
To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management approach on the Grand Parade 
restrictive?
Before turning to a summary of the local and global 
South case examples that demonstrate innovative and 
progressive street trading management approaches, 
I explore the relationship between street trading and 
public space. 
Repression or restriction of street trading has been 
motivated by contemporary visions of the supposed 
appearance of ‘world-class cities’ (Skinner, 2008a). 
The relocations of street traders prior to the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup, to make way for renovations of emblematic 
public spaces in the Cape Town city centre, are viewed 
by commentators as driven by the dual pressure of 
managing competing land uses and creating a shop 
window of ‘well-managed’ spaces to attract foreign 
investment (Lindell, 2010; Steck et al.2013; Morange, 
2015). But what does the relocation of traders from 
public spaces such as Green Market Square mean for the 
‘sense of place’ of these spaces?
2.6. Genius loci
Norberg-Schulz (1979:5) suggests that:
The spaces where life occurs are places…A place is a 
space which has a distinct character. Since ancient 
times the genius loci, or spirit of place, has been 
recognized as the concrete reality man has to face and 
come to terms with in his daily life. Architecture means 
to visualize the genius loci and the task of the architect 
is to create meaningful places, whereby he helps man 
to dwell.
While referring to the role of architecture and architects 
in creating a sense of place, planners and the users and 
occupiers of a space also enact physical placemaking. 
Norberg-Schulz (1979:18) observes that “the structure 
of a place is not a fixed, eternal state”. 
Landman (2010) goes further and puts forward a 
framework for understanding spatial transformation 
as a socio-spatial process. This process involves space, 
need, idea, order, form and meaning. Space is often 
informed by specific time- and context-based needs. 
Need produces a response in how to address it, and 
this starts to produce an ordered spatial manifestation 
of the need and idea. This form reflects the character 
of a space and contributes towards the creation of a 
sense of place, which can be modified over time. People 
attach meaning to spaces and places, by ‘reading’ or 
‘experiencing’ them (ibid.). Spaces and places can appeal 
to people’s emotions, such as feeling safe or unsafe in a 
place (ibid.). As such, physical space influences the use 
of space, as well as people’s behavioural patterns and 
reactions to it (ibid.). These responses can contribute to 
the transformation of a space if considered necessary by 
a sufficient number of people. This once again represents 
a need that can give rise to further transformation of a 
space. A range of actors involved in the production and 
management of space influence this process (Landman, 
2010). 
Thus, these producers and managers of space, both 
planners, city administrators, users and occupiers of 
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a space, have a vital role in planning and trading in 
public spaces. A strong sense of place will help define 
the meaning and use of a public space in the mind of 
the public. A positive sense of place can create and 
be created by concentrated use of public space (often 
colloquially referred to as ‘vibrancy’) as well as a feeling 
of safety in the space, and these can be seen as mutually 
reinforcing. Street trading, and its management, thus 
has the potential to contribute to, or detract from, this 
vibrancy and feeling of safety. I consequently establish 
assessment criteria and ask the subsidiary research 
question: 
To what extent does the City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management approach affect the ‘genius loci’ 
or ‘sense of place’ of the Grand Parade, and does this 
support or hinder trader livelihood strategies?
2.7. Innovative and progressive 
implementation of street trading 
management
The first case example of a progressive approach to 
street trading management is the recent (2014) reform 
of street trading management policies in India.  The 
reforms are based on a history of innovation and street 
trader mobilisation (Sinha and Roever, 2011). The Street 
Vendors (Protection of livelihood and regulation of 
street vending) Act of 2014 takes an inclusive approach 
by making the granting of trading permits (known as 
vending certificates) non-restrictive. It states that (i) all 
existing vendors should be granted trading permits, as 
long as they do not trade at more than one stall or have 
alternative sources of income; and (ii) that they should 
be granted a trading space at their current location, or 
at a nearby location (Sinha and Roever, 2011). Secondly, 
the legislation recognises ‘natural markets’ which are 
areas where traders naturally concentrate in reaction to 
customer flows, without trying to relocate or minimise 
these. Thirdly, participatory institutions known as 
Town Vending Committees have been set up, and their 
recognition by authorities and their constitutions enable 
them to have significant decision-making and advisory 
powers (ibid.)
The second case is the innovative street trading policy 
and implementation approach followed in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania from 1992 to 2000. The approach 
enabled traders to cooperatively manage their activities 
at street level (Nnkya, 2006). In the approach, known as 
the Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project (SDP):
The underlying assumption of SDP was that what 
people did should be the basis of planning decisions, 
rather than a master plan with legal force but little 
basis in economic and social realities. Its goal was 
strategic planning without master plans, but with 
a pragmatic solution to urban spatial management 
problems, which would be continually under review 
and development.
(Lyons et al., 2012: 1018, my emphasis)
Nnkya (2006) notes that the advantages of this 
approach included, firstly, street trader involvement in 
policy and implementation decisions. This promoted the 
consolidation of traders’ organisations, and they had an 
influence on decision-making. Secondly, the approach 
encouraged self-management of trading areas, which 
has led to numerous area-based traders associations 
(ibid.) Some area-based traders associations have 
registered as cooperatives in busy and lucrative inner 
city areas (ibid.).
This approach was short-lived. Removal of the UNDP 
Sustainable City Programme’s support for the SDP in 2007 
was soon followed by a national and municipal policy 
backlash against street trading, resulting in evictions 
and destruction of trader stalls and stock (Lyons et al., 
2012). Lyons et al. (2012) view these actions as a dislike 
by municipal officials of participatory approaches that 
were followed, as well as the power of the local business 
and political elite to lobby against street trading in the 
name of achieving the appearance of a ‘world-class city’.
A third case is the street trading management system 
used in Bangkok, Thailand. Policy has fluctuated 
over time, from tolerance to stricter regulation, 
depending on national economic growth (street 
trading is more tolerated during economic crises and 
increasing unemployment), and also depending on the 
metropolitan region governor’s personality (Kusakabe, 
2006). Purchasing from street traders, and eating in 
the street (‘public eating’) is accepted as a cultural 
phenomenon, even for middle income Thais (Yasmeen 
and Nirathron 2014). Overall, the trend has been 
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towards greater legitimisation of traders and broader 
trading areas, with an acceptance by authorities that 
street trading is part of Thai culture and important for 
poverty alleviation and economic growth (Kusakabe, 
2006; Yasmeen and Nirathron, 2014). In Bangkok, the 
less restrictive and participatory approach followed led 
to increased municipal revenue, reduced corruption and 
improved by-law and regulation adherence by street 
traders (Kusakabe, 2006; Yasmeen and Nirathron, 2014).
There are three important lessons from the Thai 
example. Firstly, changing the respective prejudices of 
street traders, officials and the general public through 
education is important in building a consensus around 
the value of street traders in cities (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2015). Secondly, the idea of ‘street congestion’ is 
relative and context-specific, and technical norms of 
‘carrying capacity’ or ‘degree of congestion’ of a street 
should be contextually negotiated (ibid.).  The minimum 
pavement width for street trading is set at two metres 
in Bangkok, versus for example, three metres in 
Johannesburg (Kusakabe, 2006; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). 
From a practical perspective, a general threshold should 
be defined under municipal by-laws, with an allowance 
for locally negotiated guidelines (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). 
Lastly, trading license certificates in Bangkok provide an 
asset for street traders, as they allow access to social 
welfare payments, and can be used as collateral for 
loans (Kusakabe, 2006; Yasmeen and Nirathron, 2014). 
This incentivises trader registration and fee payment 
(ibid.).
The final international case involves a comparative 
study of nine markets in Dar es Salaam by Lindell and 
Appelblad (2009), specifically looking at the impacts 
of contracting out market management to the private 
sector. There were five main findings around this form 
of management. First, it increased fee collection, which 
was then shared between the private companies and 
municipal authorities. Second, there was no increase 
in market maintenance or market infrastructure 
investment. The limited interest and expertise in street 
trading of private companies meant that markets were 
seen as revenue sources, not urban investment assets. 
Third, there was repression and violence towards 
traders, with few avenues to raise concerns over 
treatment. Fourth, politicians and their networks were 
awarded contracts, leading to increased corruption. 
Finally, in regard to trader cooperatives managing 
markets, it was found that these were not necessarily 
more democratic than private sector-managed markets, 
as the membership costs of these cooperatives excluded 
most traders. Cooperatives were found to be less 
inclusive than trader associations, due to income level 
disparities and a heightened focus on profit over trader 
development (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009).
A celebrated South African case of progressive street 
trader management is the so called ‘eThekwini model’ of 
Figure 2.2: Bangkok street food vendor. (Source: Accidental Travel Writer, 2017)
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the late 1990s and early 2000s. The model was a result of 
the inclusive upgrading of the Warwick Junction market 
based on concerted pressure from a well-organised street 
traders organisation, the Self-Employed Women’s Union 
(SEWU) (Horn, 2014). This led to a temporary progressive 
street trading model approach between 1999 and 2001 
and “selective policy implementation and regression” 
(Skinner, 2008b) between 2001 and 2005 (Horn, 2005). 
The model involved four key principles (Skinner, 2008b; 
Dobson and Skinner, 2009). Firstly, it recognised that 
busy, congested city areas are not only where street 
traders seek to trade, but also those that need the most 
urban management. Secondly, it acknowledged the 
uneven success of markets, and elected to only develop 
markets in areas where there is significant footfall, and 
which complement, not replace, street trading. Thirdly, 
there was recognition of the need to explicitly subsidise 
the informal economy, rather than focus on pure profit 
making or cost-recovery. Lastly, the model relied on 
participatory and area-based approaches (ibid.).
A number of key institutions were involved. Specifically, 
area-based management in Warwick Junction involved 
a dedicated project manager; solid links with Planning, 
Business Development, Health, and Police departments 
in particular; a site office to foster participation, and a 
‘users and residents’ committee with links to project 
management. There was an empowered street trading 
organisation (SEWU). SEWU put pressure on municipal 
authorities, leading to the creation of a federation 
of street trader organisations in 1995, the Informal 
Traders Management Board (ITMB)(ibid.). The ITMB was 
involved in making strategic policy inputs. Parallel to the 
IMTB board, a multi-stakeholder forum was established 
to address street trading regulation issues, consisting 
of a dedicated Department of Informal Trade & Small 
Business Opportunities (DITSBO), the IMTB, private 
businesses, and relevant departments with concerns in 
the eThekwini city centre (Horn, 2014).
A new street trading policy was developed by a task 
team that included relevant departmental officials, 
academics, and NGOs (such as WIEGO - Women in 
Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing). 
The eThekwini council adopted a developmental 
management policy in 2002 (Skinner, 2008b; Dobson 
and Skinner, 2009). In order to implement the policy, 
an Implementation Working Group (IWG) was formed 
which included relevant city officials, ITMB, and advisory 
NGOs with street trading expertise: WIEGO, StreetNet, 
and the Legal Resources Center (LRC)(Horn, 2014). 
The institutions allowed for localised, negotiated, and 
flexible solutions to practical day-to-day issues (Bénit-
Gbaffou, 2015). However, most of these participatory Figure 2.3: Warwick Junction stalls (Source: Smithsonian Cooper-Hewitt National Design Museum, 2011)
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and decentralised institutions were disbanded or 
restructured with the change in the City manager in 
2004 (Horn, 2014). Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) observes 
that the number and institutionalisation of spaces for 
engagement, and the focus on building street trader 
organisational capacity to be involved in strategic 
policy and implementation decisions, were key to the 
eThekwini model.
I now turn briefly to two recent pilot street trading 
management projects in the Johannesburg city centre 
that, as Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) argues, show an alternative 
approach driven from outside municipal structures. The 
first involved a joint venture agreement between the 
Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC) and the Central 
Johannesburg Partnership (CJP). The MTC is a semi-
autonomous ‘Municipally Owned Entity’ (MOE) that 
took over street trading management in the early 2000s, 
reporting to an independent board as well as the City’s 
Department of Economic Development. The CJP consists 
of private property and business owners in the central 
city. This agreement effectively shared responsibility 
for street trading management and fee collection. One 
manifestation of the agreement has been the Retail 
Improvement District (RID), a city improvement district 
(CID)(ibid.). 
This CID aimed to integrate street traders into the 
district’s streets unlike other CIDs in the city, and the 
successful street trading management model piloted 
there, backed by significant public investment via the JDA 
(Johannesburg Development Agency) which involved 
pavement refurbishment, linear market construction 
(cf. Figure 2.4) and BRT (bus rapid transit) routes and 
stations, resulted in the accommodation of 700 to 900 
street traders in the area (ibid.). 
The positive aspects of the RID model are fourfold (Bénit-
Gbaffou, 2015).  First, it allows for cross subsidisation 
where the property owner levy pays for street security 
and cleaning. Second, it makes use of diverse trading 
stalls types that do not impede pedestrian flows. Third, it 
establishes localised mechanisms for conflict resolution, 
maintenance, and control. Lastly, it promotes strong 
working relationships between management (CJP) and 
the City via regular meetings, funding and networks. On 
the other hand, there are limitations to the model. It is 
not trader-centric as they have limited input or control 
over management decisions. Financial sustainability 
is heavily reliant on the CID levy. Lastly, management 
efficiency is dependent on the strong lobbying power of 
the CJP and network links with municipal officials and 
politicians. 
Many of the traders involved in the RID are members of 
the traders association, South African National Traders 
and Retailers Alliance (SANTRA), and the successful 
experience contributed to a level of trust between 
SANTRA and the CJP (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). In the 
context of this working arrangement, and following 
Operation Clean Sweep in 2013, the two organisations 
proposed a pilot street management programme in 
the area around Park Station, Johannesburg’s main 
train station and public transport terminus, in an effort 
to show the possibility of sustainable street trading 
management (ibid.).
There were five main aspects of the pilot. First, the 
financial sustainability relied partly on a rental fee paid 
by traders, which, based on negotiations between CJP 
and SANTRA, was a square metrage fee (minimum of 
R10/day/square metre), which allowed entrepreneurial 
traders to pay more for extra trading spaces while 
not serving to be exclusionary to survivalist traders. 
Figure 2.4: Kerk Street linear market, Johannesburg (Source: 
Urban Joburg, 2013)
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Second, as with the RID model, cleaning and security 
management and coordination would be paid for by 
trading stall rentals. Third, regarding ‘street carrying 
capacity’, it was agreed that all existing traders would, 
as far as possible accommodated through professionally 
designed sustainable spatial solutions. Fourth, the 
model intended to include shop and property owners, 
as they have a stake in improved management of the 
area, and to encourage their financial participation in 
the management model (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015).
Lastly, an unresolved issue was that of representation 
on the street trading management committee. Only 
SANTRA was represented on the committee, and they 
had developed a close relationship with the CJP in the 
RID pilot. However, the other trader organisations in the 
area were not represented and this had the potential to 
cause tensions (ibid.)
The aspects of these tensions between trader 
organisations need to be understood when analysing 
street trading management practices. Before turning 
to a discussion of these organisations and their 
politics, common elements can be identified from the 
progressive approaches above, which pragmatically 
address the complexities of street trading management. 
These elements are fivefold. One, they are grounded 
in participatory processes. Two, they involve street 
trading forums where multiple stakeholders can debate 
issues, and make agreements and compromises. Three, 
these street trader forums are resourced to allow 
for consolidation and capacitation of street trader 
organisations. Four, they often involve the setting up of 
a dedicated street trading management institution with 
a clear mandate. Last, they involve area-based street 
trading management processes and institutions.
From these elements, I derive assessment criteria and 
ask: 
To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management approach on the Grand Parade 
pragmatic?
2.8. Trader organisations
As noted earlier, restrictive approaches to street 
trading management are the norm. This has caused 
street trader politics to consist of fluctuating but 
predominantly antagonistic relationships with 
local authorities, and resistance to these restrictive 
management approaches (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016). The 
state, as well as NGOs, insist on engaging with a unified 
body of legitimate trader representatives, and view 
trader organisations as “lacking continuity, legitimacy, 
representativeness and strategic vision” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2016:1105). However, this is hypocritical, as these 
divisions are predominantly produced by the state via its 
management and engagement techniques (ibid.). Trader 
organisations exist in different forms over time, but are 
often dominated by personalities. These leaders are 
often active in “fighting for positions, status and money, 
like most political entrepreneurs” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2016:1107). They are also involved in mediation, 
problem solving, among others, often at the expense of 
their own business. There is limited evidence of trading 
organisation influence over local government policies or 
practices towards informal trading (Matjomane, 2013).
Trader organisations have defined political niches that 
are fluid, involve different strategies and tactics, and 
shift with political opportunity (Lindell, 2010). There are 
four distinct, but related, aspects to these differences 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016). Firstly, organisations have varied 
constituencies. Secondly, they have different spatial 
focuses, from local areas up to national level. Thirdly, 
their main objective can be around either policy and 
legislation, or economic development. A policy and 
legislation objective would include opposing abusive 
police practices, resisting eviction and trying to guarantee 
security of tenure for trading spaces. It could also 
involve increasing the number of legal trading spaces, 
negotiating municipal services and infrastructure, 
and setting up forms of trader self-management or 
management partnerships. An economic development 
objective would include negotiating trader business 
training and support, forming cooperatives, developing 
access to credit or bulk buying, or applying for 
government tenders. Lastly, street trader organisations 
engage with municipalities in antagonistic or cooperative 
ways, but this depends on opportunity (Lindell, 2010). 
Their degree of antagonism or cooperation sits on a 
continuum, and also varies depending on the sections 
and levels of the state that are engaged (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2016). This may also involve playing one off against the 
other (Lindell, 2010). However, trader organisations 
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have built historical identities around either antagonism 
or cooperation (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016).
Intra-organisational unity is challenged by the scarcity 
of general meetings (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016). This is due 
to the fact that meetings during the day affect trader 
incomes, and that most traders do not live near to their 
workplace and therefore have to catch transport home 
after work (ibid.). Inter-organisational unity is affected 
by the nature of municipal trading management. 
Organisations try to consolidate their power in a context 
of legal trading space scarcity, struggling to secure trading 
spaces for their members. This forces competition 
between organisations, or attempts at delegitimising 
other organisations or traders, particularly foreign 
traders (ibid.).
Xenophobia is prevalent in trader discourses (Bénit-
Gbaffou, 2016). This can occur when foreign traders, 
barred from legal trading space access , set up illegally in 
better locations or with more mobility, sometimes even 
in front of the legal trading stalls of South African citizens 
(ibid.). Nationality and legal trading space scarcity are 
conflated into xenophobia, with South African traders 
calling for stricter clampdowns on illegal trading and the 
involvement of Home Affairs in these processes (ibid.). 
This can even escalate to violence against foreign traders 
(Crush et al., 2015; Kihato, 2009)  – dubbed ‘violent 
entrepreneurship’ by Charman and Piper (2012).
While self-management of trading spaces has the 
potential for more inclusivity and democracy in city 
spaces, Bénit-Gbaffou (2016) raises two questions. These 
questions are similar to those she argues should be 
asked about City Improvement Districts in the privatised 
management of public space. Firstly, she questions how 
public space governance can be delegated to (large or 
small) entrepreneurs. Secondly, she questions how 
rights to freedom of association can be respected, and 
raises the possibility that delegating rent collection and 
trading space allocation can become undemocratic 
(ibid.). Bénit-Gbaffou (2016) concludes, that while 
street trading organisational politics are fragmented in 
their agency, and often involve clientelism and ad hoc 
arrangements, they highlight issues of representation, 
democracy, and political efficiency.
2.9 Conclusion
This chapter began with a discussion of the importance 
of the informal economy in South Africa, and 
demonstrated its key role in food security and the lives 
of marginalised Capetonians. This was followed by a 
an overview of the informal sector policy environment 
at national and provincial levels, which highlighted 
national and provincial strategies that aim to support 
informal businesses, but that many of these strategies 
have had mixed results. The Draft Business Licensing 
Bill of 2013 is mostly punitive and discriminates against 
foreign migrants, while the National Informal Business 
Upliftment Strategy (NIBUS) of 2014 has not resulted 
in much improvement in the operating environment 
for most informal traders. Provinces have been slow 
in supporting and regulating the informal sector, and 
their informal economy initiatives often show neglect 
of spatial divisions, and do not do much to revise or 
streamline existing legislation that hinders informal 
businesses. 
In turn, a disjuncture was identified between 
developmental state policies and restrictive municipal 
street trading management practices. This discussion 
covered concepts such as the right to the city, the 
just city and the nature of participatory spaces in 
urban decision-making in South Africa. The meanings 
surrounding management and regulation were 
interrogated, and the elements of both progressive and 
restrictive street trading management approaches were 
identified. The value and importance of ‘genius loci’, 
or ‘a sense of place’, for planning and trading in public 
spaces was highlighted, and local and global South case 
examples demonstrating innovative and progressive 
street trading management approaches were discussed. 
These approaches contained common elements that 
were identified and turned into criteria for assessing the 
case under study. Finally, street trader organisations and 
politics were discussed. This discussion identified the 
aspects of the various strategies and tactics that trader 
organisations employ. Intra- and inter-organisational 
unity were shown to be challenged by the nature of 
municipal trading management, as legal trading space 
scarcity produces tensions between organisations, 
which can spill over into xenophobia. 
The overarching aim of this dissertation is to critically 
assess the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street 
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trading management approach on the livelihood 
strategies of traders on the Grand Parade. The aim of this 
research is also to provide City officials and planners with 
recommendations on how to better enable livelihood 
strategies of street traders on the Grand Parade. In 
pursuance of this aim, criteria were developed in this 
chapter, against which the case will be evaluated. These 
criteria can be summarised in the table on the following 
page (Table 2.1).
Let us now turn to discussions on research methods and 
techniques.
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OVERARCHING CRITERIA ASSESSMENT CRITERIA DERIVED FROM LITERATURE 
REVIEW (CF. CHAPTER 2)
SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS DERIVED FROM ASSESSMENT 
CRITERIA
Restrictive Street Trading 
Management Approach
Criminalising the poor and hindering livelihood strategies To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management 
approach on the Grand Parade restrictive?Engendering municipal corruption, violence and 
mismanagement
Fostering informal arrangements, patronage and aggression 
between traders
Producing resistance and adaptation on the part of traders, 
both individually and collectively
Genius loci Concentrated use To what extent does the City of Cape Town’s street trading management 
approach affect the ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ of the Grand Parade, 
and does this support or hinder trader livelihood strategies?
Feelings of safety
OVERARCHING CRITERIA  
FOR PROGRESSIVE STREET 
TRADING MANAGEMENT
Developmental Ease of access for new entrants with limited financial capital To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management 
approach on the Grand Parade developmental?Support and services to sustain livelihoods
Differentiated support structures for survivalist and 
entrepreneurial street traders.
Pragmatic Street trading management based on participatory processes
Multiple stakeholder street trading forums
Consolidated and capacitated street trader organisations
Existence of a dedicated street trading management institution
Area-based street trading management processes and 
institutions
To what extent does the City of Cape Town’s street trading management 
practice on the Grand Parade align with national developmental 
policies?






The main and subsidiary research questions are 
presented in chapters 1 and 2 respectively. This chapter 
concerns the research methods and techniques that are 
used to answer these questions. The choice of research 
methods and techniques are informed by the research 
question. The choice is also informed by my desire to 
describe and understand the impacts of the City of 
Cape Town’s street trading management approach on 
the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade 
from the traders’ point of view.
The first section of this chapter deals with the research 
methods employed, namely the case study and 
discourse analysis methods. The case for this research 
is the Grand Parade, which is located in Cape Town’s city 
centre, and is introduced at this point. This is followed 
by a discussion of the research techniques used. These 
are non-participant observations, and semi-structured 
interviews. The limitations of each technique are also 
discussed. A short note on positioning follows this 
discussion. The third part of this chapter details how the 
research participants were selected to participate in this 
study. This part of the chapter also includes a discussion 
of the ethical considerations that are of concern in this 
study. This section also includes a discussion of how 
these concerns have been addressed. This chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the data analysis and 
interpretation techniques used in this study. But first I 
turn to a discussion of the research methods employed.
3.2. Research Methods
This section details the processes followed to gather 
data. The case study and discourse analysis methods are 
used to gain an understanding of how the policies and 
discourse around street trading interact with the City’s 
management approach, and the impacts this has on 
trader livelihood strategies. It is to a discussion of the 
case study method that I now turn.
3.2.1. Case Study Method
Duminy et al. (2014: xiii) note that planners in African 
cities “are being trained to view and interact with the 
world in a way that is sharply at odds with the manner 
in which the multitude of urban residents perceive and 
negotiate urban life”. One could surely say the same of 
municipal management officials and local government 
policy makers. A more nuanced understanding is needed 
“to proactively engage with the realities of African 
urbanisation - the modes of land access, settlement, 
movement, collaboration and livelihood often grouped 
(negatively) under the bracket of ‘illegal’ and (sometimes 
interchangeably) ‘informal’” (Duminy et al., 2014: xiv). 
In Africa, planning theory is not only challenged by the 
trends and forces driving urbanisation in this context, 
but also by the political and policy crisis affecting cities 
where “planning systems…are marked by the ‘colonial 
wound’”(Mignolo 2009 cited in Duminy et al., 2014: 
1). The case study method, adapted to local contexts, 
can be viewed as a mode “better suited to describe and 
interpret the contradictory processes of rapid change 
and uncertainty that characterise African urbanisms” 
(Duminy et al., 2014: xiv).
Abu-Lughod (1994) argues that urban complexities at 
a city or neighbourhood scale can only be understood 
through case studies.  The case study method allows one 
to produce context-dependent, value-driven knowledge 
(Flyvbjerg, 2011). However, there is a paradox in 
the case study’s widespread use and low regard by 
academics (Gerring, 2004). Flyvbjerg (2011) argues that 
five misunderstandings are at the root of this paradox. 
These misunderstandings concern theory, reliability, and 
validity. I deal with the concern of theory in this section. 
Reliability and validity are addressed in section 3.4.
The first misunderstanding is that concrete case 
knowledge is less valuable than general theoretical 
knowledge. Flyvbjerg (2011) argues there is no context-
independent knowledge in the social sciences. Case 
knowledge must, therefore, be valued as highly since it 
firstly, allows for a nuanced view of reality. Behaviour 
cannot be understood merely as “rule-governed acts” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2011:303). Secondly, cases are important 
for developing good research skills. Concrete research 
experience is attained through proximity to the study 
issue as well as feedback from research participants 
(ibid.) The case study method enables me to reveal 
the way in which the multitude of factors that interact 
to produce the City of Cape Town’s street trading 
management approach impact upon the livelihood 
strategies of the traders on the Grand Parade.
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Babbie and Mouton (2001) state that one cannot 
generalise from a case study. Flyvberg (2011) argues 
to the contrary - the second misunderstanding. The 
case study can form the basis for generalisation if it is 
supplemented by other methods. The “force of example” 
and transferability of the case to other contexts are 
often underestimated (Flyvbjerg, 2011:305). The aim of 
my study is to draw out general lessons from the effects 
of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management 
on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand 
Parade. These lessons can then possibly be applied to 
other similar urban contexts.
The third misunderstanding is that the case study 
is useful for generating hypotheses, but not suited 
for hypothesis testing and building theory. This is 
countered by Flyvberg’s (2011:306) argument that 
the “generalisability” of case studies, and hence their 
suitability to hypothesis testing, can be increased via 
strategic case selection. Specifically, Flyvberg (2011) 
argues that the need to understand the deeper causal 
relationships around a problem and its consequences, 
rather than just describing the symptoms, requires 
choosing a valid case. This is better than random 
sampling methods that emphasise representativity 
(ibid.; cf. section 3.5). George and Bennett (2005) 
confirm this by arguing that the case study method is 
better suited than others to theory development as it 
allows for better ‘process tracing’. Through process 
tracing, the researcher examines varied data sources to 
find whether or not the:
Causal process a theory hypothesises or implies is in fact 
evident in the sequence and values of the intervening 
variables in that case.
(George and Bennett, 2005: 6)
Process tracing allows for the inductive generation of 
new variables and hypotheses based on these sequence 
observations. In turn, the generation of new theories 
and models will be more specific and concrete than 
those created simply through correlation between a 
limited array of variables (George and Bennett, 2005).
The fourth misunderstanding noted by Flyvberg (2011) 
is that the case study method contains a verification 
bias. Specifically, there is the possibility of confirming 
the researcher’s preconceived ideas (ibid.). Ragin and 
Becker (1992) and Flyvberg (2011) argue that their 
preconceived assumptions and hypotheses have often 
been proved wrong when conducting intensive and in-
depth case studies. The authors further argue that in 
these instances study results have necessitated revision 
of their initial hypotheses. Therefore, as Flyvberg’s 
(2011) experience shows, the case study does not result 
in a greater tendency towards verification.
The final misunderstanding is that of the difficulty in 
summarising and developing general propositions from 
specific case studies (ibid.). Flyvberg (2011) counters 
this by arguing that the difficulties associated with 
summarising case studies often arise from the (e.g. 
complex) nature of the reality studied, rather than the 
case study method. 
It is to a discussion of the case under study that the 
chapter now turns.
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3.2.1.1 The Case: The Grand Parade 
The Grand Parade is a large public space in the heart of 
central Cape Town. It is situated between the Cape Town 
City Hall and Cape Town Central Library on the south, 
the Castle on the east, Cape Town Station and Golden 
Acre shopping centre on the north, and the Central 
Post Office building on the west (cf. Figure 3.1). The 
streets framing the space, colloquially known as ‘the 
Parade’, are Darling Street to the south, Castle Street 
to the east, Strand Street to the north and Lower Plein 
Street to the west. The main Cape Town Bus Terminus 
is located between the Grand Parade and Strand Street 
to the north. Curiously, the service road accessing the 
bus terminus from Lower Plein and Castle Streets is also 
known as Castle Street, but is in fact a continuation of 
the Castle Street running between Strand and Hout 
Street to the west.
The Grand Parade was once the site of the first fort 
established by the Dutch East India Company at the Cape 
in 1652 (Abrahams, 1996). When the fort was abandoned 
the garrison was moved to the adjacent Castle that 
had subsequently been erected (Figure 3.2) (ibid.). 
The space was then used as a parade ground for the 
soldiers. According to Abrahams (1996:55), the Parade 
has subsequently been used an important public square 
for “civic functions, military parades, promenading the 
latest Victorian fashions, bi-weekly market stalls and 
more recently, political rallies, including the speech by 
Nelson Mandela in 1992 after his release from 27 years 
of political imprisonment ”. This speech was made from 
the main balcony of the City Hall (Thompson, 2017). 
Current City plans include celebrating this event with a 
statute of Mandela and an interpretive display (ibid.). 
Figure 3.1: Location of the Grand Parade in the Cape Town city centre, and case study area 
boundary (Source: by author, adapted from Google Maps, 2017)
Figure 3.2: Predicted location of the Fort on the present-day Grand Parade, from 
historical map overlays (Source: Abrahams, 1996)
N
41
The case study area is the Grand Parade. The boundaries 
for the study are defined as the streets officially 
recognised as the boundaries of the Parade, as detailed 
above and indicated in Figure 3.1. However, it must be 
noted that the physical and municipal boundaries of this 
space may or may not be recognised by traders and their 
customers on the Parade. Boundaries can be permeable 
and may have different meanings for different people. 
These meanings may be attached to real or perceived 
jurisdictional boundaries, or to spheres of influence. 
Mbembé and Nuttall (2004) note that individuals, goods 
and information move freely across boundaries into 
various spaces and interstices. 
False assumptions can also sometimes be made as to the 
existence of a community within a specific geographic 
extent (Ragin and Becker, 1992). In response to this, 
Keller (1968) argues that the existence of a geographically 
demarcated area is not proof of the existence of 
community, cohesive or otherwise. Therefore this 
study does not make the assumption that all traders 
operating on the Grand Parade are homogenous or 
make up a cohesive community. It is also for this reason 
that this study aims to include as many trader voices on 
the Parade as possible, bearing in mind the significant 
time constraint to this research. Sampling procedures 
employed in this study are discussed in detail in section 
3.5. This chapter now turns to a discussion on the 
Discourse Analysis method.
3.2.2. Discourse Analysis Method
‘Discourse’ can be thought of as the structuring of 
language in different patterns according to the differing 
domains of social life that people participate in 
(Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Specifically, a discourse is 
a “particular way of talking about and understanding the 
world (or an aspect of the world)”(Jørgensen and Phillips, 
2002:1). Discourse contributes to the construction 
of social identities, social relations, and systems of 
knowledge and meaning (ibid.). Thus, ‘discourse 
analysis’ is the analysis of these patterns. Morgan (2010) 
notes that discourse analysis is in fact an umbrella term 
for a number of approaches to analysing discourse, 
including critical discourse analysis (first developed by 
Norman Fairclough) and Foucauldian analysis (based on 
the theories of Michel Foucault).
A key advantage of the different methods of discourse 
analysis is that they can surface or aid in the construction 
of alternative social positions by research participants. 
Discourse analysis can also disrupt long held ideas of 
self, gender, autonomy, identity, and choice (Morgan, 
2010). This can play a part in empowering vulnerable 
individuals. Discourse analysis can also provide a positive 
social critique of the process under study (ibid.). As 
Morgan notes, the method is relevant and applicable in 
various times and places to different subjects. She also 
argues that discourse analysis, through understanding 
the function of language and discourse in a situated 
context, allows for both positive individual and social 
change.  It thus challenges traditional theory, policy 
and practice in a number of contexts. In this approach 
researchers cannot be neutral observers, as the method 
forces them to take a reflective stance (ibid.).
In this study, I analyse discourses contained within 
written texts (municipal policies and legislation) as well 
as verbal texts of key actors including traders, municipal 
officials, and a representative from a formal business 
on the Parade. I use the critical discourse analysis 
approach, in order to reveal the ‘language’, ‘institutional 
culture’, and ‘ideology’ of the public institutions and 
accompanying policies impacting street trading on the 
Grand Parade. In short, I use critical discourse analysis to 
uncover the meaning behind what is said. Morgan (2010) 
notes that as meaning is never fixed, everything is always 
open to interpretation and negotiation. Every analysis 
can give rise to further critique. Therefore, explanations 
of concepts such as street trading management and 
justification for their use in each analysis must be made 
(ibid.; cf. section 1.2).
Critical discourse analysis has been used in recent years 
to understand urban policy implementation processes 
(Jacobs, 2006). The methodological assumption is that 
urban policy is a field where varied interest groups aim 
to control a narrative for political ends (ibid.). Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) argue that political conflict is an important 
factor shaping public discourses. Also, Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough (1999) warn that personal discourses 
are often constrained by structural relationships of 
dependency. However, the line between public and 
personal discourses is not clear-cut. I attempt to 
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distinguish between the two in my research by analysing 
whether elements of personal discourses are derived 
from public discourses, or from lived experiences.
Critical discourse analysis has a number of benefits. 
Firstly, it can help illustrate how ideology influences 
policy change (Marston, 2002). Organisational actors 
often use ideological discourses to promote a policy 
agenda that is in their best interests (ibid.). In the case of 
the Grand Parade, critical discourse analysis allows me 
to surface these ideological discourses with regard to 
street trading management. Secondly, critical discourse 
analysis aids in changing urban policy practices. 
Marston (2004) contends that critical discourse 
analysis is particularly useful in focusing on ‘sites of 
resistance’, where individuals challenge “colonising 
discourses, inequalities and hierarchical power relations 
in organisational settings” (Marston, 2004:18). Lastly, 
a critical discourse analysis approach based on the 
work of Fairclough (1995), allows a more nuanced and 
relational analysis of the competing discourses around 
street trading management on the Grand Parade.
The chief limitation of critical discourse analysis is its 
subjectivity to a researcher’s biases and interpretations 
(Morgan, 2010). I address this limitation in section 3.4. 
In conclusion, while critical discourse analysis allows for 
a theoretically informed and nuanced study of urban 
policy, the usefulness of the analysis relies on careful 
selection of evidence, while also attempting not to over-
generalise from limited evidence (Jacobs, 2006). Thus, 
I am vigilant of the process I follow in selecting and 
interpreting evidence. 
3.2.3. Positioning
In an attempt to situate myself within my research, 
I acknowledge the limitations of the case study and 
discourse analysis research methods employed. In doing 
so I take inspiration from Tuhiwai Smith (1999:39), who 
urges researchers in the global South to carefully and 
critically engage with the “significant acts” that these 
research methods entail. Specifically, these significant 
acts are: 
The methodologies and methods of research, the 
theories that inform them, the questions which they 
generate and the writing styles they employ.
(Tuhiwai Smith, 1999:39)
Tuhiwai Smith (1999) notes this does not mean a total 
rejection of Western research or knowledge, but a 
centering of the concerns and worldviews of indigenous 
peoples. It also means “coming to know and understand 
theory and research from [their] own perspectives and 
for [their] own purposes” (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999:39). 
Most importantly, as Gbadegesin (1991) argues:
Africans cannot be in a strategic position to solve 
current problems and plan for a better future unless 
they are fully informed about their cultural pasts. 
Gbadegesin (1991:216)
Throughout this research process, I attempt to maintain 
awareness of my own and the research participants’ 
cultural pasts, in an effort to generate more useful 
research outcomes. In so doing, however, I am also 
aware of the pitfalls of romanticising any particular 
culture. It is to a discussion on the research techniques I 
use in this study that the chapter now turns.
3.3. Research Techniques
This section discusses the research techniques utilised 
in this research. The techniques are: non-participant 
observation and semi-structured individual interviews. 
The data collected using these techniques collectively 
yields answers to the research question. 
3.3.1. Non-Participant Observation
This technique is the first step in the research process. 
During non-participant observation, the researcher is an 
“outside observer” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:293), and 
does not involve themself in any of the activities taking 
place. I observe the activities being undertaken at the 
Grand Parade. I record my observations in a fieldwork 
notebook, as well as through photographs and sketches. 
While these notes are initially abridged in the field, they 
are elaborated upon soon after each interview while 
the experience is still fresh in my mind. These field 
notes also serve to document any unanticipated events 
encountered during the course of my research. Lastly, 
the fieldwork journal also records interpretation and 
analysis of findings on an on-going basis, as well as my 
thoughts on what research participants say, or have left 
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unsaid. Together these notes constitute another source 
of research data from which to draw.
Non-Participant observation, as an initial phase in the 
research process, enables an understanding of the use 
of the Grand Parade. In particular, this technique helps 
me identify, among others:
• The current forms of trading, their location, and
the physical structures that are used for trading
purposes.
• Elements that appear to be missing, for example
particular forms of infrastructure or services, and
what this signifies and suggests. This is corroborated
during the interviews.
• Additional information that would help to answer
the research questions, such as whether or not
physical infrastructure appears to have an enabling
or hindering effect on trading.
The observations are likely to provide a wealth of 
information while also raising a number of questions. 
The observations help shape the questions that are 
asked during the individual interviews. For example, the 
layout and physical infrastructure, such as the fencing 
around the food stalls on the Plein Street end of the 
Grand Parade, may appear to hinder customer access. 
This observation gives rise to questions on the layout 
and types of physical infrastructure on the Grand Parade. 
These questions have been posed to both traders and 
city officials. 
The main advantage of non-participant observations 
is that they provide information from spontaneous, 
unplanned and/or unexpected events. This technique is 
also useful in difficult contexts such as noisy, crowded 
settings like a public square. The limitation is that taking 
notes (or recording via photographs and/or film) while 
observing events might be distracting to the research 
participants. To counter this, I attempt to reduce the 
influence of my presence by building a limited rapport 
with the research participants, given the time available 
for this study. This will allow them to feel more at ease 
with my presence, and less reactive. I discuss reactivity 
in  section 3.4. The section now turns to a discussion of 
individual interviews. 
3.3.2. Individual interviews
The validity of a great deal of what we believe to be 
true about human beings hinges on the viability of the 
interview [as a research technique]. 
(Briggs, 1986: 1)
Individual interviews give research participants an 
opportunity for their voice to be heard. They provide 
important insights for the research while also surfacing 
the participant’s own subject-positioning (Hill Collins, 
1999). The interviews are semi-structured to ensure 
that information relating to impacts of street trading 
management on traders’ livelihood strategies on the 
Grand Parade may be uncovered. Semi-structured 
interviews are not according to a rigorous set of 
questions, but are open, allowing new ideas to be 
brought up during the interview as a result of what 
the interviewee says (Edwards and Holland, 2013). The 
interviewer in a semi-structured interview generally has 
a framework of themes to be explored (ibid.). As I am 
a less experienced researcher, I therefore make use of 
semi-structured interviews.
Holstein and Gubrium (2004) argue that all interviews 
are reality-constructing, meaning-making occasions 
and that the interview itself should become a site in 
which interviewers and interviewees co-construct data. 
Interviews enable the gathering of deeper insights 
through probing questions. Probing also gives rise to 
rich descriptions of the issue under study. As Babbie 
and Mouton (2001) note, probing, if done carefully, will 
not result in response bias in subsequent questions in 
an interview. I record and transcribe interviews for the 
purpose of inserting, verbatim, participants’ ‘accurate’ 
(or unedited) ‘voice’ (Hill Collins, 1986) in my research 
as evidence of a finding. It is important, as Roulston et 
al. (2003) warn, that a researcher avoids asking leading 
questions. Therefore, I carefully frame questions to 
avoid this pitfall.
The majority of the data is collected through interviews 
with street traders on the Grand Parade. All interviews 
are conducted in person, while allowing for follow-up 
interviews to happen via phone, and with the tone of 
each interview being conversational. As interviews 
can be time consuming, particularly for the research 
participants, I limit the number of semi-structured 
interviews with traders on the Parade to 12, with a trader 
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from Adderley Street, two blocks away from the Parade 
(cf. Figure 3.1) also interviewed. Additional interviews 
are conducted with city officials, law enforcement, 
and a representative of a formal business on the edge 
of the Parade. I discuss this in greater detail in section 
3.5, which outlines the sampling procedures. There are 
19 semi-structured interviews in total. The option of 
additional in-person or telephonic follow-up interviews 
is available and is used when clarification is needed.
The interviews are conducted in English, but participants 
are encouraged to use expressions in their mother tongue 
if these more accurately capture the sentiment they are 
trying to express. During follow-up interviews, I check the 
accuracy of translations to ensure that I have captured 
the intended meaning and understanding of what was 
said.  Ison (2005) argues that it is through language, 
metaphors and dialogue that understanding can arise. 
Conversely, it is also through language, metaphors and 
dialogue that misunderstandings may arise (Ngwenya, 
2013). As Ngwenya (2013) argues, this is particularly 
the case when researcher and research participant have 
different cultural backgrounds. Therefore, these follow-
up interviews are vital for understanding the voice of the 
research participant.
3.4. Reactivity and verification bias 
Interview questions are carefully considered in their 
construction and delivery in order to avoid, firstly, any 
leading questions which would influence a response 
that is biased towards the researcher’s perspective. 
Secondly, interview questions are carefully worded to 
reduce misunderstandings between participant and 
researcher. Roulston et al. (2003: 644) note that there is 
always a degree of uncertainty in the interview process 
and “one can never be sure what will occur”. Part of this 
uncertainty is a result of the fact that the researcher 
has an influence on the research itself. Consequently, a 
researcher must be aware of the impact they have on a 
research participant. Visser (2000 cited in Mandiyanike, 
2009: 64) argues that “positionality and the manner 
in which one is perceived inevitably influences the 
knowledge one produces”. Roulston et al. (2003) 
further note that a researcher positively and negatively 
influences the type of data produced by research 
participants. This is known as reactivity. Reactivity 
can influence participants in one of two ways (Bailey, 
2008). First, the researchers’ expectations can influence 
participants’ responses and/or behaviour positively. 
The researchers’ expectations can also influence 
participants’ responses and/or behaviour negatively. 
Thus, reactivity presents a threat to the internal validity 
of the research. Babbie and Mouton (2001: 122) argue 
that reactivity can increase the difficulty of conclusively 
establishing the true meaning of interview content. 
I note that in this research reactivity cannot be controlled 
for as in blind experiments. In order to diminish reactivity, 
two steps are taken. Firstly, the research participant is 
constructed as a co-researcher. Secondly, by spending 
time engaging with the co-researchers, rapport is built 
and reactivity is reduced. Comprehensive field notes are 
also taken during this engagement period to document 
the nuanced views of the participants. 
I now turn to the issue of verification bias. As I have 
argued in section 3.2.1 above, citing Flybjerg (2011), the 
case study method is sometimes subject to verification 
bias. This is the possibility of confirming the researcher’s 
preconceived notions. In order to counter this bias, I 
will check the findings with the research participants to 
ascertain whether or not my understanding is accurate. 
Prolonged engagement with the research participants 
also serves to create a rapport. The validity and reliability 
of this research is enhanced by making use of two 
different research techniques, namely non-participant 
observations and semi-structured interviews. This will 
allow for verification of the qualitative research findings. 
This verification will ensure that the findings presented 
in chapter 4 are indeed valid and reliable. The chapter 
now turns to a discussion of the sampling procedures 
utilised to select the interview respondents. While 
this research is qualitative in nature, it is nevertheless 
important to understand how the research participants 
were chosen.
3.5. Sampling Procedures
The sample comprises 7 women and 12 men. The majority 
of the research participants are traders operating on 
the Grand Parade. One trader interviewed operates 
from Adderley Street, near the Parade. I also interview 
municipal officials directly responsible for street trading 
management on the Grand Parade as well as officials in 
senior positions in the City department managing street 
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trading on a metro scale. Other interviewees include 
a law enforcement officer, as well as the manager of 
Texie’s Fishmarket and Takeaways, the sole formal 
business located in a building on the Grand Parade. 
Purposive sampling is utilised to select the research 
sample. This non-probability sampling method enables 
the researcher to make use of their knowledge of the 
population and research aims in order to select a sample. 
Snowball sampling, another non-probability sampling 
method, is also used in this research. Snowball sampling 
involves asking interview participants to identify other 
individuals who can be a part of the research.
Non-probability sampling methods, like snowball and 
purposive sampling, yield a sample whose:
[A]ggregate characteristics [will not] closely
approximate those same aggregate characteristics in
the population.
Babbie and Mouton (2001: 172)
Specifically, the sample is not representative of the 
population and can lead to bias. In order to address 
this I attempt to ensure that the excluded population 
of traders in my study does not differ significantly from 
the overall population on the Parade. In addition to the 
issue of representativity, there is a need to corroborate 
the information provided by research participants. This 
is accomplished by, firstly, including as wide a range 
of ‘voices’ of possible in the research process (Field, 
2012). Secondly, information is cross-checked with 
other research participants (such as municipal officials 
and a law enforcement officer, to mention two), media, 
academic reports, as well as documents in the public 
and private domains. This is done in order to ‘hear all 
sides of the story’. 
3.6. Ethical Considerations
One must be aware of the asymmetrical power 
relations between the research participants as well as 
between the researcher and the ‘researched’ (Field, 
2012). An asymmetrical power relation can present 
ethical problems, and these must be addressed. Firstly, 
informed consent must be considered. The research 
participants must be made aware of the study’s aim 
and their choice on whether or not to take part in the 
research. A consent form issued to prospective research 
participants outlines the nature of the research, and 
highlights the possibility that they can withdraw from 
the study at any time. I read through the form and 
explain the form to each respondent in the event that 
they are not fully comfortable reading English. Second, 
in terms of confidentiality, consent is requested for 
the use of participants’ name/designation/words in 
the research. In order to protect the anonymity of all 
research participants, I choose not to make use of 
any names. This aims to protect participants from any 
potential future recriminations that may result from 
utterances made during the research.
Prior to the start of this research, while working with an 
NGO, I met the leaders of the Grand Parade Merchants 
Association (GPMA), one of the traders’ associations 
represented on the Grand Parade. My prior relationship 
with GPMA leaders may possibly lead to perceptions of 
bias or favouritism. This may also become an issue during 
the research process. I address this issue by spending 
time with research participants who are members of 
different traders’ associations on the Parade in order to 
build up a similar level of rapport.
3.7. Data Analysis
I use Fairclough’s (1995) approach to critical discourse 
analysis to analyse all the data collected. Firstly, the 
interviews are transcribed, and as Roulston et al. (2003) 
note, this is a tedious process. Through multiple readings 
of the transcribed data, inconsistencies are noted and 
then clarified through follow-up consultations. Secondly, 
recurring categories are highlighted and assigned labels 
(coded). To order and structure the data, I use themes 
that correspond with the subsidiary research questions 
derived from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. This 
is done because, as Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) argue, 
texts cannot be understood or analysed in isolation. They 
argue that texts can only be understood in relation to 
networks of other texts - such as the literature reviewed 
- and in relation to the social context (ibid.).
Fairclough (1995) provides two dimensions on which 
to focus during data analysis. Firstly, one must focus on 
the ‘communicative event’, which can be the language 
contained in a media article or an interview. The 
communicative event is further broken down into three 
parts – texts, discursive practice and social practice. 
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The term texts refers to speech, writing, visual images 
or a combination of these. Discursive practice is the 
“production and consumption of texts” (Jørgensen and 
Phillips (2002: 68). The term social practice refers to 
how the discourse relates to wider power structures and 
ideology (ibid.). Secondly, one must focus on the ‘order 
of discourse’, which is the configuration of the different 
types of discourse used within a social institution 
(Fairclough, 1995: 66). Using Fairclough’s (1995) 
approach, I focus on texts, discursive practice and social 
practice in my analysis. The structured data is presented 
and analysed in Chapter 4.
3.8. Conclusion
This chapter began with a discussion of the research 
methods and techniques employed in this research, 
as well as an introduction of the case study area. The 
strengths and limitations of each were highlighted, 
and the chapter discussed how each limitation was 
addressed. The third part of this chapter detailed how 
the research participants were selected to participate in 
this study. This section also contained a discussion on the 
ethical considerations that are of concern to this study 
and how they were addressed. The chapter concluded 
with a discussion of the data analysis and interpretation 
techniques employed. 
It is to a discussion of context of the history of street 
trading on the Grand Parade, as well as current 







The case under study was introduced in Chapter 3. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a context of the 
history of street trading on the Grand Parade, as well 
as current management arrangements. To this end, the 
chapter is structured as follows. This chapter begins 
by contextualising trading on the Grand Parade from a 
historical perspective. As there currently exist only a few 
published accounts of the history of street trading on 
the Grand Parade, this discussion is primarily based on 
an article by Zinn (2014) and the interviews I conducted 
with traders as part of this research. This section is 
followed by a discussion of the current trading and 
management arrangements on the Parade. The chapter 
then turns to discussions on trader associations and 
operational management arrangements. Lastly, safety 
and security on the Parade are discussed. The chapter 
now turns to a discussion of the history of trading on the 
Grand Parade.
4.2. History of trading on the Parade: 
a snapshot
Trading, whether formal or informal, has occurred on or 
near the Grand Parade since colonial times (Abrahams, 
1993). Zinn (2014:Online) notes that until the early 
1980s, the Grand Parade was viewed as “the pulsating 
heart of Cape Town” where one had the opportunity to 
“buy anything from flowers and fruit to cold drinks and 
even property in Belville, all at one flea market.” Third-
generation sellers ran many stalls at the time (Ibid.). 
Figure 4.1: Saturday morning trading on The Grand Parade in 1894. 
(Source: Flickr, HiltonT)
Figure 4.2: “Smallie Hendriks has worked on the Grand 
Parade since 1958”. Here, according to Hendriks, “nothing 
changes, except the prices” (THE ARGUS, Tuesday November 
24, 1981). (Source: Environmental and Geographical Sciences 
Library, University of Cape Town. Original caption.)
Figure 4.3: “A customer makes a considered selection. 
Nowhere else in Cape Town will they have so much fruit to 
choose from” (THE ARGUS, Tuesday November 24, 1981). 
(Source: Environmental and Geographical Sciences Library, 
University of Cape Town. Original caption.)
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Today, two rows of food stalls, also known as kiosks, form 
an outdoor corridor along the Plein Street end of the 
Parade. These stretch from the corner of Darling Street 
where Texies Fishmarket stands (formerly known as the 
‘movie snaps’ corner) towards the bus terminus along 
Strand Street (cf. Figure 4.4). These stalls are housed 
in free standing plastered brick buildings clad in wood 
clapboard and corrugated iron roofs that reference a 
Victorian architectural style (cf. Figure 4.5).
These buildings were erected in 1983 to replace the 
previous “ramshackle” wooden stalls that possibly dated 
back to pre-World War II (Zinn, 2014). The City Council 
stated at the time that these new structures would 
“attract tourists, improve business and bring people 
back to the city centre.” (Ibid.). 
Figure 4.4: Location and arrangement of food kiosks on the Grand Parade (Source: Google Maps, 2017) 
Figure 4.5: Appearance of food kiosks on the Grand Parade 
(Source: Author, 2017)
Figure 4.6: “The colourful stalls have stood on the Parade for half a century but are now rotting and in need of replacement” 
(THE ARGUS, Saturday September 10, 1983). (Source: Environmental and Geographical Sciences Library, University of Cape 
Town. Original caption.)
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The City envisioned that the two rows of wooden stalls 
(at the time, 10 selling fruit and vegetables and 12 selling 
cold drinks and light snacks), would be “transformed 
into a pedestrian takeaway precinct where tables, 
chairs, umbrellas and pedestrian-scale lighting would 
contribute to creating a leisurely atmosphere” (Ibid). 
Parking on the Grand Parade would also be converted 
from ‘all-day’ to short-term parking. The plans also 
involved planting a row of trees down the centre of 
the outdoor mall created by the two rows of stalls as 
depicted in Figure 4.7 (Ibid.). 
Zinn (2014) notes that stallholders welcomed the 
upgrades, despite concerns that the character of the 
market would be affected. A stallholder (cited in Zinn, 
2014, Online) states: 
We are the character. The council is leaving the interior 
of the stalls up to us, the character of the Grande 
Parade will remain. 
Zinn (2014: Online) in agreement, argued “it is the 
people behind the counters [of the stalls] that hold the 
character of what would otherwise be disregarded as a 
lifeless inner-city space”. Another trader (cited in Zinn, 
2014: Online) stated that “it will be nice to rebuild, as 
long as they do not put the rent up”. However, the rent 
did go up. Zinn (2014) notes that there were serious 
misgivings over lease agreements between traders and 
the municipality. By May 1984, rent increases had forced 
25 per cent of the original 23 stallholders to reject 
further refurbishment of the Grand Parade stalls. This 
has poignant parallels with a current dispute between 
the kiosk vendors and the City over greatly increased 
monthly rentals, with one vendor’s rent rising from 
R3,400 to R260,000 in one month (Payne, 2017). In 
addition, this “bureaucratic error” (as termed by one 
Mayoral Committee Member) follows a dispute between 
vendors and the City over how to carry out an upgrade 
of the Grand Parade, which remains unresolved (ibid.).
Zinn (2014: Online) states that thirty years later, in the 
2010s, the Grand Parade is “strikingly unglamorous”. For 
her, there is a public nostalgia for the market as it once 
was, since the market is now “characterized by neglect” 
and a loss of its former ‘sense of place’ or ‘genius loci’ 
(Norberg-Schulz, 1979; cf. Chapter 2). Zinn (2014: 
Online) further argues that:
Disillusioned visitors can be found sitting on a park 
bench or leaning against a column reminiscent 
of 19th century vernacular, looking, waiting, 
commiserating, perhaps about a place’s soul that 
no longer smiles. The branches that spread from 
“majestic” rows of trees have been neglected too long 
to ever be a source of nurtured pride.
This loss of a ‘sense of place’ (‘genius loci’—i.e. the ‘soul’ 
referred to in the above quote) can be seen as a loss of 
the perceived concentrated use (‘vibrancy’ – cf. Chapter 
2) of the Grand Parade and a public view that the space is
now unsafe and suffering from neglect. Thus the current
negative ‘sense of place’ could be impacting the number
of visitors to the Parade and hence the sustainability of
trader livelihoods.
Figure 4.7: Outline of proposal (CAPE TIMES, Thursday 
December 10, 1981). (Source: Environmental and 
Geographical Sciences Library, University of Cape Town)
Figure 4.8: The Grand Parade food kiosks entrance near the 
bottom of Lower Plein Street, Cape Town in 2017. (Source: 
GroundUp, 2017)
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Zinn’s (2014) is just one contemporary perspective on 
the Grand Parade. It is to a discussion of the current 
trading and management arrangements that the 
discussion now turns. 
4.3.1. Current trading and 
management arrangements on the 
Parade
Of the 25 current food traders on the site, 9 have been on 
the Grand Parade for over 30 years (DAG, 2017). Many 
of them are the second or third generation occupants 
of the stores which were first occupied by their parents 
and grandparents (Ibid.). A survey of food kiosk holders 
carried out by the Grand Parade Merchants Association 
(GPMA)4 shows that these trader families have an 
accumulated total of at least 785 years of presence as 
kiosk holders on the Parade. The survey also reveals that 
currently approximately 25 stall leaseholders—their 100 
dependents, 261 employees and their dependents—
rely on income from these kiosks. The kiosks are open 
from 4am to midnight, 7 days a week, with only 3 stalls 
closing at 6pm and Sundays (interview with trader, 29 
August, 2017).
On Wednesdays and Saturdays, a ‘flea market’  is held 
on the Parade to the east of the food kiosks and up to 
a line drawn from the King Edward VII statue on the 
4  The GPMA represents the majority of traders in the food 
kiosks towards the Plein Street edge of the site. Refer to section 4.3.2 
for details on other trader associations present on the Grand Parade
Figure 4.10: Wednesday and Saturday market stalls (Saturday 
2 September, 2017) (Source: Author, 2017)
Figure 4.9: Location of markets on the Grand Parade including trader association representation 
(Source: Author, adapted from Google Maps, 2017)  
Darling Street side to the Strand Street Bus terminus 
(cf. Figure 4.9). Concrete bollards currently indicate this 
line. According to traders, this flea market, known as the 
Wednesday and Saturday Market, is the longest running 
informal market on the Grand Parade (interviews 
with traders, 29 August—5 September, 2017). The 
Wednesday and Saturday Market operates from 6am 
to 1pm on both days. All stalls have to be erected and 
taken down by these times. These stalls mostly consist 
of a steel canopy frame covered by a variety of different 
canopies and tarpaulins (cf. Figure 4.10).
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The stall components and stock are brought to the 
Parade in one of two ways. Firstly, they are stored in 
rented spaces in the nearby Buitenkant, Harrington, and 
Roeland Streets or in District Six. The rental agreements 
are informal (interviews with traders, 29 August—5 
September, 2017). The components and stock are 
transported to and from the Parade in steel trolleys 
by hired assistants, who are predominantly African 
migrants. These assistants are known as trolley-pushers, 
and these arrangements are also informal. Secondly, a 
minority of traders have their own vehicles and use these 
to transport stall components and stock from other sites 
in the city. A few traders store their stock in space rented 
from the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA). 
Storage costs up to R2,000 per month (ibid.).
The City regulates what goods can be sold via the 
conditions attached to trading permits. These conditions 
are detailed in Chapter 5. A City official (interview, 
City official A, 4 September, 2017) states that these 
condisitons avoid duplication of goods, and stop food 
being sold outside the food kiosk area. However, this 
quashes endogenous approaches to trading, and 
as Turok et al. (2017) note, mobile street trading is 
significantly more common globally than in South Africa. 
Traders have differing views on these conditions (cf. 
Chapter 5). One of the Wednesday and Saturday traders 
believes that trading conditions and the profitability 
of this market were “better in the 1980s” (interview, 2 
September, 2017). For him, the opening of a number 
of malls around the city—such as the V&A Waterfront, 
Century City and N1 City—has had a negative impact 
on business. He believes that customers that used to 
spend their Saturdays shopping on the Parade are now 
shopping in malls (ibid.).
Parked cars occupy most of the area taken up by the 
Wednesday and Saturday Market on the other days of 
the week. The City’s Facilities Management department 
currently operates this public parking (interview, City 
official B, 5 September, 2017). However, there appears 
to be little control of who parks here, as confirmed by 
the research participants.
On all other days, stalls operate in three areas. Firstly, in 
the area immediately east and north of the food kiosks, 
with those to the north arranged along the walkway 
between the steel entrance to the food kiosk area and 
 Figure 4.11: Storage spaces in Buitenkant, Harrington, and Roeland Streets & District Six. (Source: Author, adapted from 
Google Earth, 2017)  
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the public toilets towards the bus terminus (indicated by 
the narrower red band in Figure 4.10). Secondly, stalls 
are arranged along the Castle Street edge of the Parade 
adjacent to the Bus Terminus (the broader red area in 
Figure 4.8). Thirdly, stalls are arranged on the pavement 
along the Darling Street edge of the Grand Parade, 
facing the City Hall (the narrower yellow area in Figure 
4.10). All these stalls are erected and taken down daily. 
They are normally put up and taken down around 6am 
and 6pm respectively, but this is often dependent on the 
weather and the time of year. These stall components 
are of similar materials and stored and transported in 
the same manner as the stalls used for the Wednesday 
and Saturday Market. The City also regulates what goods 
can be sold at these stalls via the conditions attached to 
trading permits.
4.3.2. Trader associations, leases and 
permits
There are seven trader associations in total representing 
all trader types on the Grand Parade, namely food kiosk 
traders, day traders and Wednesday and Saturday 
traders5. All traders present on the Parade are members 
of an association. The advantages and disadvantages 
of being a member of an association, as well as the 
relations between associations will be revealed in the 
course of this chapter and Chapter 5 (interviews, 29 
August – 5 September, 2017). These associations are: 
5 Figure 4.9 indicates in parentheses the trading group each 
association caters for primarily
Grand Parade Merchants Association (GPMA), Grand 
Parade United Traders Association (GPUTA), Black 
Pirates, Wednesday and Saturday Traders, Hanover Park 
Traders, Bus Terminus Traders and the Historical Traders 
(cf. Figure 4.10). 
While the food kiosk traders have direct month-to-
month lease agreements with the City, the Wednesday 
and Saturday Market traders and the daily traders on the 
Parade pay fees for trading permits to their associations. 
Traders and trader leaders interviewed request that the 
fee amounts not be disclosed due to tensions between 
the associations resulting from differences in fees paid. 
The traders associations then pool the funds and pay 
the City (ibid.). Until the early 90s, the Wednesday and 
Saturday traders had individual leases with the City 
(interview, 2 September, 2017). Interviews reveal that 
this revenue collection arrangement was negotiated 
and agreed to by trader associations representing the 
Wednesday and Saturday traders and the daily traders, 
on the one hand, and the City on the other. However, 
a trader leader confirms that these arrangements are 
not contained in association constitutions (interview, 12 
October, 2017). These arrangements can therefore be 
viewed as informal.
The monthly rental fees paid by the kiosk holders are 
significantly higher than the monthly fees paid by the 
Wednesday and Saturday traders. The latter’s rental 
fees are in turn higher than those paid the daily traders 
(interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). Facilities, 
overhead costs and sizes of trading areas account 
for most of these differences. However, interview 
responses reveal a degree of animosity between the 
three trader groupings regarding fees, particularly when 
similar goods are being sold. This is most clear between 
the food kiosk traders and day traders who sell fruit, 
and between the Wednesday and Saturday traders 
and the day traders over non-foodstuffs. Incidentally, 
the manager of Texie’s Fishmarket and Takeaways, the 
sole formal business located in a building on the Grand 
Parade, views the kiosk traders and day traders that sell 
cool drinks as competition, and notes that these items 
can be “sold cheaper than us, because they don’t pay 
rent” (interview, Texie’s Manager, 29 August, 2017).
The day traders along the Darling street pavement have 
demarcated trading bays, which are indicated by painted 
lines and allocated by the City. All the other day traders 
do not have designated trading bays and set up according 
to informal arrangements between themselves, their 
associations and City officials (interview, 5 September, 
2017). The associations, in line with the revenue 
collection arrangement, allocate trading areas on the 
Parade to their members. The food kiosk holders, who 
are not subject to the allocation arrangements, view 
the system as disorganised (interview, 29 August, 2017). 
The City states that it “monitors the demarcated sites to 
ensure that traders comply with the City’s by-law and 
within their permit conditions” (interview, 4 September, 
2017). This by-law, namely the City of Cape Town 
Informal Trading By-Law of 2009 (amended in 2013) 
will be discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to the research 
findings. A City official interviewed states that “over-
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trading”—defined by this official as extending over the 
permitted stall size and bay area — and the selling of 
foodstuffs in contravention of permit conditions is a 
regular issue (interview, City official A, 4 September, 
2017). As such, the official conducts daily inspections 
of the Parade to look for these contraventions. Those 
found in contravention are “dealt with” (ibid.) as per City 
guidelines laid out in the Informal Trading Policy (2013: 
21): 
Where a trader violates the permit conditions, he/she 
will be informed in writing of the violation and course 
of action. A ‘three-strike system’ will be employed 
whereby two (2) written warnings will be issued 
before punitive action is taken. Permit fees will not be 
refundable if the permit is revoked or suspended.
Lease and permit administration is handled by the 
Property Management department (for the food kiosks) 
and the Economic Development Department (for the 
street side bays), with both based in the Civic Centre, 
less than a kilometre from the Parade (cf. Figure 4.12). 
In addition, the location of the local District Area 
Coordinator’s office is on the 13th floor of an office 
block adjacent to the Civic Centre, and is thus not easily 
accessible to traders.
This means traders must walk all the way to the Civic 
Centre if they need to renew or query their trading 
licence conditions. This impacts their trading activities, 
as they are forced to close their stalls when going to the 
Civic Centre (Interview, 29 August, 2017). The Property 
Management department deals with fee revenue 
collection from the trader associations that allocate bays 
on the Parade, as well as the lease agreements and fees 
of the kiosk holders. This is different to the procedure 
followed for trading in the rest of the City centre, 
where trading permit administration, bay allocation and 
revenue collection are all handled directly by the City’s 
Informal Trading function in the Economic Development 
Department.
4.3.3. Operational management
The daily operational management of the Parade is 
carried out by a City employee with the designation 
of Senior Foreman. He oversees the daily cleaning of 
the Parade by a dedicated team, deals with any ad-
hoc issues that may arise, and functions as the liaison 
between the traders and the City manager responsible 
for the Parade. This Senior Foreman has a small office in 
the upper storey of the row of kiosks on the Plein Street 
edge (cf. Figure 4.4). He reports to a manager with the 
title of Facility Manager within the Strategic Assets 
Department, which forms part of the City of Cape Town’s 
Tourism, Events and Economic Development cluster. 
This manager is based in an office in the City Hall 
bordering the Parade. The City views the Grand Parade 
as one of its four strategic assets, the others being 
Athlone Stadium, the Good Hope Centre and Cape Town 
Stadium (CoCT, 2017: Online). It views these public 
facilities as “key in promot[ing] Cape Town as a premier 
events destination” (ibid.). 
4.3.4. Safety and security
Interviews reveal that traders, city officials and law 
enforcement officers all view crime as a significant 
issue on the Parade. Traders believe that the crime in 
the area consists predominantly of pickpocketing, drug 
dealing and use, and theft (interviews, 29 August – 5 
September, 2017). The City (Thompson, 2017: Online) 
views “pickpocketing, robbery, illegal and roaming 
traders, and loitering” as the main crimes on the Parade. 
Figure 4.12: Location of Civic Centre in relation to the Grand 
Parade (Source: Author, adapted from Google Maps, 2017)
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Traders view many individuals who congregate on the 
Parade, that they identify as foreign nationals, and well 
as some of those migrants who work as trolley pushers, 
as the source of most of this crime. A Law Enforcement 
official echoes this view (interview, 31 August, 2017). The 
South African Police Services (SAPS) (cited in Thompson, 
2017) also claim that prison parolees are seeking refuge 
on the Parade, as “there is currently gang warfare on the 
Cape Flats”. The homeless that live on and around the 
Parade, particularly 
near the Castle, are 
viewed by most 
research participants 
as engaging in some 
of the forms of crime 
mentioned above. 
A City of Cape Town 
Law Enforcement 
caravan is present 
on the Parade and 
staffed by a rotating 
contingent of 18 
officers (Thompson, 
2017). These Law 
Enforcement officers 
are responsible for 
enforcing the City’s 
Streets and Public 
Places by-laws 
(Seapoint CPF, 2017). 
Both traders and municipal officials overseeing the 
Parade state that the officers leave and the caravan is 
locked between 6pm and 6am. It is important to note 
that there is no South African Police Services (SAPS) 
presence. Four Central City Improvement District (CCID) 
officers are present on the Parade, despite it not falling 
within the CCID boundary (Thompson, 2017). The City’s 
Facility manager notes this is an informal arrangement 
and these officers “are helping out” (interview, 5 
September, 2017). 
A Law Enforcement official, the Senior Foreman and 
the Facility Manager are in agreement that since the 
permanent stationing of the Law Enforcement caravan 
on the Parade at the start of 2017, crime has been 
significantly reduced. SAPS (cited in Thompson, 2017: 
Online) claim that in August 2017, “75 people were 
arrested on the Grand Parade for various crimes, while 
Law Enforcement made 19 arrests”. Published crime 
statistics for the Parade for 2017 are not currently 
available from SAPS, and thus these claims are difficult 
to verify. Most traders interviewed state that they 
have seen little improvement in crime levels in 2017. 
SAPS claim that they conduct daily operations on the 
Parade in conjunction with the City and CCID, including 
undercover officers (Thompson, 2017). Interviews with 
traders and field observations do not seem to confirm 
this. In addition, one trader (interview, 31 August, 2017) 
argues that SAPS’ claim of using undercover officers 
“could be a way of pretending that they have officers 
patrolling when they don’t”. 
CCID guards are sometimes assaulted by alleged drug 
dealers and criminals (interview, 5 September, 2017; 
Thompson, 2017). Traders complain that these guards 
have limited efficacy, as they do not have the power 
to arrest suspected criminals (interview, 29 August, 
2017). This view is confirmed by the manager of Texie’s 
(interview, 29 August, 2017). CCTV cameras have 
been mounted on a number of the tall lampposts on 
the Parade. Traders claim that City officials have said 
the cameras are not working (Thompson, 2017). They 
may perceive this as the City neglecting the safety and 
Figure 4.13: Organisational structure of reporting, management and lease agreements for 
traders on the Grand Parade (Source: Author, 2017)
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security of traders and their customers on the Parade. 
Traders state that crime has a definite negative impact 
on their trading operations and reduces the potential 
number of customers coming to the Parade (interviews, 
29 August – 5 September, 2017).
4.4. Conclusion
This chapter began with a discussion of the history 
of trading on the Grand Parade. This was followed by 
a discussion of the current trading and management 
arrangements on the Parade. The chapter then turned 
to discussions on trader associations and operational 
management arrangements. The chapter concluded 
with a discussion of safety and security on the Parade.








The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyse 
the research findings. The findings are assessed on the 
basis of the criteria established in Chapter 2. Findings 
reveal the complexities of the City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management approach on the Grand Parade, the 
underlying dominant discourse around street trading 
that informs this approach, and the impact that this 
management approach has on the livelihood strategies 
of traders on the Grand Parade. 
This chapter is structured in accordance with 
assessment criteria established in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 
begins with an assessment of the City’s street trading 
management approach against criteria for restrictive 
management. This is followed by an assessment against 
criteria for positive ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’, and 
the impact if this on trader livelihoods. In turn, criteria 
for developmental, pragmatic, and hence progressive 
street trading management are used to assess the 
City’s management approach. Based on these previous 
analyses, the chapter concludes with an assesment 
of the degree of alignment between the City of Cape 
Town’s street trading management practice on the 
Grand Parade and national developmental policies. But 
first I turn to an assesment of the City’s street trading 
management approach against criteria for restrictive 
management.
5.2. Assessing street trading 
management on the Grand Parade 
based on criteria for restrictive 
management
The overarching criteria for restrictive management set 
out in chapter 2 include: 
• Criminalising the poor and hindering livelihood
strategies;
• Engendering municipal corruption, violence and
mismanagement;
• Fostering informal arrangements, patronage and
aggression between traders, and;
• Producing resistance and adaptation on the part of
traders, both individually and collectively.
Each criterion is analysed with respect to the Grand 
Parade.
5.2.1. Criminalising the poor and 
hindering livelihood strategies
Formalisation6 of traders, referred to as “entrepreneurs” 
in the City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading Policy of 
2013 (CoCT, 2013:10), is to be encouraged incrementally 
6  The City of Cape Town (2013:10) notes at this point: “This 
does not mean full formalisation such as tax and business registration; 
it should be noted that some informal traders will never be in a 
position to formalise, nor are they aspiring to grow and develop to a 
point where the minimum criteria are met for formalisation”.
“as per their needs” and “as the business and 
entrepreneurs develop over time”. The policy makes 
no mention, however, if formalisation is also aimed at 
accommodating as many traders as possible within the 
city centre. The City and associations, through informal 
allocation arrangements, in practice limit the number 
of permits that can be provided for traders on the 
Parade. Law Enforcement removes those trading on 
the Parade without permits as per the Informal Trading 
Policy guidelines highlighted in Chapter 4 (interview, 
City official A, 4 August, 2017). Therefore those who do 
not have permits to trade on the Parade are forced to 
seek alternate possible trading locations, either through 
legal City permit allocation processes, or by illegal 
means, for example, sub-letting. Thus, both the Informal 
Trading Policy and the practices of permit allocation on 
the Parade, serve to illegitimise and criminalise poor 
individuals who seek to create a livelihood opportunity 
in the city centre. These limitations align with the criteria 
for restrictive street trading management.
As noted in Chapter 4, City officials view “over-trading”—
defined by them as extending over the permitted stall 
size and bay area — and the selling of foodstuffs in 
contravention of permit conditions as a regular issue. 
This indicates a form of resistance to permit conditions 
by traders. This could be a reaction to the size of the 
stalls or bays not being conducive to sustainable trader 
livelihoods, or denying endogenous approaches to 
trading, such as mobile food trading. The Cape Town 
Informal Trading By-law, derived from the Businesses 
Act of 1991, is, through limiting street trading and 
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determine the locations and manner in which street 
trading can occur, effectively criminalising traders (cf. 
Chapter 2; van der Heijden, 2012).
Enforcement of permit conditions, apart from over-
trading, often occurs under the guise of a police raid (in 
the case of suspected counterfeit goods) or a health and 
safety inspection (in the case of foodstuffs, particularly 
at the food kiosks). In relation to counterfeit goods, a 
trader couple (interview, 31 August, 2017) states that 
traders cater to a low-income market who cannot afford 
original goods. The couple also highlight that traders 
cannot afford to buy original goods for resale. While they 
understand the legal issues around counterfeit goods, 
they feel that the City hinders trader livelihoods and 
that it should “go after the China Malls, and the people 
that import this stuff into the country…they never get 
caught” (interview, 31 August, 2017). They say that it 
appears easier for the police to raid informal traders 
who are more vulnerable and have less legal resources 
than “the big guys” (interview, 31 August, 2017). 
Incidentally, the trader couple believe the closure of 
many textile manufacturers in Woodstock and Salt 
River, as a result of cheap Chinese imports, has pushed 
many of these former workers into informal trading as a 
livelihood strategy (interview, 31 August, 2017). The City 
acknowledges trader livelihoods are impacted by the 
“influx of competitively priced goods” (CoCT, 2013:6) 
in its Informal Trading Policy, but does not propose 
how to address this. As such, traders have no effective 
support from the City in this regard. Relevant street 
trading literature has little to say on ways of protecting 
traders from these types of influxes, but one can argue 
that in South Africa, the involvement of national and 
provincial levels of government is needed to address 
such systemic economic issues facing traders and other 
small businesses.
Traders believe the City hinders their livelihoods by 
making decisions without their input, including planning 
for events on the Parade, when they are often given little 
notice, and when their livelihoods are often affected 
(interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). Another 
example, related by traders is how they, or other traders 
they know personally, were previously trading but then 
removed from Green Market Square, Greenpoint or 
the Station Deck above the Cape Town Train Station, 
also known as the ‘Top Deck’. Each of these locations 
underwent revitalisation for the 2010 World Cup (cf. 
Chapter 2). 
Traders say that in each case the City side-lined 
them, and as Morange (2015) argues, in the case 
of Greenmarket Square, this was done through a 
superficially participatory process. One trader leader 
argues that many of the existing traders did not regain 
their trading spaces in these locations (interview, Trader 
association leader, 29 August, 2017). The traders feel 
that this is a pattern of harsh treatment from the City, 
while the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 also identifies 
a pattern of restrictive approaches characteristic of these 
revitalisation efforts. Traders feel that the Grand Parade 
is a “dumping ground” for not only traders from other 
markets in the city centre, but also for the homeless and 
criminals (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). 
A trader believes that this displacement of traders from 
other locations is one of the causes of tension among 
traders and trader associations on the Parade (interview, 
29 August, 2017). 
These tensions are produced by the inequitable and 
therefore unjust decision making process (cf. Fainstein, 
2010) that the City followed in these revitalisation 
efforts. The process did not follow two of Fainstein’s 
(2010) principles for equity in just public decision 
making. Firstly, that if relocation is necessary for the 
construction of public facilities, adequate compensation 
should be made in the form of an equivalent business 
site. And secondly, that construction should occur 
incrementally to allow for those that are displaced to 
remain in the area on an interim basis (Fainstein, 2010; 
cf. Chapter 2). The assessment in this section has shown 
that by criminalising the poor and hindering livelihood 
strategies, the City’s street trading management 
approach aligns with the criterion for restrictive 
management.
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5.2.2. Engendering municipal 
corruption, violence and 
mismanagement
Interviews with traders reveal allegations of municipal 
corruption (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). 
With reference to the allegedly common, but illegal 
practice of sub-letting of stall spaces, a trader (interview, 
29 August 2017) states:
If you know somebody there [the City] you might 
become successful. It’s mostly foreigners…and not 
necessarily because they have legally obtained it...
but because they know somebody up there or they 
paid somebody up there…so it’s definitely not the 
ideal situation. As far as these blocks are concerned…
it’s not working...they will tell you, you will go on to 
the waiting list for 2020 or something...there is no 
engagement whatsoever to even encourage you to 
make an application...it won’t be possible 
In response, a City official notes that the current 
electronic permitting system is more transparent, as 
the ‘human element’ has been removed in permit 
allocation. The official admits that there were previously 
allegations of corruption against certain City officals 
involved in permit allocation (interview, City official C, 
18 September 2017). This quote also indicates that the 
legal trading space scarcity in the city centre (410 bays) 
is forcing potential traders, including vulnerable foreign 
migrants, into sub-letting, and hence criminalising them.
While the research findings do not uncover any 
evidence of violence between City officials working on 
the Parade and traders, allegations are made concerning 
a raid on the food kiosks that occurred in early August 
2017.  Traders state that this raid was to check trading 
licenses. The traders allege that police and municipal 
officials threatened them verbally when asking for 
licences, which some traders were not able to produce 
on the spot as they stored them in other locations 
for safekeeping. The traders also state that they felt 
intimidated as the police were carrying guns. An elderly 
female owner of a kiosk felt anxious due to the manner 
in which the raid was conducted (interview, 29 August 
2017). The research findings do not indicate the levels of 
police aggression that occurred in Johannesburg during 
Operation Clean Sweep in 2013 (cf. Chapter 2), but they 
do indicate some level of violence, which is noted in 
the literature as a result of a restrictive street trading 
management approach.
Mismanagement of trading permits has been revealed 
by the research findings. Some traders as well as 
municipal officials argue that certain trader association 
leaders use the permit allocation and revenue role they 
play in ways that create personal profit. For example, 
some argue that they charge permit holders a fee 
higher than the official City permit fee, and pocket the 
difference (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). 
City officials and some traders also accuse certain trader 
association leaders of allowing sub-letting, when this is 
in fact prohibited. Food kiosk holders view the informal 
revenue collection and permit allocation arrangements 
as disorganised. These arrangements can also be seen as 
confirming the criterion for mismangement (cf. Chapter 
2).
Ultimately the City is responsible for managing trading 
on the Parade and thus the onus rests on them to 
ensure that the system of permit allocation and 
revenue collection is effective and has minimal scope 
for mismanagement. When questioned on this matter, a 
city official (interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017) 
argues that this system was inherited from previous 
administrations, and they would prefer to deal directly 
with individual traders. While this may be an opportunity 
for more effective permit management, it can also be 
seen as an attempt to reduce the collective voice and 
bargaining power held by trader associations.
Most traders view the City’s record keeping as being in 
disarray, as “they regularly ask us who is legal and who 
is not” (interview, 29 August, 2017) and that they are 
“not aware of who is sub-letting” (interview, 29 August, 
2017). They also state that a new lease agreement has 
yet to be drawn up by the City since the previous leases 
expired in 1996. City officials confirm this as the reason 
for the month-to-month nature of all current leases. This 
hampers the traders’ activities, as they are uncertain of 
their tenure security and rental payments, and cannot 
plan ahead or invest in the refurbishiment of their stalls 
(interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). Tenure 
insecurity is a common issue facing traders and hinders 
individual trader business growth (cf. Chapter 2).
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The research findings reveal an inconsistency between 
the systems of permit administration the Grand Parade, 
and that followed in the rest of the city centre. The 
convoluted nature of the departmental responsibilities 
for street trading management on the Grand Parade 
(cf. Chapter 4) and the inconsistencies in permit 
administration, can be viewed as mismanagement. 
This meets a criterion for restrictive street trading 
management.
5.2.3. Fostering informal 
arrangements, patronage and 
aggression between traders
The research findings indicate that the City’s street 
trading management approach on the Grand Parade 
fosters some informal arrangements, such as those 
around revenue collection and permit allocation, sub-
letting, and storage. Patronage, and aggression between 
traders, is also fostered. Informal arrangements involve 
City entities, traders and security guards, and the 
management inconsistencies mentioned in the previous 
section contribute to these informal arrangements. 
As highlighted in Chapter 4, four CCID officers patrol 
the Parade on the basis of an informal arrangement 
between the City and the CCID. Traders have informal 
arrangements with trolley pushers, who a City official 
alleges are also engaged in criminal activities on the 
Parade:
…We call these young men ooiers. I don’t know if they 
are Nigerians or whoever. In the morning there’s this 
place up in District Six where these traders park their 
trolleys. Most of them [the trolley pushers] sleep in 
Culemborg. They will be here early morning, go up, 
fetch the trolley of the trader and push it down…and 
then the trader will pay him X amount of money…and 
then tonight he or somebody else will push it back. 
These are also people who are part of the crime on 
the Parade during the day. When we address this, I 
say to the traders, please, you cannot have your bread 
buttered on both sides…you come and cry about the 
crime rate, you complain about the illegal activities. 
But these people who are part and parcel of the 
criminal activities taking place on the Parade, you still 
pay these people money…and now these people are 
claiming they are working on the Parade.
(interview, City official A, 4 September, 2017)
Traders also have informal rental arrangements with 
private individuals for storage of their stall components 
and stock in spaces in nearby Buitenkant, Harrington, 
and Roeland Streets or District Six. Traders who were 
interviewed state that no contracts are signed for the 
use of these storage spaces, rather the agreements are 
purely verbal (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 
2017). This is the same with arrangements between 
traders and trolleypushers. The trading permit allocation 
and revenue function of most traders associations on the 
Parade can also be viewed as an informal arrangement. 
It is not governed by any formal agreement with the City 
or contained in association constitutions (cf. Chapter 4).
The parking of cars on the Parade, both by traders as 
well as day parkers is also characterised by informal 
arrangements. Traders, mostly Wednesday and 
Saturday traders who have their own vehicles, have 
an arrangement with security guards that monitor the 
vehicular entrance to the Parade. Officially, it is illegal 
for traders to park on the Parade (interview, City official 
A, 4 September, 2017). Fieldwork observations and 
interviews with traders and City officials, confirm that a 
number of traders do park their vehicles on the Parade 
in resistance to this regulation.
Wednesday and Saturday traders use their vehicles as 
one non-permeable edge of their trading space in order 
to enclose the space and provide for easy loading and 
off-loading of stalls and goods (interview, City official A, 
4 September, 2017). This appears to be a response by 
traders to the lack of permanent stall infrastructure on 
the Parade, as well as a form of resistance to the City’s 
street trading management. City officials in charge of 
the Parade do not have any firm plans on how to resolve 
this issue (interviews, City officials A and B, 4 and 5 
September, 2017). 
Certain traders also allege patronage. They argue that 
leaders of certain trader associations have a “cosy” 
relationship with City officials and politicians (interviews, 
29 August – 5 September, 2017). This is evidenced by 
repeated favouritism shown by the City to the trader 
associations in matters that affect all trader associations 
(ibid.). These matters include permit irregularities, 
involvement in City-led workshops and discussions 
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around plans for traders when events are held on the 
Parade. A report on a workshop held in 2015, convened 
by the CTP to discuss the involvement of Grand Parade 
traders in the proposed City Walk, is revealing. 
According to the report, the meeting had two focal 
points: firstly, to discuss the “challenges felt by the 
traders operating in the central city”, and; secondly 
to “capture opportunities on how traders could 
meaningfully participate in the City Walk” (CTP, 2015 – 
original emphasis). However, the meeting’s participants 
only included representatives from two of the seven 
trader associations present on the Parade (GPUTA and 
Black Pirates). Individuals from these two associations 
are accused by certain traders of being subject to the 
patronage of City officials and politicians (interviews, 
29 August – 5 September, 2017). Roever (2006; cf. 
Chapter 2) argues informal arrangements, and the 
tendency by authorities to alternate between tolerance 
and repression of street trading produces relations of 
patronage. Therefore, it can be argued that the nature 
of the City’s street trading management approach has 
produced these elements of patronage.
While no research findings suggest violence between 
traders, fieldwork observations and interviews with 
Law Enforcement and City officials, indicate that 
there is aggression between some traders and trolley 
pushers (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). I 
witnessed an argument and subsequent fight at a trader 
stall, between a trader and a trolley pusher. These 
disagreements are said to occur regularly and concern 
payment for trolley pushing services. Traders and City 
officials state that when daily takings are low, some 
traders are not able or refuse to pay a trolley pusher. 
It is alleged that these arguments and incidents of 
aggression most often occur with traders trading on the 
Darling Street pavement facing the City Hall (interviews, 
29 August – 5 September, 2017). These traders are 
alleged to be foreign migrants sub-letting stalls (ibid.). 
According to some traders, this sub-letting takes place 
because of the alleged illegal residency status of some 
of the migrants (ibid.). This claim is difficult to verify as 
none of the traders in this area consented to interviews, 
possibly due to their multiple vulnerable statuses. The 
trolley pushers are also predominantly foreign migrants 
and this could appear to be a case of tensions and 
aggression between two marginalised and vulnerable 
groups. 
These tensions can be analysed against the literature 
reviewed. When assessed against the criteria of 
engendering violence and fostering aggression between 
traders, that are produced by a restrictive street trading 
management approach (cf. Chapter 2), one can argue 
that the context of legal trading space scarcity forces 
traders into competition, which may lead to attempts at 
delegitimising other traders, particularly foreign traders 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016; cf. Chapter 2). Nationality and legal 
trading space scarcity are conflated into xenophobia. 
There are also tensions between traders and homeless 
people on the Parade, with a number of the homeless 
alleged to be foreign migrants (cf. Chapter 4). It can be 
argued that the precarious nature of street trading, due 
to trading space scarcity and lack of tenure security, 
hinders access by foreign migrants to the livelihood 
opportunity that street trading provides, and puts 
further pressure on already vulnerable and marginalised 
groups. Hence they are further marginalised and can 
perhaps be pushed into homelessness and crime. Further 
research could be conducted to explore if this is indeed 
the case in the Cape Town city centre. These tensions 
once again impact on the ability of the City to manage 
street trading effectively (from their perspective), and 
serve as a further hindrance to trader livelihoods.
Tension between associations results from differences in 
fees paid, and the lack of transparency around revenue 
collection and permit allocation arrangements. The 
animosity felt between traders selling similar items (cf. 
Chapter 4), once again echoes the tensions identified 
with a restrictive street trading management approach.
The fact that the Grand Parade is managed by the 
Strategic Assets Department, and not Economic 
Development as in the rest of the city centre, means that 
bays on the Parade are not governed by the trading plan 
for the city centre. This convoluted management has 
produced the informal arrangements around revenue 
collection and permit allocation on the Parade. Traders 
do not have recourse to legally binding agreements, and 
are subject to possible prejudice in the allocation of 
bays. Allegations of corruption in the informal revenue 
collection and permit allocation process also show that 
traders do not view this process as transparent. For 
city officials managing or planning for street trading, 
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these informal arrangements and the tensions they 
produce, between traders, associations and the City, 
make the management approach unsustainable and 
the formulation of plans difficult (cf. Chapter 2). It is 
plausible that the lack of equity in the City’s restrictive 
management approach produces a lack of efficiency 
(from a City perspective) and possible management 
failure (Bénit-Gbaffou 2015; cf. Chapter 2). 
5.2.4. Producing resistance and 
adaptation on the part of traders, 
both collectively and individually 
Research findings reveal a level of resistance and 
adaptation (cf. Chapter 2) to the City’s street trading 
management approach on the Grand Parade. A trader 
association leader (interview, 4 September, 2017) states:
You have had to kick down doors at the City. Threaten 
the City with certain things…marches and all of this…
to make people aware and listen - this is a voice that is 
coming…this is a voice you are going to deal with….it is 
not going away. That is where we are at the moment. 
Currently the City’s door is not really open, it’s slightly 
open, but at least we have our foot in the door
This quote and the language used, indicate a discourse 
of collective resistance being produced and maintained 
by trader association leaders. A perception of 
disempowerment created by the City’s street trading 
management approach has produced a discourse of 
claiming power for traders. However, research findings 
reveal that this is rarely acted upon, for example 
through marches, protests, or rent boycotts. Only one 
march took place, in 2016, calling for a return of the old 
Green Point market that was closed in 2009 due to the 
construction of Cape Town Stadium for the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup (Hirsch, 2016).
An official (interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017) 
explains that there has also been resistance by traders 
to a proposed City-led upgrade of the food kiosks:
We wanted them to stop trading for 3 months so we 
can fix their places up. They said no, we don’t want to 
give up this place. But the place is in a mess. There are 
rats all over. But they don’t want us to clean it up. They 
want to continue trading in those conditions, but they 
want us to fix it while they are trading there. We can’t 
do that, we need them to vacate the place… It’s not our 
responsibility to provide them an alternative, if they 
want to continue trading some other place. But they 
actually expected us to put up temporary structures. 
But we don’t have that kind of budget. We either do 
the one or the other…or we just demolish the kiosks 
and then what are they going to do?
This particular quote highlights the irritation felt by this 
City official towards seemingly irrational resistance from 
traders, from the official’s perspective. This attitude and 
proposed process does not align with Fainstein’s (2010) 
principles for equity in just public decision making that 
were discussed earlier in relation to relocations linked to 
the 2010 FIFA World Cup. It also shows an insensitivity 
on the part of the City and that in fact, contrary to the 
developmental intentions of the Informal Trading Policy, 
management practice does not support informal trading. 
This can be seen a case of ‘conflicting rationalities’ 
(Watson, 2003, cf. Chapter 2). The conflicting rationalities 
of traders and officials, on the one hand, and between 
the actions of officials and the City’s Informal Trading 
Policy directives. This is addressed in more detail later 
in this chapter.
As noted in Chapter 4, there is also individual resistance 
to complying with certain regulations, including 
permit conditions, stall sizes and parking. City officials 
(interviews, 4 and 5 September, 2017) note that traders 
have tried to sell food in the ‘informal’ area of the 
Parade, while the sale of food is only allowed in the food 
kiosks, as per lease agreements. Officials inspect for 
these “contraventions” (interview, 4 September, 2017) 
and notify the trader associations to “deal with” these 
members. 
Evidence of adaptation (cf. Chapter 2) to the City’s street 
trading management approach on the Grand Parade can 
be seen in the responses of trader association leaders. 
Many of those interviewed express a need for closer 
cooperation between associations. They acknowledge 
that if they can get over their disagreements and form 
an umbrella body, then they will be able to “talk with 
one voice” (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017).
The research findings align closely with the criteria for 
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restrictive management set out in Chapter 2. The City’s 
management approach, by placing restrictions on the 
number of legal trading spaces, and where and what to 
sell, produces resistance, adaptation and informality on 
the part of traders in order to sustain their livelihoods. 
5.3. Assessing street trading 
management on the Grand Parade 
based on criteria for a positive 
‘genius loci’ and impact on trader 
livelihood strategies
The criteria for positive ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ 
in relation to street trading in public spaces as set out in 
Chapter 2 are 
• Concentrated use;
• Feelings of safety.
Zinn (2014: Online; cf. Chapter 4) argues that that 
the Grand Parade is “strikingly unglamorous” and 
“characterized by neglect” and a loss of its former 
‘sense of place’. Traders confirm there are fewer visitors 
to the Parade, and hence their incomes have suffered 
(interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). This cannot 
be independently verified as no pedestrian counts are 
currently available for the Grand Parade. A reduction in 
visitors and potential customers to the Parade speaks 
to a drop in the concentrated use and ‘vibrancy’ of 
the space, as also alluded to by Zinn (2014: Online; cf. 
Chapter 4).
While part of the drop in numbers can be attributed to 
the opening of malls near the city centre, as claimed by a 
trader (cf. Chapter 4), crime and neglect appear to have 
played the largest part. Traders allege that crime is a 
major problem on the Parade and is affecting their trade 
(cf. Chapter 4). Media articles (Thompson, 2017; Serra, 
2016) confirm the existence of high crime levels. Despite 
claims by a Law Enforcement officer, the Senior Foreman 
and the Facility Manager on the Parade, that crime has 
been significantly reduced, most traders interviewed 
state that they have seen little improvement in crime 
levels in 2017 (cf. Chapter 4). 
Traders complain that CCID guards have limited efficacy, 
as they do not have the power to arrest suspected 
criminals (cf. Chapter 4). Traders, also claim that City 
officials have told them that the CCTV cameras are not 
working. This may be perceived as the City not taking 
seriously the perceptions of safety and security of 
traders and their customers on the Parade (cf. Chapter 
4).
Therefore, it appears that there are a number of safety 
and security concerns in the public view (Thompson, 
2017; Serra, 2016) and among traders. This has reduced 
feelings of safety on the Parade and contributed to a 
drop in visitors and potential customers. In turn, this has 
affected trader livelihoods. These findings do not align 
with the criteria for a positive ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense 
of place’, but rather a negative one. This confirms the 
argument that the former ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ 
(Norberg-Schulz, 1979; cf. Chapter 2) of the Parade has 
been lost (Zinn:2014; cf. Chapter 4). While broader socio-
ecomic factors affect the Grand Parade and contribute to 
crime, it can be concluded that the inability of the City’s 
street trading management approach on the Parade to 
successfully address issues of crime and neglect thus 
hinders trader livelihood strategies (cf. Chapter 2).
City managers and planners will have to acknowledge 
these impacts in order to craft management strategies 
and plans that attempt to move the Parade towards a 
more positive sense of place, and in so doing support 
trader livelihoods. 
5.4. Assessing street trading 
management on the Grand Parade 
based on criteria for progressive 
street trading management
The criteria for a progressive street trading management 
approach are: developmental and pragmatic. Each 
criterion is used to assess the Grand Parade case in the 
sections that follow.
5.4.1. Developmental
The assessment criteria for developmental street trading 
management approaches are: 
• Ease of access for new entrants with limited financial
capital;
• Support and services to sustain livelihoods; and
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• Differentiated support structures for survivalist and
entrepreneurial street traders.
5.4.1.1. Ease of access to new 
entrants with limited financial capital
Before dealing with the cost of trading permit 
applications and other costs associated with becoming a 
legally recognised trader on the Grand Parade, one must 
consider the trading permit application process itself. 
The City’s website and the District Area Coordinator’s 
Office at the Civic Centre, which deals with informal 
trading applications, are the only publicly available 
sources of information on applying for a trading permit 
(interview, 29 August, 2017). This precludes easy access 
to information for potential traders, as multiple forms 
of information access are not available, for example at 
other civic centres or Department of Labour offices. 
Older individuals who are not information technology 
(IT) literate or those with mobility challenges are 
disadvantaged. 
In addition, the information on the website is only 
available in English, which disadvantages individuals 
whose home language is not English. Only 28% of Cape 
Town’s population speak English as their home language 
(StatsSA, 2011). Afrikaans and isiXhosa, are the home 
languages of 35% and 29% of the city’s population 
respectively (ibid.). These disadvantages can be seen 
as infringing on potential traders’ right to freedom of 
trade, occupation and profession, as contained in the 
Bill of Rights, as well as not meeting Fainstein’s (2010) 
principle for diversity in just governance, that authorities 
“should assist groups who have historically suffered 
from discrimination in achieving access to opportunity 
in… employment” (Fainstein, 2010:174; cf. Chapter 2). 
This also runs counter to the criteria for a developmental 
street trading management approach (cf. Chapter 2).
All applications for an informal trading permit must be 
made online. The City has made provision for traders 
to be assisted to complete the online application at 
the District Area Coordinator’s office. In order to apply 
for an informal trading permit, the applicant must first 
register for an e-Services account. An e-Services account 
requires an identity document (ID) and a “business 
partner number”, which is the reference number the 
City uses to identify residents on their system. This 
number is “found on the third line in the header of 
[the] municipal account statement” (CoCT, 2017a). 
This requirement further serves to exclude individuals 
who reside in rented or informal accommodation, and 
foreign nationals who may not be in possession of valid 
residence permits. It may be for this reason, that some 
foreign nationals are sub-letting their stalls. 
Once registered on the e-Services system, the applicant 
must be “activated” on the Informal Trading Bay service 
(also known as the electronic permitting system). To 
activate this service, the applicant will need an ID and 
business partner number (as before), as well as a digital 
copy of their ID (scanned document) and their own 
email address. This once again disadvantages those who 
are not IT literate. Once the applicant has been granted 
access to the service, they can apply for an available 
trading bay. Supporting documentation needed for this 
includes an identification document (ID/work permit/
passport), proof of address, affidavit of unemployment 
and a photograph. The applicant is also asked to provide 
as much detail about their proposed trading as possible, 
as well as whether they “will be able to meet the required 
number of trading hours, et cetera”(CoCT, 2017a). 
On receipt of an application, the electronic permitting 
system preselects an applicant “based on the highest 
score” (CoCT, 2017a). This score, or how it is determined, 
is not explained on the website. The score is assumed to 
refer to the criteria and considerations for bay allocation 
listed in Section 9.5.4. of the City’s Informal Trading 
Policy (CoCT, 2013:19):
a) Applicants must be:
i. existing informal traders, or
ii. desire to become informal traders (provided they
comply with the requirements below, and may be for
example, informal employees, seeking to establish
their own business)
b) The nature of the goods and services should not
conflict with or unduly compete with:
i. the type of goods/services sold by formal businesses
in the trading area/ or close to the bay
ii. the type of goods/services, sold informally, in the
same trading area;
c) Unemployed people will get preference
d) Where bays are available, traders operating more
frequently will get preference over occasional/casual
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traders within the trading area 
e) The applicants ability to meet the trading hours set
for the trading area
f) Preference will be given to Historically Disadvantaged
Individuals
g) Consideration shall be given to new traders to the
City database
h) Only one bay will be allocated per trader
i) Preference will be given to traders who do not trade
in any other trading area
j) Preference will be given to those who do not share
the same household with an existing permit holder,
provided that
i. There are more trading bays than applicants
ii. The applicant is not economically dependent on the
existing permit holder
k) Preference will be given to applicants who reside
in, or close to, the trading area for which the permit
is applied
l) The trader must be in possession of a valid South
African identity document or relevant documents
allowing the individual to working permit.
m) In the case of foodstuffs being processed and
traded, the trader must be in possession of the required
Business License (and Certificate of Acceptability)
On selection, a screening interview is conducted. 
Questions cover similar criteria to those in Section 
9.5.4 of the Informal Trading Policy, such as whether 
the applicant is a historically disadvantaged individual 
and if they are a “new entrant to Informal Trading with 
the City”(CoCT, 2017a:19). One of the questions asks: 
“Does the trading good/service which the applicant 
intends selling/rendering, positively contributes (sic) 
to the nature of business within the trading area or its 
immediate vicinity?” (CoCT, 2017a). One wonders how a 
trader could answer that question. 
A successful applicant is then allocated a trading bay 
according to the approved informal trading plan for 
the area in which the bay is located. Once an informal 
trading permit fee is paid, an informal trading permit is 
issued (CoCT, 2017a). Selling food as an informal trader 
requires an additional “hawking in meals” licence, and a 
certificate of acceptability from an environmental health 
office that governs food safety and hygiene regulations. 
An existing trader does not feel the permit application 
process is accessible. The trader (interview, 29 August, 
2017) notes that:
Any City department…Water, Electricity or any 
department…try phoning them. I don’t think the City 
attempts to enhance the communication with the 
informal sector. Try going to the Civic Centre to apply 
for a permit, for instance.
As can be seen from the above description of the trading 
permit application process, it is far from simple and 
disadvantages potential traders in a number of ways. 
The mission statement contained in the City’s Informal 
Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013) reads: 
Through a developmental approach, the City seeks to 
facilitate the (sic) access to job and entrepreneurial 
opportunities within the informal trading sector. 
As argued above, one may legitimately question whether 
the trading permit application process in fact promotes 
accessibility. This process will need to be addressed to 
further the aims of access and freedom of trade.
The cost of a permit depends on the type of trading 
undertaken as well as trading needs (CoCT, 2017). 
Monthly tariffs range from R20 for a 1,5m x 1,5m bay 
to R1 440 for a lockable container (Ibid.). A “hawking 
in meals” licence costs R10 (Ibid.). To understand the 
affordability of these costs one must look at the city’s 
income statistics. The proportion of households in 
Cape Town that fall within the low income category, 
which ranges from no income to just over R50 000 
annually (R4 166 per month), varies between locations 
in the metropolitan area (WCPG, 2017). For example, 
approximately 63 per cent of households in the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchells Plain district fall within the 
low income bracket, of which 16.5 per cent have no 
income (Ibid.). Most traders do not reside close to the 
Grand Parade (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 
2017). The average household expenditure on food, 
housing and transport in South Africa in 2015 was 62 
percent (StatsSA, 2015). This means that the maximum 
monthly disposable household income for low income 
households (not including health, education and other 
costs) in Cape Town is around R1580. This is not much 
more than the monthly tariff for a lockable container. 
Taking into account the number of households with no 
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income, even the R20 monthly tariff for a 1,5m x 1,5m 
bay is significant.
In addition to permit costs, there are storage costs of up 
to R2,000/month, stock purchases, trolley pusher and 
employee costs. The standardised steel canopy frame 
used by traders for shelter is not provided by municipal 
authorities. The structure costs approximately R1,500 
and is made by arrangement with metal workshops 
around the city (interview, 29 August, 2017). No formal 
loan facilities are available to traders (interview, Trader 
association leader, 2 September, 2017). Lastly, as 
indicated in Chapter 4, traders must walk all the way 
to the Civic Centre if they need to renew or query their 
trading permits. This affects their trading activities, as 
they are forced to close their stalls when doing so. The 
lack of an accessible area-based project office, as in the 
eThekwini model (cf. Chapter), means direct engagement 
is not enabled. Assessing against the criterion of ease 
of access to new entrants, this highlights the diffcult 
nature of engaging the City as a trader. Taking both the 
direct financial costs (application and permit fees, and 
trading costs) and the indirect costs associated with 
the application process, it can be concluded that access 
to new entrants with limited financial capital can be 
improved. 
5.4.1.2. Support and services to 
sustain livelihoods
The City’s self-stated developmental Informal Trading 
Policy details organisational and individual support 
measures for traders (CocT, 2013). The organisational 
measures include the establishment of Multi-
stakeholder Engagement Forums, Representative 
Organisations, and Industry Development Organisations 
(Ibid.). First, the multi-stakeholder engagement forums 
are to be established by the City at Metro and District 
level and “serve to identify problems, solutions and set 
the direction for the development of the sector in the 
respective areas” (CocT, 2013: 11). These forums are also 
intended to “spread information to the sector via the 
representative organisations” (Ibid.). Second, support to 
and assistance with the establishment of Representative 
Organisations or trader associations is to be offered. Third, 
“industry-specific intermediaries (private sector firms or 
purpose-built development organisations)” (Ibid.) offer 
development and business support. Specifically, this 
support would entail “perform[ing] functions on behalf 
of informal traders such as product design, mentorship, 
contract negotiation, and a business interface role with 
respect to informal enterprises.” (Ibid).
The individual support measures are both direct and 
indirect (CocT, 2013). The direct support includes 
firstly, business or technical training and mentorship. 
Secondly, “new traders will be encouraged to join a 
trader association in the trading area” (CocT, 2013:19). 
Thirdly, the policy states that traders will be encouraged 
to register at “industry-development organisations 
related to the trader’s goods/service (should those be 
available)” (Ibid.). Ongoing indirect support is viewed by 
the City as the provision of: a) roads, water, sanitation; 
b) spatial and land use planning; c) site identification,
preparation and development; d) contract development 
and legal services, and; e) management and regulatory 
services (Ibid.).
Interviews reveal that a number of these support 
measures are not in effect. While a monthly meeting is 
held by the City’s Facility Manager for the Parade, this 
meeting involves only two stakeholders: namely trader 
association representatives, and the Facility Manager. 
The Facility Manager represents the Tourism, Events 
and Economic Development department of the City, 
but no other relevant City departments are present. In 
addition, Law Enforcement, the CCID and surrounding 
business owners/managers are not represented. 
No area-based multi-stakeholder engagement forum 
exists (interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017). 
This impacts the possibilities for more effective 
engagement and trader support. On a broader city level, 
no permanent multi-stakeholder engagement forum 
currently exists (interview, City official B, 5 September, 
2017). While such a structure is mandated in the City’s 
Informal Trading Policy, the annual Informal Economy 
Summit7 and quarterly ‘Round Tables’ (that rotate to 
different areas of the city centre) do not include sufficient 
relevant stakeholders and offer limited opportunities for 
trader engagement, a view shared by both trader leaders 
and City officials (interviews, 29 August – 12 October, 
7  In the City’s own words, “the Informal Economy Summit 
is an Area Economic Development Department [event] that is held 
annually to get a better understanding of the problems and issues 
that faces (sic) the sector” (CoCT: 2017:1)
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2017). In fact, no ‘Round Table’ has been held for the 
Grand Parade due to the convoluted City management 
arrangements and tensions between trader associations 
on the Parade (interview, City official E, 2 October, 
2017). This also bears a negative consequence for 
developmental street trading management and trader 
engagement possibilities.
Research findings reveal some evidence of capacity 
building and engagement. According to a trader 
association leader:
We also work with the City on a leadership training 
program for members to send their leaders to. People 
are not skilled enough to run an organisation. We have 
these programs now…it is supported by the city.
(interview, Trader association leader, 4 September, 
2017)
We now have these by-law workshops. We felt that the 
by-laws were more protecting the City than us. But it 
is open to amendment for the next 2 years, so we can 
still revisit it.
(interview, Trader association leader, 4 September, 
2017)
A City official states that the City is investigating the 
possiblity of part or full self-management of street 
trading markets in appropriate contexts (interview, City 
official D, 3 October, 2017). They suggest that the Grand 
Parade could be a candidate for such a model. While 
there are benefits to self-management, I argue that 
this is premature. The current tensions between trader 
associations on the Parade, and the lack of existing 
trader capacity, serve to hamper any successful self-
management of trading. The City has also recently signed 
an agreement outsourcing street trading management 
of Greenmarket Square and St Georges Mall to the CCID 
(interview, City official E, 13 October, 2017). However, 
research has shown (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009; Bénit-
Gbaffou, 2015; cf. Chapter 2) that contracting street 
trading management to private companies or CIDs is not 
generally beneficial to trader livelihoods. These models 
are not trader-centric, the managing agents have little 
experience or understanding of the needs of traders, 
and the models are not financially secure due to reliance 
on internal or CID levy funding (ibid.).
Most of the trader association leaders interviewed 
express their frustrations with the level of engagement 
from the City, the lack of trader association involvement 
in strategic decision-making impacting their livelihoods, 
and the lack of a broader number of stakeholders in 
the forums that do exist. A trader association leader 
(interview, 29 August, 2017) expresses that:
[I]f they are really serious with the Parade…currently
we are meeting with...I don’t know what’s his
portfolio…the guy we are meeting with? If we can sit
with someone higher on the decision making side.
From the association’s side we are sitting with people
who can’t make decisions. If the forum is not going to
bear fruit then we will lose interest, and then it will take
longer on the next round. It’s about how serious the
City is with getting the Parade on track. If the City is 
more transparent with their future plans it will help, 
because currently we don’t know whether to revamp 
our shops or what to do. We know there is something in 
the pipeline, but the City is not forthcoming with those 
things.
One trader body has responded to this lack of engagement 
and support by attempting to build a broader coalition 
of trader associations in the Cape Metro and Western 
Cape. The Western Cape Informal Traders Coalition 
(WCITC) has held annual trader association summits 
for the past three years (interview, Trader association 
leader, 4 September, 2017). A trader association leader, 
who is involved in WCITC, states:
As a coalition we try to educate people about their 
rights, access to legal advice, skills programs. The city 
has for the last three years come to the party…after 
we put a memorandum to the Mayor indicating that 
we will have a summit. After last year’s summit and 
this year there is more participation. It’s about us…we 
can also give input….As the WCITC we try to mobilise 
all traders, and we become the mouthpiece for you at 
the city level
(interview, Trader association leader, 4 September, 
2017)
It can be concluded from the research findings that 
while the stated developmental approach to street 
trading contained in the City’s Informal Trading Policy 
encourages organisational and individual support 
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measures for traders, the street trading management 
practice does not reflect this. Therefore a significant 
degree of support and services to sustain livelihoods is 
not being provided. Assesing against the developmental 
street trading management criterion of support and 
services to sustain livelihoods, it can be concluded that 
the developmental aspects of the City’s street trading 
management approach are limited in this respect.
5.4.1.3. Differentiated support 
structures for survivalist and 
entrepreneurial street traders
On the Grand Parade, interviews reveal that three trader 
groupings can be considered as entrepreneurial. These are 
the food kiosk owners, the more established Wednesday 
and Saturday traders, and the more established day 
traders. Each of these groupings can be characterised by 
two criteria. Firstly, each has employees. Secondly, each 
is strongly represented in trader association leadership. 
This indicates a level of financial stability to take up this 
unpaid role (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; cf. Chapter 2). Less 
established daily traders, mainly those on the Darling 
Street edge, and the less established Wednesday and 
Saturday traders can be viewed as survivalist. These 
groupings can be characterised by the inverse of the 
criteria for entrepreneurial traders: no employees, and 
no representation in trader association leadership. 
Interviews reveal no differentiated support structures 
between survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders 
on the Parade (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 
2017). Both types of traders are thus not supported in a 
context specific fashion considering they have different 
needs. The implications for planning are two-fold.  Firstly, 
entrepreneurial traders are not allowed the opportunity 
to expand by paying more for extra trading bays (Bénit-
Gbaffou, 2015; cf. Chapter 2). Therefore the opportunity 
to lower costs and improve access to survivalist traders 
through cross-subsidisation is foregone. Business 
development training that could allow for these traders 
to grow their businesses and perhaps transition into 
formal businesses is also lost. Secondly, targeted support 
for survivalist traders, understanding their specific needs 
and the constraints on their business, could enable 
them to attain greater livelihood and food security. 
The developmental aims of the City’s Informal Trading 
Policy are not borne out in differentiated support, when 
assessed against this criterion. It can be concluded that 
this limits the developmental nature of the City’s street 
trading management approach on the Grand Parade.
5.4.2. Pragmatic
The assessment criteria for analysing whether the street 
trading management approach of the City of Cape Town 
is pragmatic are: 
• Street trading management based on participatory
processes;
• Multiple stakeholder street trading forums;
• Consolidated and capacitated street trader
organisations;
• Existence of a dedicated street trading management
institution; and 
• Area-based street trading management processes
and institutions.
5.4.2.1. Street trading management 
based on participatory processes
The City’s Informal Trading Policy states that trading 
plans must be adopted where required. This is vital in 
areas where there is an overlap between stakeholders, 
business, public or City uses (CoCT, 2013). A trading plan 
sets the geographical boundary for the trading area and 
allocates trading bays. It can also include specific trading 
conditions or criteria, set out development priorities 
for the local economy or industry specific development 
plans, and trader and employee development. 
Environmental and heritage protection are allowed for. 
It can also cater for markets and high demand zones, and 
set out third party arrangements and responsibilities 
for managing trade in the area. Lastly, it can include 
guidelines for the frequency of stakeholder meetings, or 
the need for engagement forums (CoCT, 2013). 
Informal trading on the pavement edges of the Grand 
Parade and central city is managed according to the 
Informal Trading Plan for Subcouncil 16 (Ward 77)
(cf. Appendix A). However, due to the convoluted 
management of the Parade by both the Facilities and 
Property Management Departments, and the informal 
arrangements around permit allocation and revenue 
collection, only the day traders along the Darling 
street pavement that have demarcated trading bays 
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are indicated in this plan. All the other day traders and 
Wednesday and Saturday traders are not a part of the 
plan. This means that the majority of trading occuring on 
the Grand Parade is de facto not governed by the trading 
plan for the city centre. The majority of traders on the 
Parade therefore currently have no participatory space 
to influence decision making that legally binds trading in 
their area. This further highlights the conflicted priorities 
of the City in regards to the Parade, and how this results 
in a lack of support for trader livelihoods.
The City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading By-Law of 
2009 (amended in 2013) details in Section 6 the public 
participation process to be followed when adopting a 
trading plan. The By-Law obliges the City to consult with 
all interested and affected parties “including the informal 
and formal sectors” (CoCT, 2013:6) before adopting 
a trading plan. Similarly to other public participation 
processes, it lays out details of how notifications 
should be handled, inviting comments and objections, 
and regulations for public meetings. The need for the 
consideration of all options prior to adoption of a 
trading plan is also outlined (CoCT, 2013). As such, the 
formulation and adoption of trading plans is envisaged 
as a participatory process. 
However, the nature of participation in this and other 
participatory processes led by the City in regards to 
street trading must be analysed. One must be cognisant 
of the level of stakeholder participation, the relative 
influence of each, and the power dynamics between and 
within stakeholder groupings. The process is City-led and 
thus an ‘invited space’ of participation (Cornwall, 2004; 
cf. Chapter 2). The City has the dominant power in this 
process, and can shape the discourse to its own ends. 
Trader associations on the Grand Parade are suspicious 
of one another, and not united under a Parade-
specific umbrella body. While the number of trader 
associations represented on the Grand Parade is due to 
historical processes and differing trading types, tensions 
between these associations have been heightened and 
reproduced by City actions. These actions include, but 
are not limited to, the relocation of traders from other 
markets in the city centre and alleged patronage of 
certain associations and their leaders. 
Therefore, the bargaining power and influence of 
traders on the Grand Parade, if they are to be included 
in the trading plan and other participation processes, 
is curtailed. They have limited power to shape the 
discourse and are hindered by the negative connotations 
that the term “informal” carries (cf. Chapter 2). As one 
trader leader (interview, Trader association leader, 4 
September, 2017) so poignantly argues:
The word “informal” gives people a sense of belonging…
it’s a way to recognise us, for the authorities to recognise 
us. Informal traders. It’s almost like a brand, when you 
say: oh the traders? Oh…uh… the hawkers? Oh, the 
street traders? Oh no, those are a bunch of skollies! 
Whenever you have street trading you will have crime. 
Almost as if the crime is breeding there…You rather 
have to go to Canal Walk or the Waterfront or go to 
a mall, you know, you will be more safer there. It’s not 
being advertised as a business that if you support that 
business you are actually supporting their families…It is 
being given the…um…the brand of negativity.
It can be safely assumed that formal businesses, 
property owners and the CCID have superior financial 
resources to traders associations. These stakeholders 
also have access to greater social capital, and can rely 
on the positive power that the term “formal” carries in 
public discourse (cf. Chapter 2).  
In terms of trader participation in ongoing operational 
management discussions on the Grand Parade, it is 
useful to analyse the nature of the monthly meetings 
that the Facility Manager chairs with representatives of 
all seven trader associations. These meetings have been 
convened since late 2016 (interview, 29 August, 2017). 
The Senior Foreman, on behalf of the Facility Manager, 
verbally announces the dates of these meetings. 
According to traders, this is often with little warning 
(interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). The 
meetings are held during trading hours. Thus, the trader 
association leaders have to close their stalls to attend, 
thereby incurring a negative impact on their business 
(interview, 29 August, 2017). This echoes the issue 
raised by Bénit-Gbaffou, (2016) around holding trader 
organisation meetings, where meeting scheduling has 
an impact on trader business (cf. Chapter 2). The Facility 
Manager states that he began convening these meetings 
to “deal with the problems on the Parade” (interview, 
5 September, 2017). The agenda of the meetings is set 
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by the Facility manager, without consultation with the 
trader association leaders (interview, Trader association 
leader, 29 August, 2017). 
This raises questions around the nature of City 
engagement, and the level of participation and 
legitimacy of these meetings. Generally, issues 
discussed are around trading impacts due to upcoming 
events planned for the Parade, as well as ongoing 
operational issues such as crime (interview, City official 
B, 5 September, 2017). Some trader leaders interviewed 
claim that these meetings are of little use to them 
(interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). The Facility 
Manager has observed that some trader association 
leaders do not attend meetings (Interview, City official 
B, 5 September, 2017). These perceptions indicate that 
due to the lack of inclusion in the setting of agendas, 
and the one-sided nature of these engagements, traders 
feel disempowered and see the meetings as of little use, 
particularly if they are to sacrifice business to attend. 
The City is therefore, through the nature of its direct 
engagement with traders on the Parade, producing 
further tensions and hindering effective management 
and trader support.  
The research findings also do not reveal any level of 
trader participation in the drafting of the City’s Informal 
Trading Policy, Informal Trading Policy Implementation 
Plan or Informal Trading By-Law. The by-law workshops 
alluded to by a trader association leader earlier are for 
by-law ‘education’, with limited possibility for input 
(interview, Trader association leader, 4 September, 2017)
The current forums for engagement by traders in street 
trading management on the Grand Parade are limited. 
These are namely the monthly meetings with the Facility 
Manager, and annual Informal Economy summits. These 
both share similar weaknesses, namely, lack of sufficient 
relevant stakeholders, limited opportunities for traders 
to voice their concerns, and strict control by the City 
over the narrative of discussions. It can therefore be 
concluded that the City of Cape Town’s street trading 
management approach on the Parade is based on 
limited and inequitable participatory processes. This is 
echoed by a trader association leader’s words: 
The emphasis must remain on an equal partnership 
in which our participation is viewed and accepted 
as serious enough to warrant our participation in all 
discussions/plans and programs which are relevant to 
us. Hence we subscribe to the slogan: nothing about 
us, without us!
(Muller, 2017a: 2)(original emphasis)
Research findings confirm the lack of transformative 
potential in City-led ‘invited spaces’ of engagement and 
policy making regarding street trading (Winkler, 2011; 
cf. Chapter 2). In addition, as argued earlier in relation 
to City decision making that hinders trader livelihoods 
through their lack of participation, Lefebvre’s right to 
the city and Fainstein’s arguments for inclusive forms 
of governance that promote more just outcomes are 
being ignored by the lack of equitable participatory 
spaces for engagement by traders. Assessed against 
the criterion of street trading management based on 
participatory processes, the City’s approach is limited in 
its transformative potential and pragmatism.
5.4.2.2. Multiple stakeholder street 
trading forums
The City’s Informal Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013) makes 
provision for multi-stakeholder engagement forums to 
be established by the City at Metro and District level. 
These would serve to identify problems, solutions, 
and set the direction for street trading development 
in different areas of the city. The policy stipulates that 
these forums would also serve to spread information to 
traders via trader organisations. It was noted earlier that 
research has revealed no area-based multi-stakeholder 
engagement forum exists for the Grand Parade 
(interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017). 
On a broader city level, only the quarterly ‘Round Tables’ 
and the annual Informal Economy Summit exist as 
forums for engagement. As noted the nature of these 
spaces limit any possiblities for multiple stakeholders to 
debate issues and make agreements and compromises 
(Skinner, 2008b; Dobson and Skinner, 2009; cf. Chapter 
2). No ‘Round Table’ has been held for the Grand Parade 
due to the convoluted City management arrangements 
and tensions between trader associations on the Parade. 
It can therefore be argued that limited multi-stakeholder 
street trading forums exist. Assessing the City’s street 
trading management approach against this criterion, it 
can be concluded that it lacks pragmatism and hence 
progressiveness.
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5.4.2.3. Consolidated and capacitated 
street trader organisations
Historic efforts at consolidation driven by trader 
associations, such as the WCITC initiatives, have 
remained largely unsuccessful. Only at the 2017 Informal 
Economy Summit was it announced that WCITC and 
UKITA (United Khayelitsha Informal Traders Association) 
are in the process of amalgamating (Muller, 2017b), 
and this presents an opportunity for greater bargaining 
power in negotiations with the City at a metro level.
The City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading Policy (CoCT, 
2013) mandates support to and assistance with the 
establishment of trader associations (CoCT, 2013). The 
Policy states that the purpose of these organisations is to 
represent their members in engagement forums (Ibid.). 
However the research findings reveal little support 
to trader associations, bar several leadership training 
programs and by-law workshops. The Informal Trading 
Policy also encourages business or technical training and 
mentorship programmes. However, there is also little 
evidence of these types of capacity building programs 
(Interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). No street 
trader forum exists to facilitate the participation of trader 
associations in a multi-stakeholder engagement forum. 
The City appears not to realise that a more organised 
street trading sector is of benefit to the city as a whole, 
both in management and governance terms, and thus a 
sound investment (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; cf. Chapter 2).
As argued earlier, the restrictive nature of the City’s street 
trading management approach on the Grand Parade 
produces tensions between trader associations, through 
limiting legal trading spaces, informal revenue collection 
and permit allocation arrangements, and selective and 
limited engagement with associations. It also produces 
resistance to these restrictive management practices 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016; cf. Chapter 2). City officials note 
that they would prefer to engage with a unified trader 
body, and view the associations as lacking representivity 
(interview, City official A, 5 September, 2017 and City 
official C, 2 October, 2017). However, this is hypocritical, 
as these divisions are mostly produced by the City’s 
street trading management approach. This echoes 
Bénit-Gbaffou’s (2016) argument in Chapter 2. Assessing 
the City’s street trading management approach on 
the Parade against the criterion for consolidated and 
capacitated street trader organisations, the findings 
reveal the City to fall short of a pragmatic approach.
5.4.2.4. Existence of a dedicated 
street trading management 
institution
Findings reveal the convoluted and opaque nature 
of the street trading management structure on the 
Grand Parade. Chapter 4 detailed how the trading 
management on the Grand Parade is the responsibility 
of the Strategic Assets department of the City of Cape 
Town, while trading management in other areas of 
the city, as well as permit and license administration 
is the responsibility of the Economic Development 
department. With the Organisational Development 
and Transformation Plan (ODTP), an organisational 
restructuring process currently under way within the 
City, the Economic Development department has fallen 
away, and the street trading management function is 
now housed under Area Economic Development within 
the Area-based Management Directorate, along with 
Local Tourism Development, Public Participation and 
Customer Relations (interview, City official E, 2 October, 
2017)(cf. Figure 5.1). In this new area-based structure, 
the city centre falls under Area North which also 
includes Mamre, Atlantis, Durbanville, Melkbosstrand, 
Milnerton, Brooklyn, Maitland, Langa, Kraaifontein, 
Observatory, Cape Town, Sea Point, Camps Bay and Hout 
Bay (Evans, 2017)(cf. Figure 5.2, highlighted in light blue). 
There is thus no dedicated street trading management 
institution in the City.
The City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading Policy (CoCT, 
2013) notes 16 different City departments that have 
roles and responsibilities in the effective facilitation, 
support and management of street trading. The key 
departments are: Economic Development, Spatial 
Planning and Urban Design, Building and Development 
Management and the Transport Department. These are 
the former names of these departments, prior to the 
ODTP which also involves the re-naming and re-aligning 
of functions. The research findings reveal limited 
dedicated interdepartmental cooperation. 
The lack of a dedicated street trading management 
institution means that any form of interdepartmental 
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Figure 5.1: Organisational Development and Transformation Plan (ODTP) Organogram (Source: CoCT, 2017)
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cooperation, as in the eThekwini model, is limited 
(Skinner, 2008b; Dobson and Skinner, 2009; cf. Chapter 
2). The current convoluted street trading management 
structure on the Parade is not only opaque to street 
traders themselves (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 
2017), but also to the author. This structure is possibly a 
part cause of the ineffective, haphazard and restrictive 
street trading management practice that the research 
findings in this chapter have revealed.  This street 
trading management practice has been shown to have 
significant negative impacts on the livelihood strategies 
of traders on the Grand Parade. Therefore, the lack of 
a dedicated street trading management institution 
indicates a lack of pragmatism in the City’s street trading 
management approach on the Parade.
5.4.2.5. Area-based street trading 
management processes and 
institutions
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that area-level 
multi-stakeholder engagement forums do not currently 
exist in the Cape Town city centre. While the monthly 
meeting between trader associations can be viewed as a 
form of area-based street trading management, the lack 
of other stakeholder representatives in these meetings 
limits their effectiveness. The frustration felt by trader 
association leaders towards these meetings can be 
seen as symptomatic of their limited nature. Issues 
affecting trading on the Grand Parade such as crime 
and inappropriate infrastructure cannot be addressed Figure 5.2: Area-based service delivery geographical extents - Area North highlighted in light blue (Source: CoCT, 2017; 
ESRI, 2017)
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effectively without interdepartmental cooperation 
arising out of area-based multi-stakeholder engagement 
forums (Skinner, 2008b; Dobson and Skinner, 2009; cf. 
Chapter 2). 
Building an umbrella body to represent all traders 
associations on the Grand Parade has not been possible 
due to the fragmentary and tense nature of trader 
association relationships. Perceptions of patronage 
towards some trader leaders and organisations, and 
relocations of traders from other markets to the Parade, 
has produced and reproduced distrust between trader 
associations. In addition, the lack of a multi-stakeholder 
engagement forum means that sustainable and locally 
adapted solutions to trading issues affecting the 
livelihood strategies of the traders on the Grand Parade 
cannot be found (Skinner, 2008b; Dobson and Skinner, 
2009; cf. Chapter 2). The lack of sufficient area-based 
street trading management processes and institutions 
once again indicates a lack of pragmatism in the City’s 
street trading management approach on the Parade.
Taking all the assessments above into consideration, 
it can be concluded that the limited developmental 
and pragmatic nature of the City’s street trading 
management approach on the Grand Parade result in its 
lack of progressiveness. The findings and analysis reveal 
that this lack of progressiveness serves to limit the 
positive impacts of the City’s street trading management 
approach on the livelihoods of traders on the Parade.
5.5. Alignment of management 
practice with the City’s Informal 
Trading Policy
Research findings reveal the disjuncture identified in 
the literature between developmental policy at national 
and local government levels, and the performance 
of municipal officials directly tasked with urban 
management (cf. Chapter 2). This disjuncture is between 
the developmental approach of the City’s Informal 
Trading Policy and the restrictive nature of the City’s 
practice. These ‘conflicting rationalities’ (cf. Chapter 2) 
appear to impact on trader livelihoods. I will now go into 
more detail regarding this disjuncture.
The City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading Policy of 2013 
is informed by the Constitution, the NDP and national 
developmental legislation (CoCT, 2013). The Policy takes 
a developmental approach. It even heads one section of 
the Policy as such. As part of this approach it aims to 
“improve conditions for informal trading, assisting it to 
thrive by focusing on 1) planning and development, 2) 
policy issues, and 3) institutional arrangements” (CoCT, 
2013:9). Under Planning and Development, the City firstly 
acknowledges the legitimacy and role of the informal 
economy, in terms of its employment and economic 
growth prospects. Secondly, it notes that development 
interventions should be area-based and focus on 
improving sustainability, growth and profitability for the 
trader. Thirdly, partnerships between “private sector 
developers and land owners, or other development 
organisations and other government departments” are 
essential to “benefit the informal sector and private 
sector, consumers and the City alike” (CocT, 2013:10). 
Variation and flexibility in the developmental approach 
is also highlighted, and this depends on “the trader, 
the industry, and the local level social and economic 
environment” (CocT, 2013:10).
Research findings reveal that this developmental 
approach found in the City of Cape Town’s Informal 
Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013) is at odds with the City’s 
practice. This section compares the Policy directives 
with management practice as revealed by the research, 
in order to elucidate the extent of the misalignment.
The Informal Trading Policy details three groups of 
principles that should be used to “operationalize the 
[developmental] approach, especially the development 
planning process” (CoCT, 2013:11). These are Economic 
Principles, Spatial Principles, and Engagement Principles. 
Economic Principles are intended to facilitate economic 
growth in the informal trading sector by, firstly, reinforcing 
“business zones” by “link[ing] new and existing trading 
areas to business areas to create viable hubs of business 
activity”(CoCT, 2013:12). While the focus of this study 
is the Grand Parade, my research suggests that there 
is no evidence that any new trading areas have been 
created in the city centre since the adoption of the 
Informal Trading Policy (interview, City official C, 18 
September, 2017), or that any trading areas have been 
linked to business areas. While the street trading areas 
in Greenmarket Square, St George’s Mall and Adderley 
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Street may be located in areas with concentrations of 
(formal) business activity, there appear to be no City-led 
efforts to link these. 
Secondly, traders are to be linked “to a range of 
capacity building and business support services that 
caters (sic) for the different types and levels of traders” 
(CoCT, 2013:12). As discussed earlier, there appears to 
be limited evidence of this. Thirdly, the policy states 
that “the buildings and property owned by the City 
are leveraged for maximum economic return” (Ibid.). 
The language used here reveals the City’s competing 
priorities. 
Regarding the ongoing upgrade of the City Hall, the City’s 
Mayoral Committee Member for Assets and Facilities 
Management, Councillor Stuart Diamond, states that 
“we also need to optimise our key strategic assets as 
outlined in the City’s ODTP” (Chetty, 2017:Online). One 
of the ODTP pillars is “ensuring long-term operational 
sustainability” for the City which entails “manag[ing] its 
portfolio of assets so as to secure its financial viability 
and stability, which will in turn enable sustainable service 
delivery” (CoCT, 2017b: 40). The ODTP continues,  that:
While the outcomes of the ODTP process will focus on 
value creation through effectiveness and efficiency, 
the underlying foundation will be a customer-
centric operating model that will illustrate the City’s 
responsiveness to its citizens. 
(CoCT, 2017b:40)
This language of ‘asset maximisation’, ‘portfolio 
management’, ‘value creation’ and ‘customer-centricity’ 
echoes Miraftab’s (2007) and Morange’s (2015) 
arguments highlighting the neo-liberalisation of urban 
governance in Cape Town (cf. Chapter 1 and 2).  Trading 
management on the Grand Parade is the responsibility 
of the Strategic Assets department of the City, while 
trading management in other areas of the city, as well 
as permit and license administration is the responsibility 
of the Economic Development department. While this 
management structure is opaque to outsiders, it reveals 
that, on the Grand Parade at least, the asset maximisation 
imperative of Strategic Assets department - “to ensure 
the financial sustainability of the City’s key assets” (CoCT, 
2017c) - takes precedence over sustainable livelihood 
development. 
As part a focus on tourism, the City raised a discussion 
at its Informal Economy Summit in October 2017 on how 
“informal trading markets can be turned into tourism 
destinations that would attract tourist’s (sic), thus 
increasing trader’s livelihoods” (CoCT, 2017d:1). This 
appears to be an attempt, driven by the ODTP process, 
to ‘sweat the assets’ that public spaces like Greenmarket 
Square, the area around Cape Town Stadium, and the 
Grand Parade represent. While the City may argue that 
its reasoning is to support trader livelihoods through 
linking tourism more strongly to the informal economy, 
the question can be raised if this move is not rather 
motivated by a New Public Management approach, 
where the language of empowerment is used to mask 
real concerns for ‘efficiency’ (Winkler, 2011; cf. Chapter 
2).
The financial imperative is exemplified in the fourth 
economic principle of the Informal Trading Policy. This 
principle pertains to “High Demand Areas” and involves 
“targeting highly accessible and visible locations for 
value added trading in order to derive benefit for 
informal traders, consumers and formal business alike” 
(CoCT, 2013:12). The use of the term “value added 
trading” is confusing as one wonders how beneficiation 
of traders’ goods and services can be accrued through 
their location in areas of high pedestrian traffic. This 
term further echoes the technocratic and financial tone 
alluded to above.
Spatial Principles contained in the Informal Trading 
Policy acknowledge that informal trading contributes 
to the value of public spaces and can potentially act 
as a catalyst for the generation of “positive public 
spaces”(CoCT, 2013:12). This is to be encouraged in 
three ways. Firstly, by developing those areas that could 
have the most significant impact on the largest number 
of people. That is, by developing areas with large flows 
of pedestrian traffic (Ibid.). Fieldwork observations and 
interviews confirm that the Grand Parade accommodates 
large flows of pedestrian traffic daily due to its location 
as thoroughfare between the city centre, District Six, 
Cape Town Station and the Bus Terminus. Many school 
children, and those who travel on public transport to 
or from the city centre pass through this public space 
(interview, Trader, 29 August, 2017).
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However, interviews and media articles reveal that there 
has been minimal development of the Grand Parade 
to allow for street trading to harness the significant 
pedestrian flows that pass through the area. Research 
findings reveal that issues of crime and neglect on the 
Grand Parade have contributed to loss of positive ‘sense 
of place’, reduced visitor numbers, and consequent 
negative impacts on trader livelihoods. Thus the City’s 
street trading management practice has not created a 
‘positive public space’ that supports trader livelihood 
strategies.
Secondly, the Informal Trading Policy states that space 
for informal trading areas should be allocated in line 
with the City’s Spatial Development Framework (SDF) 
and Local Area SDFs or District Plans (CoCT, 2013).  This 
aligns with Policy 3.2 of the current City of Cape Town 
SDF, which states: 
Local plans and urban upgrading initiatives 
in commercial areas should be encouraged to 
accommodate the needs of the informal sector i.e. 
through appropriate urban design.
 (CoCT, 2012:40) 
The draft 2017 City of Cape Town SDF echoes these 
sentiments by stating that the City will:
Ensur[e] that sufficient, well-located and appropriately 
designed formal and informal trading facilities are 
provided in activity areas as well as other suitable 
public assembly points, such as transport interchanges, 
public spaces, parking areas and road reserves (where 
appropriate)
(CoCT, 2017e:197)
Findings reveal that no consultation has happened with 
traders regarding proposed renovations to the Parade, in 
order to ascertain and design for their needs (interviews, 
29 August – 5 September, 2017).
Thirdly, the Informal Trading Policy states that “an 
appropriate level of infrastructure for informal trading 
should be provided” (CoCT, 2013:10). One should note, 
“appropriate” as this is determined by the City. This 
infrastructure varies depending on the type of trading 
undertaken in the area (CoCT, 2013). Infrastructure 
can include electricity, water, sanitation, drainage, 
shelter, and storage facilities (Ibid.). One of the strategic 
objectives in the policy, informed by this principle, is 
that infrastructure requirements in each trading area 
should be identified [by the City] (ibid.). The delivery or 
provision of this infrastructure should be accompanied 
with a maintenance plan (Ibid.). 
Supportive infrastructure is lacking. Piecemeal 
interventions have been the norm, with most being 
cosmetic or reactive to safety issues (interviews, 
29 August – 5 September, 2017).  The paving of the 
Parade prior to the 2010 Soccer World Cup can be 
viewed as a cosmetic intervention, which may have in 
fact negatively impacted trading. A trader (interview, 
2 September, 2017) asserts that City officials have 
realised that the Parade should not have been paved as 
the paved surfaces are now uneven and the rainwater 
pools in areas. He states that it is impacting traders and 
customers. The trader further states that the homeless 
remove paving to use in building shelters around the 
Castle (interview, 2 September, 2017). The roofs of the 
food kiosks were refurbished by the City in preparation 
for the World Cup, however a trader leader states that 
most of the maintenance of the kiosk interiors is paid for 
by individual traders (DAG, 2017). 
Reactive safety interventions include the erection of 
a steel fence enclosing the food kiosk area and the 
installation of CCTV cameras on lamp posts near the 
kiosks. The food kiosk area can only be accessed via 
three entrances. Kiosk traders assert that the fence has 
made little impact on crime levels. It has in fact reduced 
pedestrian flow to their kiosks, and consequently 
reduced their earnings (interviews, 29 August – 5 
September, 2017). The manager of Texie’s confirms this 
view (interview, Texie’s Manager, 29 August, 2017). The 
position of the entrances is not immediately legible as 
day trading stalls and dustbins have been placed against 
the fence (cf. Figure 5.4). In addition, traders claim that 
homeless individuals sit and sleep against the fence. 
Interviews with traders also reveal that better canopy 
structures and on-site storage facilities are viewed as 
beneficial to their livelihood strategies (interviews, 29 
August – 5 September, 2017).
Rosheda Muller of the Grand Parade United Traders’ 
Association sums up the feeling of a number of traders 
interviewed when she says:
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The City has provided 12 law enforcement officers to 
address some of the many concerns we have, but there 
is no physical progress, like infrastructure, or fixing up 
of the place. When the wind blows too hard or it rains 
too much, we are still unable to trade. This has been 
something we have been asking the City for years.
(cited in Thompson, 2017: Online)
Lastly, ‘Engagement Principles’ contained in the 
Informal Trading Policy focus on the manner in which 
stakeholder engagement must take place. Firstly, the 
City is mandated to “communicate widely, accessibly, 
in different forms (print, electronic media) to improve 
the targeting and reach of information to the sector 
stakeholders” (CoCT, 2013:12). In section 5.4.1.1. above, 
it is highlighted that there are only two sources of 
information on informal trading in the City of Cape Town: 
the City’s website and the District Area Coordinator’s 
Office at the Civic Centre. It is also argued that the 
digital nature of permit applications and the exclusive 
use of English on the City’s website create barriers to 
information access. Research indicates no records of 
print media, radio or other forms of communication 
being used to communicate with sector stakeholders, 
bar the distribution of pamphlets to notify of upcoming 
monthly meetings (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 
2017). Secondly, according to the Informal Trading 
Policy, equity and inclusion in engagement processes 
necessitate “includ[ing] all relevant stakeholders in the 
appropriate fora at the appropriate level” (Ibid.). As 
discussed in in sections 5.4.1.2 and 5.4.1.3., this policy 
principle is not manifested in the City’s street trading 
management practice. 
The City’s Informal Trading Policy mandates annual 
monitoring of policy implementation, coordinated by 
the Economic Development Department, and bi-annual 
evaluation via a multi-stakeholder engagement platform 
(CoCT, 2013:24). A City official confirms that neither 
monitoring nor evaluation occur due to budgetary and 
capacity constraints within the Economic Development 
Department (interview, City official E, 2 October, 2017). 
The Informal Trading Policy also states that street 
trading data is essential for analysing trends, spatialising 
trading and anticipating growth, in order to incorporate 
street trading into planning processes (CoCT, 2013:24). 
Monitoring is also essential in identifying and 
understanding the needs of traders (ibid.). The research 
findings reveal that apart from the data in the electronic 
permitting system, little other data on street trading in 
Cape Town has been collected. The Policy suggests a 
monitoring (or feedback) system to allow for logging of 
issues and feedback. Street trading management officials 
currently use the SAP-based electronic permitting system 
to monitor issues logged regarding permit payments, 
however this is not used for logging issues facing traders 
and allowing for feedback (interview, City official C, 18 
September, 2017). The lack of monitoring and evaluation 
of the City’s Informal Trading Policy and street trading 
management practice, and the lack of data collection, 
result in scant empirical evidence of policy and practice 
impacts on trader livelihoods. In addition, the case for 
increased budget allocations for the City’s Informal 
Trading function cannot be made. The continued lack of 
budget in the department is seen by a trader leader as 
hampering any further development of traders:
We remain hopeful that the City digs in its heels and 
emerges soon with a dedicated informal sector budget, 
one that will put beyond any doubt its commitment 
to uplift and empower our sector with the necessary 
infrastructural and logistical support.
(Muller, 2017a: 1)
Based on the evidence presented above, it can therefore 
be concluded that when comparing the directives 
contained in the City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading 
Policy (CoCT, 2013) with the City’s street trading 
management practice as revealed by the research, 
a disjuncture exists. This is a disjuncture between a 
Figure 5.3: View of security fence around kiosks with 
entrance illegible (Source: Author, 2017).
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developmental Informal Trading Policy (with restrictive 
aspects) and a street trading management practice that 
is limited in its developmental, pragmatic and hence 
progressive nature, and bears many of the hallmarks of 
a restrictive approach. This echoes the arguments made 
in Chapter 2 regarding the ‘conflicting rationalities’ 
of urban governance and street trading management 
(Watson, 2003, cf. Chapter 2), and experiences in 
eThekwini, Johannesburg and the other global South 
case examples detailed, where approaches to street 
trading management have fluctuated from restrictive 
to progressive (Skinner, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; 
Skinner and Haysom, 2016.)
In closing, a trader association leader highlights his 
frustration with the perceived continued lack of 
developmental street trading management on the part 
of the City of Cape Town:
In the 90s, I don’t think the City was equipped to 
facilitate the informal sector…I mean informal trading 
is a means of employment…You would think that the 
local government would come on board and support 
it, but that’s not the case…Maybe their excuse back 
in 94…for instance…was that it was new territory, but 
what’s the excuse now?...I think it’s inexcusable for the 
City to not assist the informal sector…and yet they are 
creating all these barriers instead of building bridges…
It’s unacceptable at this point.
(interview, Trader association leader, 29 August, 2017)
5.6. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to analyse my research 
findings against the criteria established in chapter 
2. The discussion in the first part of this chapter
highlighted that the City of Cape Town’s street trading
management approach on the Grand Parade bears a
number of the hallmarks of being restrictive. Potential
traders are criminalised and the livelihood strategies
of current traders are hindered. Corruption, violence
and mismanagement are engendered, and informal
arrangements, patronage and aggression between
traders are fostered. Both individual and collective
resistance and adaptation on the part of traders is
produced. The cumulative effect of these elements
of restriction is a negative impact on street trader
livelihoods on the Grand Parade.
Research findings reveal that the Grand Parade has lost 
a positive ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ due to crime 
and neglect. While this can partly be ascribed to broader 
socio-economic factors impacting on the Parade, it 
can be concluded that the inability of the City’s street 
trading management approach on the Grand Parade to 
successfully address issues of crime and neglect thus 
hinders trader livelihood strategies.
When assessed against criteria for developmental, 
pragmatic, and hence progressive street trading 
management, the City’s street trading management 
approach, while containing developmental aims in its 
Informal Trading Policy, is found to lack many of these 
progressive elements in the practice of management 
on the Grand Parade. Thus opportunities to enable 
and support the livelihood strategies of traders on the 
Parade are lost, and the restrictive effects of the City’s 
street trading management approach are left largely 
unmitigated.
Collectively, the assesments in this chapter highlight a 
disjuncture between the City’s developmental Informal 
Trading Policy (with restrictive aspects), that is derived 
from national developmental policies, and street trading 
management practice on the Grand Parade, that is limited 
in its developmental, pragmatic and hence progressive 
nature, and bears many of the hallmarks of a restrictive 
approach. This speaks to the ‘conflicting rationalities’ 
of urban governance and street trading management, 
and experiences in other local and global South cities, 
where approaches to street trading management have 
fluctuated from restrictive to progressive.
Table 5.1 provides a summary of my research findings. 
(Insert table)
Let us now turn to the final chapter of this dissertation in 
which management and policy recommendations - that 
are aimed at addressing some of the findings derived 
from this research - are put forward.
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OVERARCHING CRITERIA ASSESSMENT CRITERIA DERIVED 
FROM LITERATURE REVIEW (CF. 
CHAPTER 2)
SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
DERIVED FROM ASSESSMENT 
CRITERIA
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
Restrictive Street Trading 
Management Approach
Criminalising the poor and hindering 
livelihood strategies
To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s 
street trading management approach on 
the Grand Parade restrictive?
• The  City’s street trading management
approach on the Grand Parade bears all the
hallmarks of being restrictive.
• It produces informal arrangements,
aggression and resistance on the part of
traders.
Engendering municipal corruption, 
violence and mismanagement
Fostering informal arrangements, 
patronage and aggression between traders
Producing resistance and adaptation on 
the part of traders, both individually and 
collectively
Genius loci Concentrated use To what extent does the City of Cape 
Town’s street trading management 
approach affect the ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense 
of place’ of the Grand Parade, and does 
this support or hinder trader livelihood 
strategies?
• The former ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ of
the Parade has been lost due to crime and
neglect.
• The inability of the City’s street trading
management approach on the Parade to
successfully address issues of crime and
neglect hinders trader livelihood strategies.
Feelings of safety
OVERARCHING CRITERIA  
FOR PROGRESSIVE STREET 
TRADING MANAGEMENT
Developmental Ease of access for new entrants with 
limited financial capital
To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s 
street trading management approach on 
the Grand Parade developmental?
• The developmental aims of the City’s
Informal Trading Policy are not borne out in
practice.
• Access for new entrants is difficult, there
is limited support to traders, and no area-
based multi-stakeholder engagement forum
exists
• No differentiated support structures
between survivalist and entrepreneurial
street traders exist
Support and services to sustain livelihoods
Differentiated support structures for 
survivalist and entrepreneurial street 
traders.
 Table 5.1 Summary of research findings
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Pragmatic Street trading management based on 
participatory processes
To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s 
street trading management approach on 
the Grand Parade pragmatic?
• The City’s street trading management
approach is not pragmatic.
• There are limited spaces for participation,
and the forums that do exist lack sufficient
relevant stakeholders, offer limited
opportunities for traders to voice their
concerns, and the City exerts strict control
over the narrative of discussions.
• There has been limited City effort to
capacitate street trader organisations
• No dedicated street trading management
institution or area-based street trading
management processes currently exist.
• The City’s restructuring process, together
with the convoluted street trading
management structure on the Parade serve
to limit any pragmatic management
Multiple stakeholder street trading forums
Consolidated and capacitated street trader 
organisations
Existence of a dedicated street trading 
management institution
Area-based street trading management 
processes and institutions
To what extent does the City of Cape 
Town’s street trading management 
practice on the Grand Parade align with 
national developmental policies?
• A disjuncture exists between the stated
developmental approach of the City’s
Informal Trading Policy (informed by national
developmental policies) and its practices.
• The combination of organisational
restructuring processes, confused
mandates as well as the low political and
funding priority given to street trading
management has meant that the complex
of socio-economic factors and persistent
management issues on the Parade, that
require interdepartmental cooperation to
address, continue to negatively impact trader
livelihoods.
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Figure 5.4: Two gulls fighting on the King Edward VII statue in front of the Cape Town City Hall - a symbol of the tensions created 
between traders on the Grand Parade by the City’s street trading management approach? (Source: Sunday Times, 2017)
Figure 5.5: Image of the Grand Parade on the cover of the City of Cape Town Table 







The overarching aim of this dissertation was to critically 
assess the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street trading 
management approach on the livelihood strategies of 
traders. The Grand Parade served as the case under study. 
Accordingly, research findings revealed, for the most 
part, negative impacts on traders’ livelihood strategies, 
despite the municipality’s stated developmental goals 
(cf. Chapter 5)(cf. section 6.5 of this chapter for a note 
on a ‘good’ aspect). The aim of this study was also to 
establish a few recommendations in response to the 
research findings, so that municipalities may become 
more supportive of street traders’ needs and livelihood 
strategies. To this end, an in-depth review of the relevant 
literature concerning street trading management and 
livelihood strategies was presented in Chapter 2. This 
review, in turn, served as a means to establish subsidiary 
research questions and accompanying assessment 
criteria. The City’s management approach was then 
assessed against criteria for restrictive, progressive and 
pragmatic street trading management. The research 
methods and techniques used to collect data were 
discussed in Chapter 3. Finally, Chapter 4 provided a 
context of the history of street trading on the Grand 
Parade, as well as current management arrangements.
Research findings, guided by the main and subsidiary 
research questions, were presented in Chapter 5. 
These research findings are summarised in section 
6.2 for the purpose of answering the main research 
question (cf. Chapter 1). I then provide broader 
recommendations pertaining to street trading policy 
and management in the Cape Town city centre, as well 
as specific recommendations focused on street trading 
management on the Grand Parade. Due to the aim of 
my research, recommendations focus predominantly on 
enhancing the municipality’s role and activities towards 
fulfilling its development goals by addressing traders’ 
concerns. However, it has become clear from the 
literature reviewed and my fieldwork findings that City 
officials cannot address traders’ concerns in isolation 
from broader political and socio-economic concerns, as 
well as in isolation from other stakeholders’ concerns. 
Recommendations presented in this chapter are thus 
geared, firstly, towards the types of actions and policies 
that are implemented by the municipality, and how these 
actions and policies impact traders’ livelihoods, and, 
secondly, towards trader associations’ and coalitions’ 
roles and activities. Avenues for future research are also 
identified. Before concluding the dissertation, the final 
section details the limitations of this research, followed 
by personal reflections on the study. Let us begin by 
revisiting the main research question.
6.2 Establishing Answers to the Main 
Research Question
The main research question of this dissertation asked:
What is the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management approach on the livelihood 
strategies of traders on the Grand Parade?
From the findings presented in Chapter 5, we may 
conclude that the City of Cape Town tends to adopt 
a more restrictive approach to managing traders 
on the Grand Parade. This approach corroborates 
many of the concerns discussed in Chapter 2, since it 
serves to produce informal arrangements, aggression 
and resistance on the part of traders. Thus, we find 
a disjuncture between the stated developmental 
approach of the City’s Informal Trading Policy (informed 
by national developmental policies) and its practices. In 
response to the main research question: The impact of 
the City’s current approach to managing street trading 
is, effectively, negative.
Regardless then of the City’s Policy that aims to support 
street trader livelihood strategies, case study findings 
reveal an impasse between the municipality’ desires and 
its implemented actions. Accessibility to new entrants 
is limited, and few support structures and services are 
provided to traders. Furthermore, only some traders 
have access to the ‘capacity development’ initiatives 
that exist, thereby exacerbating existing tensions 
between the different trader associations on the Parade. 
Opportunities for participatory planning processes also 
remain negligible. In sum, the current management 
approach adopted by the City serves only to highlight 
the ‘conflicting rationalities’ at play in the context 
under study (cf. Watson’s, 2003, argument in Chapter 
2). Furthermore, there is no dedicated street trading 
management institution in the City of Cape Town. The 
combination of organisational restructuring processes, 
confused mandates as well as the low political and 
85
funding priority given to street trading management 
has meant that the complex of socio-economic factors 
and persistent management issues on the Parade, that 
require interdepartmental cooperation to address, 
continue to negatively impact trader livelihoods. 
In order to acknowledge street traders’ ‘rights to the city’ 
(Lefebvre, 1968; cf. Chapter 2), and to promote justice 
in decision-making according to principles of equity, 
democracy, and diversity (Fainstein, 2010; cf. Chapter 
2), City officials and planners will need to reconsider 
the generally restrictive street trading management 
approach that currently impacts negatively on the 
livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade. The 
policy and management recommendations presented 
below attempt to provide guidance in this regard.
6.3. Recommendations
The recommendations presented in this chapter are split 
into two parts. The first being broader recommendations 
around street trading policy and management in the Cape 
Town city centre. The second part is focused specifically 
on policy and management recommendations to better 
enable livelihood strategies of street traders on the 
Grand Parade. Both sets of recommendations are aimed 
at City of Cape Town officials and planners involved in 
street trading management. But as highlighted in this 
research, street trading impacts, and is impacted by, 
many City departments, and thus the recommendations 
are also aimed more broadly at the City administration. 
6.3.1. Recommendations for street 
trading policy and management in 
the Cape Town city centre
6.3.1.1. The ‘eThekwini model’ as a 
guide
I base my recommendations predominantly on what is 
know as the ‘eThekwini model’, which evolved out of 
the inclusive upgrading of the Warwick Junction market 
in Durban (cf. Chapter 2). It is regarded as an example 
of a progressive street trading management model that 
is based on participatory and area-based approaches. 
If a similar model is pursued in regard to the Cape 
Town city centre and the Grand Parade, this will assist 
in the gradual realisation of the developmental aims 
contained in the City’s Informal Trading Policy, which are 
not reflected in its management practice on the Parade. 
In light of the organisational restructuring process 
currently underway in the City of Cape Town (ODTP), it is 
an opportune time to recommend institutional changes 
to the street trading management model and structure 
within the City administration.
In line with the eThekwini model, for area-based 
management to be effective in the Cape Town city 
centre and on the Parade, it needs firstly to involve a 
dedicated project manager, and foster solid links with 
the Planning, Economic Development and Health 
functions in the City, as well as Law Enforcement and 
SAPS. Secondly, it needs an accessible locally based 
office and a city-centre multi-stakeholder street trading 
committee to foster participation in decision-making. 
Thirdly, a street trader forum, consisting of all trader 
associations in the city centre, is needed to facilitate 
consolidation and capacitation of trader associations 
and their participation in the multi-stakeholder street 
trading forum. Lastly, area-based market and street 
trading management committees must be set up to 
allow for negotiated solutions to contextual issues.
Currently, the local District Area Coordinator within the 
Area-based Economic Development function of the City 
fulfils the role of a project manager (as well as a personal 
interface with traders). However, the area this official is 
responsible for is vast, stretching form Atlantis to Hout 
Bay (cf. Chapter 5).  Clearly, this office must be better 
resourced to provide more fine-grained and coordinated 
area-based management. In addition, the current 
location of the local District Area Coordinator’s office 
can be improved. This can be done by moving it from its 
inaccessible location on the 13th floor of an office block 
adjacent to the Civic Centre, to a ground floor location in 
either the Civic Centre or at City-owned property in the 
central city, close to transport links.
Secondly, while the shift to a new ‘area-based service 
delivery’ structure in City administration as part of 
the ODTP process may result in stronger coordination 
between the departments relevant to street trading 
management, this needs to be consolidated in the form 
of a multi-stakeholder street trading committee. While 
such a structure is mandated in the City’s Informal 
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Trading Policy, the current annual Informal Economy 
Summit and quarterly rotating ‘Round Tables’ do not 
include sufficient relevant stakeholders and offer limited 
opportunities for trader engagement. The establishment 
of a multi-stakeholder street trading committee for the 
city centre is a priority, and this should include trader 
association representatives, relevant senior municipal 
officials, private sector representatives (e.g. CCID), an 
NGO representative, and lastly the local ward councillor. 
This committee should be a permanent institution 
that allows for stakeholder debate and the possibility 
of pragmatic agreements and compromises regarding 
street trading in the city centre. A voting power balance 
must be established between these stakeholders to 
ensure that trader needs are not marginalised. The 
decision-making roles and functions of this committee 
should be clarified in a policy document (cf. Chapter 2).
In parallel to the multi-stakeholder street trading 
committee, a street trader forum, consisting of all 
trader associations in the city centre, should be formed 
to facilitate participation in this committee. This forum 
could be supported and capacitated by the City through 
organisational training via an independent party, such 
as an NGO specialising in street trading (e.g. StreetNet, 
WIEGO). As argued by Bénit-Gbaffou (2015; cf. Chapter 
2), a more organised street trading sector is beneficial 
to a city in terms of both management and governance, 
and is therefore a good investment. Organisational and 
skills development training would also be in line with 
national informal business development directives 
contained in the National Informal Business Upliftment 
Strategy (NIBUS) (cf. Chapter 2).
Lastly, area-based market and street trading 
management committees (e.g. on the Grand Parade) 
must be set up. These should include trader association 
representatives and relevant municipal officials. These 
could allow for negotiated solutions to contextual issues 
to be found, through participation and flexibility, while 
promoting street trading management efficiency and 
a sense of ownership by traders. These committees 
should meet monthly, and be accountable to the city-
centre multi-stakeholder street trading committee. This 
research has shown that current area-based monthly 
meetings are ineffectual due to their limited stakeholder 
representation, lack of feedback mechanisms and one-
sided nature (cf. Chapter 5). 
However, it must be noted that while these 
recommendations represent a significant change to the 
City of Cape Town’s current street trading management 
model, changes are always subject to political will, 
priorities, and budgets within the City administration. 
As noted by a City official, the current water crisis in 
Cape Town has further de-prioritised street trading 
(interview, 13 October, 2017). This, combined with the 
limited budget allocation to the City’s street trading 
management function, present serious obstacles to the 
implementation of these recommendations. However, 
monitoring and evaluation of the City’s street trading 
management can help make a case for increased budget 
allocations, amid a growing political will towards pro-
poor policies, as evidenced by recent shifts in the City’s 
housing policy (de Greef, 2017).
The lack of regular monitoring and evaluation of the 
City’s Informal Trading Policy by the  (former) Economic 
Development Department, due to budgetary and 
capacity constraints and lack of a multi-stakeholder 
forum (cf. Chapter 5), results in scant empirical evidence 
of policy impacts on street trader livelihoods. As noted 
in the Policy and in Chapter 5, street trading data is 
essential for analysing trends, spatialising trading and 
anticipating growth, in order to incorporate street 
trading into planning processes. Monitoring is also 
essential in identifying and understanding the needs of 
traders. 
The Policy also suggests a monitoring and feedback 
system to allowing for logging of issues and feedback. 
The City’s current SAP-based C3 Electronic Reporting 
System allows for citizen complaints and service requests 
regarding, for example, water leaks or power outages 
to be sent to the correct line department (GPOKCID, 
2017). These are recorded, tracked and reported, and 
the system enables the City to measure time taken to 
resolve complaints, as an indicator of service delivery 
success and improvement over time (ibid.). Street 
trading management officials used the SAP-based 
electronic permitting system separately to monitor 
issues logged regarding permit payments (cf. Chapter 5). 
I recommend linking these two systems to allow street 
traders to log infrastructural and other issues in their 
area. This will also allow these issues to be brought to 
the attention of street trading management officials, 
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and enable the City’s response to issues affecting trader 
working conditions and livelihoods to be evaluated. 
The SAP-based electronic permitting system could thus 
be expanded into a more consolidated street trading 
management tool, and aid District Area Coordinators 
in their direct engagements with traders. Greater levels 
of quantitative data, combined with qualitative data 
from regular trader surveys and multi-stakeholder and 
area-based street trading management committees, 
can provide the empirical evidence for larger budget 
allocations to street trading management in Cape Town. 
In Fainstein’s words, “bureaucrats can use their control 
over information to bend their political superiors to 
their will” (Fainstein, 2010: 180; cf. Chapter 2).
6.3.1.2. Trading permits
Current permit conditions mean that endogenous forms 
of trading, such as mobile food trading, are currently 
denied in the city centre and on the Grand Parade, and 
traders are not able to respond to monthly or seasonal 
fluctuations in customer demand (cf. Chapter 2 and 
5). Based on the important role of street trading in 
food security as highlighted in Chapter 2 (Skinner and 
Haysom, 2016), and the scope for allowing greater 
flexibility in health regulations (Turok et al., 2017), I 
recommend that investigations into relaxing permit 
conditions around food trading be conducted. Food 
safety is important, and the City should follow the lead 
of eThekwini where a Food Handlers Program educates 
food traders on basic hygiene and food management 
health issues (David et al., 2012). Petersen et al. (2017, 
cited in Krige, 2017) also suggest the installation of 
bulk refrigeration to help keep stock fresh for street 
food traders. In the case of the Grand Parade, this could 
be housed in a structure adjacent to the current kiosks. 
Trading permit conditions should also be relaxed to 
allow traders to vary what they sell based on monthly or 
seasonal fluctuations in customer demand.
The accessibility of the permit application process 
to new entrants can be improved. Trading permit 
application information on the City’s website is currently 
only available in English, spoken by only 28% of Cape 
Town’s population as their home language (cf. Chapter 
5).  This information should also be made available in 
Afrikaans and isiXhosa, the home languages of 35% 
and 29% of the city’s population respectively (StatsSA, 
2011). In addition to the City’s website and the District 
Area Coordinator’s Office at the Civic Centre, permit 
application information should be made available at 
other civic centres and Department of Labour offices. 
Jiyane and Mostert (2010), in a study of information 
and communications technologies used by female 
informal traders in rural areas of South Africa, note that 
mobile phones are their primary means of business 
communication, with radio and TV their sources 
of business-related information. Therefore, permit 
application information should also be publicised by the 
City via SMS, radio and TV (Jiyane and Mostert, 2010; 
Roever, 2010). The proposed increase in street trading 
management staffing capacity in the City would allow for 
the creation of a dedicated street trading walk-in centre 
where potential new entrants could source information 
and be guided through the application process, while 
existing traders could be assisted with permit-related 
queries or renewal, or directed to their nearest District 
Area Coordinator. The area-based project office in the 
eThekwini model serves as a precedent (cf. Chapter 2).
The onerous requirement of both an identity document 
(ID) and a municipal account number to register on the 
e-Services system, should be made flexible to allow
for an ID (or passport number for foreign nationals) to
be sufficient for those prospective traders who reside
in rented or informal accommodation. In addition, a
proof-of-residence affidavit from a local ward councillor
(Kretzmann, 2015) should suffice for proof of address
requirements for those in informal accommodation.
For applicants who are not IT literate, the requirement
for an email address should fall way, and assistance
with online applications in the proposed walk-in centre
should be given.
The research findings reveal that no differentiated 
support structures exist for survivalist and 
entrepreneurial street traders, resulting in their context 
specific needs not being met. Firstly, entrepreneurial 
traders should be allowed the opportunity to expand 
by paying more for extra trading bays (cf. Chapter 2; 
Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). These would have to be outside 
the city centre due to the scarcity of bays in this area. 
The current permit management system (as informed 
by the Informal Trading By-law) does not allow for the 
allocation of more than one bay per individual, ostensibly 
to provide access to a greater number of potential 
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traders (cf. Chapter 5). While the system does allow for 
assistants to be registered along with the primary renter 
of the bay, regulations do not allow for the possibility 
that entrepreneurial traders renting multiple bays could 
potentially employ greater numbers of assistants, than 
would be possible at the micro scale of an individual 
bay. Increased permit revenue from the creation of 
additional bays across the metro, in line with directives 
in the current City SDF, would allow for the opportunity 
to lower costs and improve access to survivalist traders 
through cross-subsidisation.
Secondly, the current Informal Trading By-law only 
allows for the transfer of permits to a family member 
or assistant in the case of death, or temporary transfer 
in the case of illness, pregnancy, family responsibility, 
religious or cultural issues. However, the financial 
security of the trader is still limited, and the trading 
permit cannot be used an asset to secure loans or be sold 
between traders. There is thus an opportunity to reform 
the Informal Trading By-law to allow for the tradeability 
of permits. This exchange could occur in a marketplace 
mechanism established and managed by the City. The 
City would provide a guarantee against trading bays, 
backed by a guarantee fund. Negotiations with financial 
institutions could enable the trading permit to be 
accepted as collateral against loans by traders. In the 
event of loan default, ownership of the bay would revert 
back to the City. Further research could be conducted 
into the viability of such a proposal. As an alternative, 
the Bangkok example could be followed, with trading 
permits allowing access to social welfare payments via 
the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), as well 
as being accepted as loan collateral by South African 
banks. In so doing, trader registration and fee payment 
would be incentivised (cf. Chapter 2).
Lastly, as argued by Turok et al. (2017), the gradual 
phasing in of certain standards and regulations could 
allow traders to build up their resources and capabilities. 
This approach would incentivise compliance, instead of 
penalising non-compliance.
6.3.1.3. Trader associations
Trader leaders note that trader associations and provincial 
coalitions suffer from a lack of unity (cf. Chapter 5), but 
the possible reduction in tensions between associations 
as a result of the proposals contained in this chapter 
could allow for consolidated and more representative 
trader association membership of the Western Cape 
Informal Traders Coalition (WCITC). The WCITC and UKITA 
(United Khayelitsha Informal Traders Association) are 
currently in the process of amalgamating (cf. Chapter 5), 
and this presents an opportunity for greater bargaining 
power in negotiations with the City. Representivity and 
democracy can also be fostered in trader associations 
and coalitions through organisational and leadership 
training as highlighted earlier.
The higher profile that a broader trader body would 
give street trading in Cape Town would not only assist 
in efforts to highlight the importance of street trading 
to employment, food security and the economy of 
the city, but also aid in sourcing funding. In addition 
to City sources, national and provincial small business 
development, and private sector CSI and donor funding 
sources can be sought. An increase in revenue would 
allow for greater internal capacity in trader associations 
and provincial coalitions, and enable more extensive 
lobbying and development efforts. Internal training and 
support, forming of cooperatives, developing access 
to credit or bulk buying, and applying for government 
tenders (cf. Chapter 2; Lindell, 2010) would become 
more feasible. Radio can also play a role in providing 
a reliable channel of communication between traders 
themselves, and with the general public (Roever, 2010; 
cf. Chapter 2). As such, trader coalitions should look into 
developing a radio programme, in conjunction with a 
local NGO (e.g. StreetNet, WIEGO), to promote street 
trader development, organisational activities, and public 
expression of issues facing traders. This programme 
could be aired regularly on a local radio station. The 
Gente de Confiar (“People of Trust”) radio programme 
in Lima, Peru serves as a precedent (Roever, 2010).
6.3.1.4. Spaces of participation 
As argued by Winkler (2011; cf. Chapter 2), state-led 
public participation in South Africa is ineffective and 
lacks transformative potential due to the deepening 
centralisation of decision making, a focus on performance 
management, and the powerful role of politics in 
planning. Research findings confirm these elements in 
the management of street trading in the Cape Town city 
centre, particularly in the City-led ‘invited spaces’ of 
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engagement and policy making (cf. Chapter 5). While, 
the existing and proposed structures for participation 
may have the potential to lead to more transformative 
outcomes, I propose that the City moves towards Heller’s 
“optimist conflict model” of participatory democracy and 
responsive government (2001, cited in Winkler, 2011). 
As Winkler notes, active citizenry is one aspect of this 
model. Hence, the trader association capacity building 
and self-funding proposals I put forward in this chapter 
will aid in their abilities to challenge public policy and 
claim spaces for participation. 
Another aspect of the model is a more responsive 
state “so that the boundaries between claimed and 
invited spaces for participation may become more 
permeable” (Winker, 2011:267). This will require that 
the City re-designs the current and proposed spaces of 
participation in street trading management and policy, 
so that they are not merely ‘tick box’ exercises that fulfil 
constitutional requirements (cf. Chapter 1 and 2). They 
must become more inclusive, responsive, and effective, 
even if trade-offs in outcomes are necessary. However, 
this change will require political will. While the City’s new 
‘area-based service delivery’ structure has the potential 
to improve responsiveness as well as the participatory 
potential of its street trading management approach, 
recent shifts towards more pro-poor policies highlight a 
growing political will. This could hopefully one day lead 
to a necessary “step-by-step process of radical reform 
and social learning in all domains of public action” 
(Friedmann 1987:407).
6.3.2. Street trading policy and 
management recommendations for 
the Grand Parade
6.3.2.1. Street trading management 
function
One of the primary issues affecting street trading on 
the Grand Parade is the convoluted and ineffectual 
management arrangement between the City’s Strategic 
Assets, Property Management and former Economic 
Development Departments. There is no clear mandate 
for, or experience with, street trading management in 
the Strategic Assets Department that is tasked with 
operational issues on the Parade. Research findings reveal 
the tensions this arrangement creates and the negative 
effects on trader livelihoods. I therefore recommend that 
the responsibility for street trading management on the 
Parade be moved from the Strategic Assets Department 
to the new Area Economic Development function within 
the Area-based Management Directorate. This is the 
case in the rest of the city centre, which falls under Area 
North in the City’s new structure (cf. Chapter 5). 
Doing so would necessitate an agreement between these 
two departments, as the Strategic Assets Department 
would still be the asset owner. However, revenues from 
trading permits on the Parade should be ring-fenced 
together with permit revenue from the rest of Area 
North (stretching form Atlantis to Hout Bay) and used for 
street trading management and development in these 
areas, which is not currently the case (cf. Chapter 5). The 
move of street trading management responsibility to the 
Area Economic Development will also facilitate inclusion 
of all traders on the Parade into the city centre Trading 
Plan. This will allow for trader association engagement 
with the plan.
6.3.2.2. Permits and leases
Research findings reveal that historical processes, and 
the precarious nature of street trading, have created 
the number of different trader associations present 
on the Grand Parade. However, the scarcity of legal 
trading spaces in the city centre and the informal permit 
allocation and revenue collection arrangements on the 
Parade have served to further exacerbate tensions. In 
line with the previous recommendation, I suggest that 
all trading permits and spaces on the Grand Parade 
be allocated via the electronic permit system used 
in the rest of the city centre. Not only will this create 
more transparency in permit allocation and revenue 
collection, it will also serve to reduce tensions between 
trader associations. While a shift to the electronic permit 
system may remove a revenue stream for associations 
on the Parade, other sources of funding are suggested 
in section 6.3.1.3 above.
Individual leases for the food kiosks would remain the 
responsibility of the Property Management Department, 
but I recommend a thorough audit of these leases and 
a re-negotiation and signing of new leases to provide 
tenure security for kiosk holders. Rents should be 
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determined in conjunction with kiosk holders to ensure 
affordability. These may be below market value, but 
the City needs to acknowledge the employment, social 
development and food security function that street food 
trading plays on the Grand Parade.
6.3.2.3. Use of space on the Grand 
Parade
The scarcity of legal trading spaces in the City centre 
(only 410 street trading bays) promotes sub-letting 
and hence further informality (cf. Chapter 5). While 
urban management considerations such as pedestrian 
movement and safety must be kept in mind, there exists 
an opportunity to expand the opportunities available to 
street traders in the city centre. As stated in the 2017 
Draft Cape Town SDF,  “well-located and appropriately 
designed” street trading facilities should be provided 
in “suitable public assembly points, such as transport 
interchanges, public spaces, parking areas and road 
reserves (where appropriate)” (CoCT, 2017e:197). 
The Grand Parade is such a public space and it experiences 
significant pedestrian flows to and from the adjacent 
transport interchange. It is therefore a ‘natural market’ 
(Sinha and Roever, 2011; cf. Chapter 2). However, only 
half of the Grand Parade is given over to street trading 
and the rest is used irregularly as an events space. Even 
the half of the Parade where trading is allowed is only 
fully utilised on Wednesdays and Saturdays. I propose a 
more flexible approach to trading permit allocation on 
the Parade. 
On the western half of the Parade where street 
trading is currently allowed, further trading permits 
can be allocated to allow new traders to operate on 
the remaining 5 days of the week in the same spaces 
currently allocated to Wednesday and Saturday traders. 
These new traders would need to vacate the spaces on 
these days, but could plan around this. On the eastern 
half of the Parade where street trading is currently 
prohibited, trading spaces could be allocated for daily 
trading, 7 days a week, with event planning taking 
cognisance of sufficient notice to traders in the case 
of interruptions to trading (e.g. minimum 2 weeks). If 
events are planned months in advance this schedule 
could be widely communicated and negotiated by the 
City with traders. Permit conditions could reflect these 
uses in both cases. 
This proposal would fulfill a number of needs. Firstly, 
as identified in Chapter 5, the Grand Parade has lost 
its ‘sense of place’ due to neglect, crime, and a loss 
of concentrated use and ‘vibrancy’, which are all 
interlinked. This has negatively affected trader incomes. 
While many of the socio-economic factors affecting 
the Parade require broader municipal, provincial and 
national interventions, it can be argued that more 
intense use of the Parade would serve to not only 
support trader livelihoods, but also perhaps reduce 
current concentrations of homelessness and drug 
dealing on the Parade. This could in turn improve safety 
perceptions on the Parade, in turn increasing potential 
customer numbers. It should be noted, however,  that 
the intention of this proposal is not to displace homeless 
persons from the Parade to other areas of the city. There 
should be stronger involvement from the City’s Social 
Development Department, in coordination with street 
trading management of the Parade, to address the 
needs of the homeless individuals who currently make 
the Parade their home. Through coordinated long-term 
support, some of these individuals could perhaps one 
day trade from a bay on the Parade.
Secondly, from a City perspective, this more intense 
use would not only provide better ‘asset maximisation’ 
of the Parade through increased permit revenues, it 
would also serve to further the developmental goals 
contained in the City’s Informal Trading Policy, and thus 
be politically advantageous. It would also focus public 
attention on the importance of street trading in public 
spaces, in terms of employment, food security and 
more broadly acknowledging the right to the city of 
marginalised citizens.
The City’s recently stated goal of linking street trading to 
tourism (cf. Chapter 5) could be achieved on the Grand 
Parade by attracting tourists through the ‘vibrancy’ 
that more intense use would create. While heritage 
concerns could be raised given the history of the Parade 
and surrounds, these could be addressed through 
improved maintenance and management of the Parade, 
as well as involvement of the South African Heritage 
Resources Agency (SAHRA) in the process. In addition, 
City-funded permanent trading stalls, designed based 
on trader inputs and in keeping with heritage-approved 
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aesthetics, could be installed on the western half of 
the Parade. These would provide better shelter from 
the elements, give a sense of permanence to traders 
(with generational histories on the Parade), and visually 
demonstrate the City’s commitment to trading on the 
Grand Parade (cf. Chapter 2 for stall examples from 
Durban and Johannesburg). The trading stalls could be 
funded through a combination of permit and rental 
revenue, the municipal infrastructure grant, as well as 
donor and private sector corporate social investment 
funding sources. Permanent trading stalls in other areas 
of the City could generate revenue through the sale of 
advertising space on their surfaces.
City officials acknowledge the limited funding and 
personnel capacity of the Informal Trading function 
in the City (cf. Chapter 5). However, the increased 
administration of managing extra traders on the 
Parade would not present a significant increase to their 
current workload considering the current number of 
trading bays in the city centre (410). In addition, the 
proposal in section 6.3.1.1 above, on how to increase 
budgets for street trading management, would assist 
in expanding the capacity of the department. Existing 
trader associations would be free to recruit members 
from these new traders. While this may create some 
competition between associations in the short term, 
inclusion of new traders into existing structures would 
decrease the possibility of further associations forming, 
and thus prevent increased fragmentation and tensions 
in the long term.
In light of current City plans to renovate the Parade, this 
proposal comes at an appropriate time when innovative 
thinking and a new approach to the Parade can be 
possible.
6.3.2.4. Storage and trolley pushers
The impulse in planning is often to fix and order. This 
does not allow for flexibility in responding to the fluidity 
and transience that informality embodies, and the 
negative impacts and resistance that can be produced 
among those who planners think they are planning for. 
Recommendations could be made for the construction 
of storage space on the Parade. This would mean traders 
would not have to negotiate and pay for storage space 
in nearby streets and District Six, or trolley pushers to 
transport stall components and stock to and from the 
Parade (cf. Chapter 4). This would particularly benefit 
female traders who face unequal power balances in 
such negotiations. However, I choose not to make this 
recommendation. Providing storage would not only 
render these trolley pushers unemployed, but would 
disrupt a network of social relations and informal 
arrangements that have built up over time. As most 
of these trolley pushers are allegedly foreign migrants, 
this may be one of their few livelihood opportunities. 
In the interests of equity in planning decision-making 
(Fainstein, 2010; cf. Chapter 2), the interests of these 
vulnerable individuals should be respected.
6.3.2.5. Self-management
City officials state that they are investigating the possibility 
of part or full self-management of street trading markets 
in appropriate contexts (cf. Chapter 5). They suggest that 
the Grand Parade could be a candidate for such a model. 
While there are benefits to self-management, I argue in 
Chapter 5 that this is premature. The current tensions 
between trader associations on the Parade, and the 
lack of existing trader capacity, serve to hamper any 
successful self-management of trading. What is needed, 
first, is broader unity among associations and capacity 
building, which will both take time to gain momentum. 
Shifting to the electronic permitting system will reduce 
some of the tensions, but greater inclusion of trader 
associations in decision-making processes, through a 
commitment by the City to create a city-centre multi-
stakeholder street trading committee, a street trader 
forum, and the holding of regular area-based street 
trading management committee meetings (cf. section 
6.3.1.1) will serve to further reduce tensions. As in 
the eThekwini model, dedicated municipal support for 
trader capacitation will help address the fragmentation 
of trader associations. 
This support should take the form of dedicated business 
development, leadership and organisational training 
and mentorship programs, thus going some way to 
fulfilling directives in the Informal Trading Policy. These 
programmes would be facilitated by independent 
parties such as NGOs (c.f. section 6.3.1.1) and dedicated 
training and mentorship providers. Funding by the City 
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could be sourced from a combination of permit revenue, 
national and provincial small business development 
funding (eg. via NIBUS; cf. Chapter 2), and private sector 
CSI and donor funders.
The City has also recently signed an agreement 
outsourcing street trading management of Greenmarket 
Square and St Georges Mall to the CCID (cf. Chapter 5). 
However, research has shown (cf. Chapter 2; Lindell and 
Appelblad, 2009; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015) that contracting 
street trading management to private companies or 
CIDs can have negative impacts on trader livelihoods. 
These models are not trader-centric, the managing 
agents have little experience or understanding of the 
needs of traders, and the models are not financially 
secure due to reliance on internal or CID levy funding. 
In addition, the profit imperative and lack of social 
development mandate of these operators do not serve 
the best interests of street traders. I thus caution against 
any move towards privatised street management on the 
Grand Parade.  In any case, it does not currently fall 
within the jurisdiction of the CCID, and should remain 
so in order to prevent further creeping privatised 
management of important public spaces.
6.4 Limitations to the study
Time has been the greatest limitation to this study. 
This has limited me from spending enough time with 
research participants prior to engaging in interviews, 
in order to build a level of trust and rapport. Interviews 
were disruptive to participants, as their lack of free time 
necessitated conducting interviews at their stalls. With 
additional time, I would also have been able to engage 
more research participants, thereby giving greater depth 
to the findings.
A second limitation has been the organisational 
inaccessibility of the City of Cape Town. The convoluted 
and opaque nature of the street trading management 
structure on the Grand Parade, as well the City’s 
organisational structure more broadly, meant that a 
significant amount of time and effort was spent locating 
the appropriate City officials to interview. The current 
organisational restructuring in the City administration 
exacerbated this. My experience pales in comparison 
to the difficulty street traders face in deciphering and 
accessing this structure (cf. Chapter 5).
The final limitation has been the focus on street trading 
management. While this research is concerned with 
the impacts of the City’s street trading management 
approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the 
Grand Parade, a major finding has been that broader 
socio-economic factors, beyond the purview of street 
trading management, impact on trader livelihoods. 
These need to be addressed. Unfortunately due to time 
constraints, I was unable to analyse and address these 
aspects fully.
A number of the recommendations contained in 
this study require increased budget allocations, 
organisational changes, and the political will to do so. 
I acknowledge this and have sought to provide paths to 
address these limitations. 
6.5. Reflections 
Before embarking on research, I held a preconception 
that the City’s approach to street trading was repressive 
and lacked any supportive aspects. This was partly 
based on reports of trader relocations in the run-up to 
the 2010 Soccer World Cup. Instead, I found significantly 
developmental aims in the City’s Informal Trading Policy, 
that were hampered by the context within street trading 
management occurs. In addition, I found that the City 
is neither monolithic nor omnipotent (Winkler, 2011), 
and that there are individuals within the City that have 
a deep understanding of street trading and empathy 
for traders. While they operate within the political and 
structural constraints of municipal administration, they 
endeavour to actively promote trader livelihoods and 
provide a degree of resistance to moves that threaten 
these.
I also knew little of the lived experiences of street 
traders. While I had an inkling of the struggles they face 
in securing their livelihoods, they privileged me with 
a generous sharing of their daily struggles. I found a 
diverse and fragmented group of individuals still trying 
to recover from past spatial and social injustices, and 
using their agency to actively resist efforts by the City to 
deny them their right to the city. 
I feel the allocated time, and the nature of dissertation 
research, result in an extractive exercise towards the 
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lives of vulnerable research participants. In the interests 
of honest research, dissertations should not sit gathering 
dust on university bookshelves. Research should be 
framed with a view to ensuring the practical applicability 
of findings and recommendations. For whom is one 
researching, and to what end?
I intend to give all trader research participants a copy 
of my study. I intend sharing my study with City officials 
involved in street trading management, as well as NGOs 
involved in street trading activism and broader social 
justice concerns. And I endeavour to follow up with City 
officials and these organisations, to ascertain whether 
the recommendations in this study can be put to use.
6.6. Conclusion
In conclusion, Chapter 1 presented the issue under 
investigation, as well as the main research question. 
Chapter 1 went on to introduce the case study area and 
the research methods used to undertake this study. 
Chapter 2 contained an in-depth review of the relevant 
literature. This literature review was used to establish 
subsidiary research questions. In turn, criteria for 
assessing the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management approach on the livelihood 
strategies of traders on the Grand Parade were derived 
from these subsidiary research questions.
Chapter 3 outlined the research methods and techniques 
used to undertake the study, as well as their limitations. 
A more detailed context of the case study area was 
provided. The chapter also contained a discussion on 
the ethical considerations for completing this research.
Chapter 4 provided a context of the history of street 
trading on the Grand Parade, as well as current 
management arrangements.
Chapter 5 described and analysed the data collected, 
using the assessment criteria established in Chapter 2 in 
order to evaluate the impact of the City of Cape Town’s 
street trading management approach on the livelihood 
strategies of traders on the Grand Parade.
Chapter 6 synthesised the research findings used to 
inform my recommendations. These involved broader 
organisational and policy changes to municipal street 
trading management. Specific recommendations were 
also given for changes to street trading management on 
the Grand Parade, as well as suggestions aimed at street 
trader organisations. All these recommendations have 
the potential to better enable street trader livelihood 
strategies on the Grand Parade, the city centre and the 


















Criminalising the poor 
and hindering livelihood 
strategies
To what extent is the City 
of Cape Town’s street 
trading management 
approach on the Grand 
Parade restrictive?
• The  City’s street trading management
approach on the Grand Parade bears all the
hallmarks of being restrictive.
• It produces informal arrangements, aggression
and resistance on the part of traders.
• The number of street trading bays
in the city centre and on the Grand
Parade should be increased by
making use of unused space on the
Parade for daily trading.
• Investigations into relaxing permit
conditions around food trading be
conducted
Engendering municipal 




and aggression between 
traders
Producing resistance and 
adaptation on the part of 
traders, both individually 
and collectively
Genius loci Concentrated use To what extent does the 
City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management 
approach affect the ‘genius 
loci’ or ‘sense of place’ 
of the Grand Parade, 
and does this support or 
hinder trader livelihood 
strategies?
• The former ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ of
the Parade has been lost due to crime and
neglect.
• The inability of the City’s street trading
management approach on the Parade to
successfully address issues of crime and
neglect hinders trader livelihood strategies.
• Interdepartmental cooperation to
address issues affecting the Parade
should be facilitated through the










 Table 6.1 Summary of Recommendations
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Developmental Ease of access for new 
entrants with limited 
financial capital
To what extent is the City 
of Cape Town’s street 
trading management 
approach on the Grand 
Parade developmental?
• The developmental aims of the City’s Informal
Trading Policy are not borne out in practice.
• Access for new entrants is difficult, there is
limited support to traders, and no area-based
multi-stakeholder engagement forum exists
• No differentiated support structures between
survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders
exist
• Accessibility of the permit
application process should be
improved through use of multiple
languages, communication
channels, and flexibility in
document requirements
• Renting multiple bays should be
allowed to lower costs and improve
access to survivalist traders through
cross-subsidisation.
Support and services to 
sustain livelihoods
Differentiated support 
structures for survivalist 
and entrepreneurial 
street traders.
Pragmatic Street trading 
management based on 
participatory processes
To what extent is the City 
of Cape Town’s street 
trading management 
approach on the Grand 
Parade pragmatic?
• The City’s street trading management approach
is not pragmatic.
• There are limited spaces for participation, and
the forums that do exist lack sufficient relevant
stakeholders, offer limited opportunities for
traders to voice their concerns, and the City
exerts strict control over the narrative of
discussions.
• There has been limited City effort to capacitate
street trader organisations
• No dedicated street trading management
institution or area-based street trading
management processes currently exist.
• The City’s restructuring process, together with
the convoluted street trading management
structure on the Parade serve to limit any
pragmatic management
• The ‘eThekwini model’ should
be used as a precedent for a
participatory and area-based
approach to street trading
management in Cape Town
• A multi-stakeholder street trading
committee for the city centre must
be formed
• A street trader forum for the city
centre must also be formed
• Organisational and skills
development training for trader
organisations must be provided
• The Informal Trading function
in the new ‘area-based service
delivery’ structure of the City must





capacitated street trader 
organisations
Existence of a 
dedicated street trading 
management institution




To what extent does the 
City of Cape Town’s street 
trading management 
practice on the Grand 
Parade align with national 
developmental policies?
• A disjuncture exists between the stated
developmental approach of the City’s
Informal Trading Policy (informed by national
developmental policies) and its practices.
• The combination of organisational
restructuring processes, confused mandates
as well as the low political and funding priority
given to street trading management has meant
that the complex of socio-economic factors and
persistent management issues on the Parade,
that require interdepartmental cooperation to
address, continue to negatively impact trader
livelihoods.
• The responsibility for street trading
management on the Parade must
be moved from the Strategic Assets
Department to the new Area
Economic Development function
within Area-based Management.
• Monitoring and evaluation must be
used to make the case for increased
budget for the Informal Trading
function amid growing political will
towards pro-poor policies.
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REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS AND
DEPARTURE: ERF 4148, GEORGE
Notice is hereby given in terms of Section 45 of the George
Municipality’s By-Law on Municipal Land Use Planning that the
undermentioned application has been received and is open to inspection
during weekdays between 07:45 and 16:30 at the Department: Human
Settlements, Land Affairs and Planning, Civic Centre, 5th Floor, York
Street, George.
Any comments or objections with full reasons therefor, should be
lodged in writing in terms of Section 50 of the said legislation at the
office of the Senior Manager: Land Use Planning, PO Box 19, George,
6530, on or before 12 September 2016, quoting the reference number,
your property description and physical address. Telephonic enquiries in
this regard may be made at 044–801 9473 (Marisa Arries) or e-mail:
marisa@george.org.za. Any person, who is unable to write, can submit
their objection verbally to the Council’s office where they will be
assisted by a staff member to put their comments in writing. Any
comments received after the aforementioned closing date may be
disregarded.
Applicant: Jan Vrolijk, Town Planner
Nature of application
1. Removal in terms of Section 15(2)(f) of the Land Use Planning By
Law (2015) of condition C6(a) and (b) out of the Title Deed of
Erf 4148, George;
2. Departure in terms of Section 15(2)(b) of the mentioned By Law
for the following on Erf 4148, George:
(a) Additional dwelling unit;
(b) Relaxation for the north western side boundary building line
on Erf 4148, George from 3,0m to 0,0m for an additional
dwelling unit.
T BOTHA, MUNICIPAL MANAGER, Civic Centre, York Street,
GEORGE, 6530. Tel: (044) 801 9473, Fax: 086 570 1900
Email: marisa@george.org.za
12 August 2016 54028
GEORGE MUNISIPALITEIT
KENNISGEWING NR: 099/2016
OPHEFFING VAN BEPERKINGS EN
AFWYKING: ERF 4148, GEORGE
Kragtens Artikel 45 van die George Munisipaliteit se Verordening op
Munisipale Grondgebruiksbeplanning word hiermee kennis gegee dat
die onderstaande aansoek ontvang is en ter insae lê gedurende weeks-
dae tussen 07:45 en 16:30 by die Departement: Menslike Nedersettings,
Grondsake en Beplanning, Burgersentrum, 5de Vloer, Yorkstraat,
George.
Enige kommentare of besware met die volledige redes daarvoor, moet
skriftelik in terme van Artikel 50 van die genoemde wetgewing by die
kantoor van die Senior Bestuurder: Grondgebruikbeplanning, Posbus
19, George, 6530 ingedien word op of voor 12 Septemner 2016, met
vermelding van die verwysingsnommer, u eiendomsbeskrywing en
fisiese adres. Telefoniese navrae in hierdie verband kan gerig word by
044–801 9473 (Marisa Arries) of e-pos: marisa@george.org.za. Indien
’n persoon nie kan skryf nie, kan sodanige persoon sy beswaar monde-
lings by die Raad se kantoor aflê waar ’n persooneellid sal help om die
kommentaar op skrif te stel. Enige kommentaar wat na die voorge-
melde sluitingsdatum ontvang word, mag moontlik nie in ag geneem
word nie.
Aansoeker: Jan Vrolijk, Stadsbeplanner
Aard van aansoek:
1. Opheffing ingevolge Artikel 15(2)(f) van die Verordening op
Grondgebruiksbeplanning (2015) van voorwaarde C6(a) en (b) uit
die Titelakte van Erf 4148, George;
2. Afwyking in terme van Artikel 15(2)(b) van die genoemde
Verordening vir die volgende op Erf 4148, George:
(a) Addisionele wooneenheid;
(b) Verslapping van die noord westelike sygrens boulyn op
Erf 4148, George vanaf 3,0m na 0,0m vir ’n addisionele
wooneenheid.
T BOTHA, MUNISIPALE BESTUURDER, Burgersentrum, Yorkstraat,
GEORGE, 6530. Tel: (044) 801 9473, Faks: 086 570 1900
Epos: marisa@george.org.za
12 Augustus 2016 54028
CITY OF CAPE TOWN
INFORMAL TRADING PLAN FOR WARD 77, BEING
CAPE TOWN CBD AND IMMEDIATE SURROUNDS
Notice is hereby given that Provincial Gazettes 5099 dated 13 Dec
1996, 5447 dated 13 June 1997, 5195 dated 7 November 1997, 5301
dated 6 November 1998 and 6379 dated 8 September 2006 has been
repealed and replaced with this amended Notice.
Notice is hereby given in terms of the City of Cape Town Informal
Trading By-law promulgated on 20 November 2009 that:
(1) The areas bounded by Kloofnek Road, Signal Hill, Buitengracht
Road, Somerset Road, Table Bay Boulevard, Tennant Road and De
Waal Drive, as indicated on Annexure 1 which accompanies this
notice, is an area in which the carrying on the business of street
vendor, pedlar or hawker is prohibited with the exception of
certain defined informal trading areas as indicated on attached
plans namely Annexures 2 to Annexure 62.
(2) The area constituted by trading bays, reflected on the attached
plans of the demarcation, be declared as an area in which carrying
on the business of street vendor, pedlar or hawker is restricted to
persons in possession of a valid permit or lease; and
(3) The abovementioned trading bays be let out by means of a permit
or lease and that no street vending, peddling or hawking be
permitted in the demarcated bays in the area indicated above if a
person is not in possession of a valid permit or lease for that
particular trading bay.
ACHMAT EBRAHIM, CITY MANAGER
STAD KAAPSTAD
INFORMELEHANDELSPLAN VIR WYK 77, NAAMLIK
KAAPSTAD-SAKEKERN EN ONMIDDELLIKE OMGEWING
Kennisgewing geskied hiermee dat Provinsiale Koerante 5099 van
13 Desember 1996, 5447 van 13 Junie 1997, 5195 van 7 November
1997, 5301 van 6 November 1998 en 6379 van 8 September 2006
herroep is en deur hierdie gewysigde kennisgewing vervang word.
Kennisgewing geskied hiermee ingevolge die Stad Kaapstad: Veror-
dening op Informele Handel, afgekondig op 20 November 2009, dat:
(1) Die gebied omgrens deur Kloofnekweg, Seinheuwel, Buiten-
grachtstraat, Somersetweg, Tafelbaai-boulevard, Tennantweg en
De Waalrylaan, soos aangetoon in bylae 1 by hierdie kennis-
gewing, ’n gebied is waar die bedryf van die besigheid van straat-
verkoper, venter of smous verbied word, met die uitsondering van
sekere omskrewe informelehandelsgebiede soos aangetoon op die
aangehegte planne, naamlik Bylae 2 tot Bylae 62.
(2) Die gebied bestaande uit die handelsplekke op die aangehegte
planne van afbakening, verklaar word as ’n gebied waar die bedryf
van die besigheid van straatverkoper, venter of smous beperk word
tot persone in besit van ’n geldige permit of huurkontrak; en
(3) Bogenoemde handelsplekke verhuur word deur middel van ’n
permit of huurkontrak en dat geen straatverkope, ventery of
smousery toegelaat word in die afgebakende handelsplekke wat
hierbo aangetoon word indien ’n persoon nie in besit van ’n gel-
dige permit of huurkontrak vir daardie betrokke handelsplek is nie.
ACHMAT EBRAHIM, STADSBESTUURDER
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Application for Approval of Ethics in Research (EiR) Projects      
Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of Cape Town 
Page 1 of 2 
APPLICATION FORM 
Please Note: 
Any person planning to undertake research in the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment (EBE) at the 
University of Cape Town is required to complete this form before collecting or analysing data.The objective of 
submitting this application prior to embarking on research is to ensure that the highest ethical standards in 
research, conducted under the auspices of the EBE Faculty, are met. Please ensure that you have read, and 
understood the EBE Ethics in Research Handbook(available from the UCT EBE, Research Ethics website) 
prior to completing this application form: http://www.ebe.uct.ac.za/usr/ebe/research/ethics.pdf 
APPLICANT’S DETAILS 
Name of principal researcher, student or 
external applicant   
Jens Horber 
Department School of Architecture, Planning and Geomatics 
Preferred email address of applicant: HRBJEN001@myuct.ac.za 
If a Student 
Your Degree: 
e.g., MSc, PhD, etc.,
MCRP 
Name of Supervisor (if 
supervised): 
Associate Professor Tanja Winkler 
If this is a researchcontract, indicate the 
source of funding/sponsorship 
Click here to enter text. 
Project Title 
An investigation of the City of Cape Town’s current management 
of informal trade, its informal  
trade policies, and ways in which the participatory processes 
followed by the City can be made more equitable, in an effort to 
better enable informal trading in the Cape Town city centre.  
I hereby undertake to carry out my research in such a way that: 
 there is no apparent legal objection to the nature or the method of research; and
 the research will not compromise staff or students or the other responsibilities of the University;
 the stated objective will be achieved, and the findings will have a high degree of validity;
 limitations and alternative interpretations will be considered;
 the findings could be subject to peer review and publicly available; and
 I will comply with the conventions of copyright and avoid any practice that would constitute plagiarism.
SIGNED BY Full name Signature Date 
Principal Researcher/ 
Student/External applicant 
Jens Skouboe Christensen 
Horber 
22 Jun 2017 
APPLICATION APPROVED BY Full name Signature Date 




HOD (or delegated nominee) 
Final authority for all applicants 
who have answered NO to all 
questions in Section1; and for all 
Undergraduateresearch (Including 
Honours). 
Click here to enter text. 
Click here to 
enter a date. 
Chair : Faculty EIR Committee 
For applicants other than 
undergraduate students who have 
Click here to enter text. 
Click here to 
enter a date. 
